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Representation and Ideology 
Allan J. Parsons 
Abstract 
It is argued that advertisements constitute a 
semiotic social resource. A communicative practice is 
realised using this resource which is part of the commercial 
function of advertising. However, this communicative 
practice is shown to be a limited meaning production. 
Advertising is theorised as a discursive social 
practice in which a communicative practice has become 
dominant. The discursive practice works ideologically, not 
simply communicatively or commercially. 
The ideological operation is understood as the 
address of social subjects in local historical situations. 
Advertisements present a unified position from which the 
text can be understood as communicative. That position is 
imbricated with representations constituted by the text, as 
the other of the ego 
The ego is imbricated with an order of discourse, 
which is a field of unevenly developed discursive practices. 
Through the overdetermination of the text in discursive 
social practice, the imbrications are hierarchised to con-
struct representations of the 'real'. The 'real' is socially 
constituted. It is not a simple ontological priority. 
The institutional intentionality of marketing 
practice authorises the communicative practice. Thus, the 
authorised practice is enacted and resisted, or deconstructed, 
through a series of readings of advertisements from British 
magazines between 1956 and 1964. That period is considered 
to be one in which advertising was consolidated, both in 
corporate strategies and technologically in the public media. 
The deconstructive reading reinstates the discursive pro-
ductions marginalised by the communicative practice. 
Advertisements are not simply reciprocal conversat-
ions freely developed between ego and other. Advertising as 
discourse is developed in the context of economic corporations' 
strategies. 
Advertisements encode, reiterate and constitute 
social subjects, through overdetermination, in relations of 
power. Ideologically, when formed as a communicative practice, 
advertisements jOin social subjects with an hegemonised order 
of power relations, which are realised in an extended social 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This Introduction is taken up by, first, an outline 
of the object of study and the overall aim of the thesis, 
second, a summary account of the conditions of existence of 
that object of study and the material forms in which it is 
realised and, third, an outline of the structure and contents 
of chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
The term advertising may be recognised to have a 
composite character. In one sense, it may be taken to refer 
to the entire institutional site wherein specific textual 
constructions, advertisements, are produced as part of over-
all, planned marketing strategies. Those strategies aim to 
distribute and to sell commodities in the form of goods and 
services, while researching how those commodities may be 
shaped into phenomena that might be desired. In a second 
sense, advertising may be taken to refer to the way certain 
texts are conventionally recognised. They are recognised to 
operate as advertising certain products, by way of command-
ing the inscribed addressees both to look at and to buy the 
represented commodities. Alternatively, advertising may be 
taken to refer to the set of textual constructs themselves, 
as if they constituted a formal unity, as a genre in the 
media of mass communication for example. Finally, advertis-
ing may be taken to refer to an underlying system of values 
and ideas, a cultural system or a meaning system, which can 
be deciphered from the set of textual constructs. 
The object of study is the advertisement as 
an institutional resource and advertisements as the material 
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means of realisation of that institution. The advertisement 
is not theorised as a primarily formal unity. The term 
advertisement is to be recognised in this thesis as referring 
both to a conventionally recognised form and to a theoretic-
ally reconstructed object of study, a social and institutional 
resource. 
It is argued that if advertisements are that which, 
when presented to a reader, only point to a product persuas-
ively, and thereby recommend purchase,then what are called 
commonly advertisements are more properly texts of a greater 
complexity. As complex texts they contain, nevertheless, 
the possibility of being construed as advertisements in that 
strict sense of being persuasive indicators, given the so-
called targetted reader constructed by marketing practices. 
It is the aim of marketing and advertising pract-
itioners to construct presentations which can be read as 
advertisements in the narrow sense. Such an intention is 
realised if the reader construes textual presentations 
from the position of the consumer. The consumer becomes 
the inscribed reader position which secures the realisation 
of that marketing intention. 
What are discussed in this thesis, then, are the 
relationships between the narrowly conceived advertisement 
and the wider field of textuality upon which such texts 
draw. Furthermore, there is an explicit refusal to realise 
simply the intention encoded in marketing practitioners' 
practice. Reading as a consumer is constructed asa poss-
ibility while that possibility is resisted actively. The 
'meaning' of advertisements, previously understood largely 
- 6 -
in terms of the realisation of marketing alms, becomes 
opened to other possible principles of production. 
If the object of study is defined as advertise-
ments, then advertisements are to be understood as both 
the dominant text and the field of textuality in which 
those texts are inscribed and through which they are realised. 
As a field of textuality, advertisements constitute an inst-
itutional, social resource. Such a resource is overdetermined 
(I) in relation to the extended institutional order in which 
it, ln turn, is inscribed. The contextualising institutional 
order to which advertisements belong is to be understood, 
first, in terms of the dominance of advertising and market-
ing over their product and, second, in terms of the more com-
plex order of the social totality in which advertising and 
marketing are inscribed as forms of economic practice. 
It is the institutional, social resource constituted 
by advertisements that is focused. Advertisements are deemed 
to have a relative independence, in terms of their institut-
ional operation, from the contexts in which they are over-
determined. Yet those contexts are inscribed in the mode of 
operation of advertisements, as part of that to which the 
institutional operation may make reference, may take for 
granted and may rework. Advertisements are theorised as 
one constitutive social institution within an extended 
institutional order. Thus, while the mode of operation of 
advertisements cannot be explained wholly by reducing them 
to their contextual determinants, neither can they be con-
sidered to be fully autonomous domain. Reading advertise-
ments comes to be understood as a relatively autonomous, but 
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overdetermined, practice which exploits and utilises the 
textual resource which advertisements constitute. 
Advertisements become the dominant texts in a 
field of textuality. They do so through the enactment of 
a given practice of reading which encodes the aim of realis-
ing a mode of intentionality constructed 1n marketing practice. 
It is argued that reading advertisements as a consumer 
constitutes a communicative practice. It is argued further 
that if the form of that practice is not resisted it will 
tend to operate as a means of securing the hegemonised (2) 
institutional order of the social totality by which it 1S 
contextualised. It will tend to do so, first, in realis-
ing the more immediate ends of marketing practitioners, 
through instituting a given communicative practice in which 
commercial processes and commercial relationships are 
registered and foregrounded. Commercialised social relations 
become discursively legitimated. Second, less immediately 
but no less importantly, a contribution is made to securing 
the dominance of economic institutions in the extended order 
of the social totality. This is achieved by strengthening, 
reworking and extending the discursive institutions through 
which commercial relationships may be understood to pervade 
the entirety of the social. 
Advertisements as conceived here relate the more 
concrete phenomena of daily reiterated social practices to 
the more abstract but no less symbolically and materially 
instituted phenomena by means of which extended social order 
is maintained and secured. Reading advertisements as a con-
sumer is one small part of a much more complex network of 
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of institutional practices which secure an hegemonised 
order. Reading advertisments deconstructively (3), the 
aim of this thesis, operates as a means of resisting that 
tendential drift toward legitimising, or giving consent, 
to an hegemonised order. 
Reading advertisements deconstructively is a 
strategy of resistance, but it is a very limited strategy. 
It is not designed to achieve the overturning of the entire 
extended institutional order of a social totality at one 
stroke. Total social revolution is deferred in favour of a 
tactic of resisting hegemonisation by enacting deconstructions, 
in place, of the constituent institutional practices by means 
of which hegemonic order is realised. In terms of advertise-
ments, this resistance may be understood as a reworking of a 
field of textuality by another discursive practice in which 
is enacted a deconstructive reading of the social institution 
constituted by advertisements. 
In that reworking the communicative practice which 
is authorised by marketing practitioners, and therepre-
sentational structures it permits, is shown to be a limited 
and interested use of social resources. Such a communicative 
practice allows a certain punctuation and closure of discourse. 
Deconstruction reopens communicative practice to discursive 
practice, and questions the authority of marketing to impose 
limitations upon discourse. 
A complex theorisation of advertisements is con-
structed. The theorisation is complex in order, first, to 
take account of marketing and advertising practitioners' 
problematics and the inscriptions they mark out in the field 
of textuality which advertisements constitute. Second, 
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the theorisation is designed to take account of the issues 
raised and the frameworks introduced and developed by the 
critics of advertising, both as an institutionalised 
practice and as a discursive practice in which a communicat-
ive practice is inscribed. Third, the theorisation is con-
structed so as to remain consistent to the concept of mean-
ing as production. Adhering to the principle that meaning 
is a discursive social product makes necessary the concept 
of deconstruction, both in its more negative sense of 
resistance to dominant meanings and its more positive sense 
of inaugurating novel meaning productions from existing 
structures. 
The complexity is necessary in order to attend 
to these issues which relate to the more obvious functions 
and the less obvious operations which advertisements can 
perform. The deconstructive reading practice aims to show 
the discursive articulation of a communicative practice, 
which is part of a pragmatic function, and its overdeter-
mined ideological operation. 
The preceding discussion concerns the general, 
theoretical conception of the object of study and the over-
all aims of the thesis. A less abstract characterisation of 
advertisements is possible, given that the institutional 
resource which is the theoretical object of study is realised 
in material forms that are recognisable in the phenomenal 
worlds of daily reiterated social practice. Are not advertis-
ments, as the dominant texts in a field of textuality, dis-
ributed in a certain place? Are they not produced for given 
audiences who consider them relevant during a specific time 
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of reading in a given historical period? Are they not pro-
duced in definite material media forms? 
The advertisements selected for study in this 
thesis are taken from magazines printed in Britain between 
the years of 1956 and 1964. The place, the medium and the 
period are understood as contextualising factors and as 
conditions of existence for the communicative practice of 
advertising and the discursive domain in which it is inscribed. 
A brief sketch of these factors and conditions is therefore 
set out in this introduction. 
The industrial conditions for modern advertising 
emerged in the 1920's, in the united States in the first 
instance ( 4) • In the United Kingdom, as indeed in the 
united States itself, the dramatic expansion of advertising 
did not begin until the early 1950's (5). By that time in 
the united Kingdom, the Conservative Party had gained a 
majority in Parliament, a majority which they increased in 
1955 (6). The post-war dominance "of socialist policies was 
being revised. Socialist government was deemed to produce 
'austerity', while Conservative government led to 'affluence'. 
Many signs were adduced as confirmation of this political 
wisdom, for example, the end of rationing restrictions and 
those on hire purchase, the lifting of import restrictions, 
the boom in house building, and the greater availability of 
consumer artefacts (7). 
All of these improvements were deemed to be taking 
place in the context of a 'managerial revolution' in which 
the very structures of industrial organisation were being 
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reformed (8). The repercussions of this industrial reorgan-
isation were, in turn, held to have significance in terms of 
the social structure more generally. Older class-based 
antagonisms were assumed to be out-dated. They were being 
replaced by other kinds of social distinctions. The connect-
ion between ownership and control of industrial organisations 
was deemed to be severed (9). The new corporations signalled 
the introduction of a more egalitarian distribution of wealth, 
income, decision-making, and life-chances. 
In 1956 the Suez crisis shook the confidence of 
Conservative politicians, as indeed it did that of the British 
public (10). Suez carne to symbolise that Britain would no 
longer find it easy to realise her political will in the 
recently reformed political-economic world order. The signs 
taken to signify social amelioration hence-forth had to be 
considered against the counterweight of arguments which sought 
to show that Britain was in the process of a prolonged decline 
(11), relative to other industrialised nations. Britain, 
having lost an Empire, was now recognised to be firmly under 
the dominance politically, economically and militarily of 
the United States. 
The political desire of the United States to con-
struct a world economic order over which it might preside 
(12), began to make itself visible inside the European 
nations, and especially Britain. Advertising and the 
emergence of a newly articulated system of media of mass 
communication are but two elements of the capitalist system 
which emerged in the post-1945 period (13). This system 
was dominated by the corporate organisations of the united 
States (14). 
- 12 -
The tendency for coporate enterprises, in the post-
1945 period, has been to move towards becoming conglomerates, 
on the one hand, and to move towards becoming multinational, 
on the other hand. Both strategies serve to stabilize the 
fortunes of large scale industrial enterprises. The former 
makes the corporate body less vulnerable to fluctuations in 
single markets by spreading interest among diverse and 
unrelated fields of production. The latter allows corpor-
ate bodies to be freed relatively from national government 
constraints. This allows them to pursue more wholeheartedly 
corporate interests, to the detriment of the national interest 
which otherwise they might have served in addition. The 
latter strategy is a significant factor in the constitution 
of a world market. 
Corporate industrial organisations, then, assumed 
a greater stability than had been possible for those small 
firms whose competition had previously been the norm (15). 
That greater stability is also encoded in the higher level 
of manufacturing potential which larger industrial units 
permitted. To a large extent, the technological problems of 
production had been solved satisfactorily. 
Given the greater degree of corporate stability 
and the higher levels of production which were possible, 
corporate strategists' major problem became that of con-
structing and maximising markets for their products (16). 
Corporations began to develop marketing strategies which 
involved the use of advertising campaigns. Marketing and 
advertising organisations began to assume a certain 
institutional autonomy from the corporations they served, 
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while remaining very dependent upon those very corporations 
(17) • 
The emergence of marketing as a business practice 
led to the construction of the figure of the consumer. 
S/he was constituted as a complex social phenomenon (18). 
S/he is, at once, the object of research for marketing, 
the posited site of desires. S/he is one of the criteria 
which determine the design of manufactured goods. S/he 
is the inscribed addressee of advertisements. S/he becomes 
the customer who buys the designed, manufactured and advertised 
products. S/he becomes the person who enjoys or uses the 
product and establishes particular patterns of consumption 
behaviour to renew or to replace those pleasures and utilities. 
Depending upon whether it is a practitioner or a 
critic of advertising who defines its role, advertising may 
either be understood as a functional element in an on-going 
economic system or an element of an ideology of consumption. 
In the former perspective, consumption is a more or less 
natural expression of human need, desire and aspiration. In 
the latter perspective, given that there is no fixed nature 
which may be adduced to support a naturalist view of con-
sumption, both desires and consumption patterns are socially 
constructed. 
The ideological character of advertising consists 
in its intervention into the social construction of desire 
and forms of behaviour. Its characteristic limitation is 
that it encodes a set of market-based expectations. As 
such, it would tend to act in the interests of those social 
forces and groups who benefit most from the workings of the 
market. 
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The ideology of consumption to which advertising 
is bound, presupposes that distribution through the market, 
if not equitable, should nevertheless be accepted as 
encoding a certain natural justice and inevitability. This 
belief in the function of the market operates alongside the 
recognition that corporate organisations can instill an 
order into the market which serves as its environment and 
that advertising can be used to stimulate and construct 
markets. While this is a long way short of a total control, 
corporate organisations nevertheless order markets to a 
significant degree. 
It is in the context of operating strategically 
in determinate market-places that advertising began to take 
up a more coherent role in the 1950's in Western societies. 
Improved techniques in both qualitative and quantitive 
research were complemented by the emergence of a new articul-
ation of the media of mass communication. 
Advertising had been an important factor in the 
economy of newspaper and magazine production since the 19th 
century (19). It has taken on a much increased significance 
for all media forms, however, since 1945. Since the mid-
1950's, with the introduction of commercial television, the 
media of mass communication have become an increasingly 
interrelated and self-referential system. That system has 
centred effectively upon television as the dominant form 
(20). The printed media, during the period in which tele-
vision achieved dominance were forced to undergo structural 
changes, both in terms of institutional ownership and control 
and in terms of subject-matter and contents (21). 
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Television tended to compete most aggressively 
with those newspapers and magazines which addressed a large, 
relatively undifferentiated, 'popular' audience (22). In 
doing so, television did not affect significantly the reader-
ship of the so-called quality newspapers, ie. the Observer, 
Sunday Times, Daily Telegraph, Times, etc ... 
In the series of changes by means of which the 
printed media were transformed from the mid-1950's onwards, 
advertising had a significant part to play. It became a 
system of subsidy for printed media and became one major 
criterion in deciding which printed products were commercially 
viable (23). This effectivity of advertising was indirect but 
tended to act in a relatively systematic way. It works in 
the context of a television-centred media system in which 
commercial channels play an important role. Advertising serves 
as a system of finance for half of what is broadcast on tele-
vision (24). In conditions of competition between licence-
financed and advertising-financed television networks, a stress 
upon audience size as one criterion for successful programm-
ing has developed. The programme formulae developed on 
commercial television were perceived to guarantee the 
regular delivery of large audiences for advertisers on the 
commercial channel. Printed media began either to refer to 
these programmes or to adopt and adapt their strategies of 
presentation (25). 
Television standards and criteria carne to operate 
as determinants on other media, notably print. Advertisers 
continued to refine their interest in audience size and 
audience constitution. Magazines, as part of a system of 
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media products, were designed in accord with marketing 
categories, criteria and goals. This begins to exert an 
influence on the forms of presentation used. The 'visual', 
as a complex configuration in print of the photographic, 
the graphic, design, colour and layout begins to be the 
dominant articulation. This configuration displaces the 
previously dominant mode, of the typographic overcoded by 
the literary. 
The women's magazine market was not so immediately 
affected by television competition, paradoxically because 
women, although constituting a large 'mass' market, were 
considered to constitute a specialised audience. In the 
long term, however, even women's magazines have declined 
as a result of television competition. 
In the short term, one of the changes occurring 
to the women's magazine market was that it was becoming 
more diversified. Younger women were being addressed in 
new terms. Advertisers were interested in drawing out the 
resources of a newly formed youth market, whose cash budget 
was largely uncommitted to the household, for example (26). 
In general, the structure of the magazine market 
shifted in the direction of fragmentation. The degree of 
audience specification which magazines could achieve was 
far greater than that which was possible for television (27). 
The advertisements analysed in chapter 4 are all 
taken from magazines during that period when commercial 
television began to be broadcast and during which a tele-
vision-centred system of media was being established. The 
years covered are those in which Britain seemed to be enjoy-
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ing prosperity, and in which marketing and advertising began 
to playa coherent role in industrial production. 1964 1S 
taken to symbolise an ending to a particular, if short-
lived,period in Britain's history. 
" the period 1962-64 seems to us to mark 
a watershed in British history. Up until 
then Britain could regard herself as a pro-
sperous world power which could afford to 
take things easy after the hardships of war 
and its aftermath. She had a stable two-
party system a stable social system and 
political institutions and even the trans-
formation of her Empire into Commonwealth 
had been achieved with commendable contin-
uity. But after 1964 things were never quite 
the same again. Her economic stability began 
to disappear as economic crisis followed 
economic crisis and budget followed budget; 
her two-party political system carne under 
ever-increasing attack, and since then faith 
in nearly all her institutions ... has been 
steadily underminded .•. In fact since 1964 
political life in Britain has become almost, 
it seems, disoriented." (28) 
The magazines from which advertisements have been 
taken are Advertiser's Weekly, Encounter, Honey, Man About 
Town, Sunday TimesColour Magazine, Town and Woman. Advertiser's 
Weekly was the major journal read by advertising practitioners 
in the 1950's and early 1960's, along with World's Press News. 
It addressed a predominantly masculine audience of senior 
advertising executives (29). Encounter, was, and continues to be 
on a small scale, a review periodical addressing a mixture 
of literary and political themes. Although not an academic 
journal, it treated, in the early 1960's,cultural issues 
seriously from a marginally left-of-centre position (30). 
Honey was one of the more successful women's journals which 
addressed the emergent youth market (31). Through its pages 
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a certain independence was proposed for young women in con-
trast to the images of wife and mother dominant in Woman, 
for example. Woman and Woman's Own were the largest selling 
magazines in the women's weekly market during the 1950's 
and early 1960's (32). Man About Town was a trade journal 
aimed at the tailoring trade. It was this magazine that 
Clive Labovitch and Michael Heseltine revamped to form Town 
(33). The transformation of Man About Town to Town is 
indicative of the shift taking place in magazine publishing. 
This is constituted as a shift away from the typographical 
and the literary to the graphic and the photographic. The 
Sunday Times Colour Magazine similarly exhibits this tend-
ency. In it, however, advertising holds prominent position, 
on a par with editorial content and eventually overtaking 
the editorial (34). 
Advertisements taken from these above-named mag-
azines are read, in Chapter 4, in terms of their constitut-
ing a discursive practice in which a communicative practice, 
authorised by marketing practitioners, is dominant. 
The path towards these analytical readings begins 
in Chapter 2 with a consideration, in section 2.1, of the 
way in which advertising is thought of by practitioners of 
marketing and advertising. In the 1950's in Britain the 
emerging institutional dominance of marketing over advertis-
ing is registered in the professionals' discourse. This is 
followed, in section 2.2, by a consideration of the critical 
viewpoints upon advertising. Those critics who deal with 
advertising as a whole are distinguished from those who con-
centrate upon the advertisements as textual constructs. 
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Emphasis is lain upon those who read advertisements. 
Varieties of reading are distinguished from one another, 
i.e. the taxonomic or classificatory, the interpretative and 
deconstructive. 
In sections 2.21 and 2.22, two critical reading 
positions are focused, that of Judith Williamson and that 
of Trevor Pateman. The placing of these two very different 
positions on reading advertisements side by side is used as 
a contrastive device which brings out those features that 
an analytical study of advertisements needs to concern itself. 
These features can be named the problem of reading as mean-
ing production, the (re-)constitution of the subject through 
reading, the contextual determination of reading, the problem 
of the (structural) unconscious and the problem of ideology. 
In Chapter 3, then, these issues are situated in the context 
of a theoretical apparatus. 
The theoretical chapter is in three parts. It 
moves from a consideration of the general concept of social 
practice and production in section 3.1 through a discussion 
of the concepts of ideology and hegemony in 3.2 towards its 
destination in a discussion of the concepts of textuality, 
discursive social practice and the strategy of deconstruct-
ion in 3.3. 
In Chapter 4, the dominant communicative practice 
which advertising is recognised to constitute is enacted. 
This is achieved in three analytically distinct aspects. In 
4.1, suture is shown to concern the positioning of a place 
of unification and coherence for the reception of a text· 
In 4.2 are set out the series of representional 
imbrications by means of which a communication is realised 
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between the posited ego of suture and the other of the 
text. In 4.3, overdetermination is shown to concern the 
constitution of a 'real' order of things through the 
sequencing and patterning of representational imbrications. 
Finally, in 4.4, a deconstructive reading is pursued which 
unpicks the discursive closures of the dominant communicat-
ive practice, restoring discursive productivity marginalised 
by that domination. 
- 21 -





Overdetermined; This is, initially, a Freudian 
term which was reworked by Lacan and borrowed by 
Althusser. It is used to refer to the processes 
of (a) multiple determination of a phenomenon by 
a number of 'causes', none of which is the 
'essential' one, and (2) the location of a 
phenomenon in a complex system which both con-
stitutes the conditions of existence of the 
phenomenon and constrains its possible develop-
ment. The two major senses are, then, multiple 
determination (as distinct from single cause) 
and conditions of existence/enablement/constraint 
within a complex system. 
Hegemonised: This term is taken to refer to an 
order secured through consent, but implying a 
form of generalised consent which exists in a 
tension with alternative conceptions of possible 
order. An hegemonised order is a dominant order 
which acts to contain other orders with which 
it may be in conflict. Potential conflicts are 
managed in such a way so as not to permit out-
right opposition to be formulated as such. 
Potential modes of opposition are domesticated 
or submerged. 
Deconstructively: Briefly, to act deconstructively 
implies a preparedness to act strategically to 
resist the dominant order instituted through the 
reiteration of given social practices, whether of 
a discursive mode or of a nondiscursive mode. 
Deconstruction proceeds by rendering into dis-
course and refocusing what may have been taken 
for granted or may have seemed obvious beyond 
questioning in a given form of social practice. 
The constructedness of the practice is put 
through a thorough examination, in terms of how 
its constituent elements are articulated. Finally 
a new ordering is instituted (which itself may be 
re-examined and deconstructed further). 
For details of the emergence of advertising and 
for its more fruitful realisation in the 1950's, 
see Ewen, S. Captains of Consciousness. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1976. 
Wilkinson indicates that American historians focus 
upon the 1920's as the period when a consumer 
society was firmly established in the U.S.A. 
See Wilkinson, R. Selling strategies. Times 








For condensed histories of advertising in relation 
to economic developments see Dyer, G. Advertising 
as Communication. London: Methuen, 1982, 
especially chapters 1, 2 and 3. 
See also Williams, R. Advertising: the magic system. 
(In Problems in Materialism and Culture. Verso, 
1980. p. 170-195). 
And see Packard, V. Hidden Persuaders. Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1960. 
In the 1955 election the Conservatives won an 
overall majority of 60 seats, increasing the 
majority they had from the 1951 election. The 
turnout of voters declined significantly between 
1951 and 1956, falling from 82.5% to 76.7%. Those 
who voted asserted a certain contentment with the 
Conservatives. Macmillan continued to secure for 
the Conservatives a positive image in the electoral 
stakes. The new found prosperity and affluence 
seemed to point to there being no positive reason 
to turn to the Labour Party to form a Government. 
See Sked, A. and Cook, C. Post-war Britain: a 
Political History. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979 
p. 114-179. 
See Marwick, A. British Society Since 1945. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982. p. 121. 
See also Nevett, T.R. Advertising in Britain: a 
History. London: Heinemann, 1982. p.178. 
It was being argued at the time that two crucial 
dimensions of inequality, that deriving from the 
accumulated wealth of private property and that 
deriving from having control over bureaucratic 
organisations, no longer conincided. Public and 
private control were deemed no longer to be 
identical. See Westergaard, J. Sociology: the 
myth of classlessness. (In Ideology in social 
science; edited by R. Blackburn. Fontana, 1972. 
p. 11~-163). 
See Westergaard, J. OPe cit., p. 121. 
See Skide1sky, R. Lessons of Suez (In The Age 
of Affluence 1951-1964; edited by V. Bogdanor 
and R. Skide1sky. Macmillan, 1970. p. 168-191). 





"The Suez affair was also unhelpful insofar 
as it served to underline Great Britain's 
dependence on America. Britain had in fact 
served notice to the world that she was no longer 
a great power. This should perhaps have been 
apparent beforehand, but it was still fairly 
easily overlooked and until 1956 Britain was 
still able to live off much of the political 
credit she had accumulated during the war. 
After 1956, however, this was simply no longer 
possible." 
For a characterisation of Britain's 
industrial decline, see Gamble, A. 
Decline. London: Macmillan, 1981. 




For a brief sketch of the initiatives taken by 
the u.S. government, both domestically and inter-
nationally, to establish a more stable capitalist 
economic system, see Weisskopf, T. The current 
economic crisis in historical perspective. 
Socialist Review, vol. II (3) May-June 1981, 
p. 9-54. 
Nevett points to the undercapitalisation of many 
British advertising agencies which led to their 
being taken over by u.S. agencies who were gen-
erally larger and had more sUbstantial finances 
behind them. The business imperative to sellout 
to U.S. agencies was matched by the need to appeal 
to the greater practical expertise of u.S. 
agencies in marketing and advertising. 
"The American invaders brought with them a new 
kind of expertise. While Britain's manufacturers 
had been struggling through the years of rationing 
to satisfy a restricted demand, and their agencies 
had busied themselves with advertising that was 
not actually intended to sell techniques of market-
ing and promotion had been tested and defined in 
the United States. Companies and agencies were 
reorganized. A new marketing vocabulary emerged. 
And a new school of researchers, headed by Dichter, 
Chested and their followers, claimed to hold the 
key to human motivation." 
Nevett, T.R. Ope cit., p. 194. 
The U.S. agencies simply had more to offer to 
companies faced with the difficulties of fighting 
off competition from foreign manufacturers export-







This, as Harris points out, was written into the 
Bretton Woods agreement which was signed in July 
1944. 
"Washington, from its position of unrivalled 
strength, was concerned once and for all to prise 
open Europe and its empires to American exports. 
The interwar depression in the States need not 
happen again if external markets for u.S. man-
ufactured goods could be found and kept. It was 
this which underlay the creation of a new 
financial order, formulated at Bretton Woods in 
July 1944, and a new set of institutions to embody 
this order - the International Monetary Fund, and 
what became known later as the World Bank and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." 
Harris, N. Of Bread and Guns. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1983. p. 36-37. 
See Dyer, G. Advertising as Communication. London: 
Methuen, p. 39-54. 
See Ewen, S. op cit. 
See also Packard, V. The Hidden Persuaders. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1960. p. 22-23: 
"In the early fifties ... Production now became 
a relatively secondary concern. Executive 
planners changed from being maker-minded to 
market-minded." 
Packard, V. Ope cit., p.23. 
See Nevett, T.R. OPe cit. p. 194. Nevett points 
to the boom in advertising agencies in the 1950's 
and to the vulnerability of agencies to changed 
economic circumstances by the mid- 1960's. 
Agencies began to reduce their staffing levels. 
On 'consumers', see Williams, R. Advertising: 
the magic system (In Problems in Materialism and 
Culture. Verso, 1980. p. 170-195). p. 187. 
See also Galbraith, J.K. The Affluent Society 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962. p. 121-130. 
The two basic propositions of the theory of 
consumer demand are characterised by Galbraith 
as, first, "that the urgency of wants does not 
diminish appreciably as more of them are sat-
isfied" and, second, "When man has satisfied his 
physical needs, then psychologically grounded 
desires take over." 






Rather more negatively, Harris perceives the 
personal to be fully invaded by the imperatives 
of the world economic market through the idea 
of consumption. 
"But the world will not leave to itself the 
secret corner of 'the personal'. It returns 
to structure it with the fantasies that sell 
goods .... The personal becomes reduced to con-
sumption. An inhuman public existence does the 
producing, and the role of 'human beings' is 
. 1 t " slmp y 0 consume .... 
Harris, N. OPe cit., p. 13. 
See Curran, J. Capitalism and control of the 
press, 1800-1975 (In Mass Communication and 
Society; edited by-Y. Curran et al .. Arnold, 
1979. p. 195-230). 
See Gouldner, A. The Dialectic of Ideology and 
Technology. London: Macmillan, 1976. 
"The communication breakthrough in the twentieth 
century begins with the spread of the radio and 
the cinema and is now coming to a culmination in 
the spread of television. The worldwide diffusion 
of television marks the end of one and the 
beginning of a new stage in the communications 
revolution - the development of a computerised 
mass information system". 
Gouldner, A. op.cit., p. 168. 
See Tunstall, J. The Media in Britain. London: 
Constable, 1983. 
Commercial television affects the press in terms 
of competition for advertising revenue. In terms 
of programme content, those formula-produced 
television series which aim to attract large 
audience to hand over to advertisers become points 
of reference which may be cited by newspapers 
and magazines in order to boost sales. The two 
largest selling magazines in Britain, the Radio 
Times and TV Times, are the official programme 
guides of BBC and lTV. 
See Curran, J. The impact of advertising on the 
British mass media. Media, Culture and Society, 
3(1) 1981, p. 43-69. 
In terms of newspapers, 
"The papers most vulnerable to [television's) 
competition were those which neither offered 
better coverage of the mass market than TV nor 









TV failed to provide." 
Curran, J. OPe cit., p. 49. 
In terms of magazines, 
"The publications that suffered most were 
general magazines which provided a broad, 
undifferentiated coverage of the market, com-
parable to that of commercial TV, yet lacked the 
specialised editorial content of the sort that 
generated linked advertising." 
Curran, J. OPe cit., p. 50. 
In this class of magazine were Picture Post, 
Illustrated and Everybody's. The readership 
of these magazines had in any case been artificially 
boosted by the restrictions placed upon newspapers 
in terms of the rationing of newsprint. Easing of 
controls on newspapers contributed to the decline 
of these magazines. 
See Curran, J. Capitalism and the control of the 
press (In Mass Communication and Society; edited 
by J. Curran et al ... Arnold, 1977. p. 195-230). 
See Tunstall, J. Ope cit., p. 37. 
See Tunstall, J. OPe cit., p. 39-40. 
See Tunstall, J. Ope cit., p. 88-94. 
The rise of women's magazines began in the late 
1930's. Sales increased throughout the 1940's 
and 1950's when Woman and Woman's Own dominated 
the women's weekly market. The decline began 
in the 1960's and was accompanied by a fragment-
ation of the women's market, along the lines of 
social class, income, age and attitudes. 
Attitudes, in the broadest category, tend to be 
divided between the 'traditional' housewife and 
varieties of 'new' woman. 
See Tunstall, J. Ope cit., p. 91-92: 
"most magazines have had to seek out specialised 
and segmented markets". 
Sked, A. and Cook, C. Ope cit., p. 10-11. 
For more details of the audience of Advertiser's 
Weekly, see The Readership of Advertiser's 






Encounter is one of a group of 'jounals of 
opinion' which have been in decline at least 
since the 1960's. This is considered to be as 
a result of the enlarged political, arts and 
magazine coverage of the Sunday Times, Observer 
and Telegraph newspapers. Such journals became 
an uncompetitive buy. 
See Tunstall, J. OPe cit., p. 105. 
For a characterisation of Honey, see White, C. 
Women's Magazines, 1693-1968. London: Michael 
Joseph, 1970. p. 171-172. 
"[Honey) was brought out after surveys by Mark 
Abrams had demonstrated the potential spending 
power of a growing teenage market, and it was 
initially intended as a magazine of general 
guidance for younger women ... " 
White, C. Ope cit., p. 172. 
Between 1961 and 1964 the circulation of Honey 
increased from 104,200 to 190,100. See White, C. 
Ope cit., Appendix V. 
Trevor MilIum also gives a brief sketch of Honey 
and characterises its readership. See MilIum, T. 
Images of Woman. London: Chatto and Windus, 1975. 
p. 104-111. 
See White, C. OPe cit. 
Woman sustained sales of over 3 million copies 
per week between 1956 and 1964, falling from 
about 3.4 million to just over 3 million. See 
White, C. Ope cit., Appendix IV. 
Again MilIum gives a brief characterisation of 
the magazine Woman and an analysis of its read-
ership in traditional marketing categories. 
MilIum, T. OPe cit., p. 104-111. 
Woman was in a position to exploit a situation 
in which, 
"advertisers with goods to sell, magazine 
publishers with plentiful paper, and housewives 
tasting unfamilar affluence, all participated in 
a great consumer boom. W.D. McClelland has also 
pointed out that in the late 1950's many young 
housewives had little experience of choosing 
non-rationed goods and eagerly sought out the 
advice offered by the magazines and their advertisers." 




See Collins, C. Town and Tom Wolsey (In British 
Photography 1955-1965: the Master Craftsmen in 
print. London: The Photographers' Gallery, 1983. 
p. 10-13). 
"'A publishing landmark!' That well worn PR 
slogan which often signifies nothing very much, 
would really have meant something had it been 
used in 1960 to describe the acquisition by two 
young Oxford graduates of an unremarkable tailor-
ing trade quarterly. For Michael Heseltine and 
Clive Labovitch transformed Man About Town into 
a sleek monthly men's magazine which was to 
influence a whole generation of designers, art 
directors and photographers." 
Collins, J. Ope cit., p.lO. 
Collins also points to the reciprocal influence 
between magazine page-layout design and advertis-
ing design, and to the dominance which advertising 
began to assume in the production of such magazines. 
She quotes Tom Wolsey who states that, 
"It all became so laid down, if you didn't get 
enough ads you lost 16 pages of colour; editorial 
became the tail of the dog. Advertising was what 
it was all about." 
Collins, J. OPe cit., p. 13. 
For a discussion of the relations between advertis-
ing and editorial see Rand, M. The Sunday Times 
Magazine. (An interview by C. Osman). Creative 
Camera, nos. 211 and 212, July/August 1982, p. 616-
620. 
See also interview with James Danziger in the same 
issue of Creative Camera on the topic of the 
Sunday Times Magazine. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROPONENTS AND CRITICS 
OF ADVERTISING 
2.1 PROPONENT PRACTITIONERS 
Proponents of advertising and marketing would 
prefer that the field of textuality constituted by advert-
isements be construed predominantly, if not wholly, from 
the position of the consumer in terms of the product 
advertised. Even while advertisements may not define a 
single meaning for a product, the productivity of the advert-
isement ought, from the proponent practitioners' viewpoint, 
to be limited to constructing a particular subject address. 
That inscribed position serves as a principle of coherence 
from which a product as theme can be perceived and construed. 
The relevance of product to subject can be understood at 
that juncture. 
While the critics of advertising seek to establish 
that there is more to the operation of an advertisement, 
through analysis or interpretation, the proponents seek to 
limit the understanding of advertisements to the realisation 
of a particular inscribed intentionality. It is the institut-
ional intentionality of advertising and marketing which the 
practitioners seek readers to prefer in the processes of 
reading advertisements. The realisation of the subject-
address and the intentionality gives a particular direction 
to the reading and allows a determinate construal of the field 
of textuality of advertisements. 
The proponent practitioners are concerned to define 
their project in relatively immediate terms. They consider 
that it is not their concern to discuss the other potential 
modes of effectivity of advertisements. Thus, advertisements 
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are designed as part of the project of selling products or 
services. This is taken as a principal horizon which serves 
to limit the interest which practitioners have in advertise-
ments as textual constructs. The practitioners recognise 
that advertising and advertisements may have unintended 
consequences, in the institutional sense, which are of a 
political and cultural character. While they may recognise 
that possibility, they do not encode explicitly political and 
cultural programmes into their project, which they conceive 
to be determined economically. There remain, nonetheless, 
implicit political and cultural horizons encoded in that con-
ception of 'economics'. 
In the 1950's in the united States as well as, 
slightly later, in the United Kingdom, a change in the self-
conceptions of marketing and advertising practices can be 
recognised to have taken place. That change received one 
of its major public expositions by way of Vance Packard's 
'The Hidden Persuaders' (1). This book is not included 
amongst those texts which are critical of advertising because 
Packard assumes a relatively uncritical view of advertising 
in general. He urges caution only in respect of what he 
calls the 'depth approach' (2). Thus, he states that, 
"Since our concern here is with the breed 
of persuaders known in the trade as the 
'depth boys', much of the book is describ-
ing their subterranean operations. For 
that reason I should add the obvious: a 
great many advertising men, publicists, 
fund raisers, personnel experts, and 
political leaders, in fact numerically 
a majority, still do a straight forward 
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job and accept us as rational citizens 
(whether we are or not). They fill an 
important and constructive role in our 
society. Advertising, for example, not 
only plays a vital role in promoting 
our economic growth but is a colourful, 
diverting aspect of American life; and 
many of the creations of ad men are 
tasteful, honest works or artistry." (3) 
What Packard's book indexes is both a change in 
the institutional relationships between advertising and 
marketing and the introduction, through marketing, of a 
number of new research techniques which materially affected 
how advertisements were designed. In effect, in the 1950's, 
initially in the united states but soon afterwards in the 
United Kingdom, the research interests of marketing began 
to achieve dominance over the rather less planned activities 
which had constituted advertising hitherto. Henceforth 
advertisements became a more coherent part of corporate 
strategy, on the one hand, and of an ideology of consumpt-
ion, on the other hand. Marketing practices served as the 
means of securing these relationships. 
The struggle for dominance between marketing and 
advertising in the 1950's can be witnessed in the pages of 
the trade journals, of which 'Advertiser's Weekly' and 
'World's Press News' were prominant. Increasingly, market-
ing came to be asserted as the basis upon which advertising 
could be constructed. This view was expressed with varying 
degrees of vehemence. For example B. Cathles asserts 
polemically that, 
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" advertising is the servant of market-
ing ... marketing is - or should be - the 
basis of the whole business of selling. 
Advertising should be its tool." (4) 
The form of Cathles argument indicates that the 
relationship was by no means secured. Brunning, on the 
contrary, indicates that a more settled pattern has developed. 
"In recent years many of the more progress-
ive members of the advertising agency world 
have changed their thinking. No longer is 
it sufficient to concentrate on the product-
ion of good advertisements. Marketing is now 
to the fore •.. Advertising is only a part 
of the total selling operation." (5) 
Historically, the practice of advertising had been 
the major institutional site out of which marketing had 
emerged. From the 1950's onwards, advertising was becoming 
only a part of a larger programme. In the 1950's this 
relationship had not been finally settled. 
Marketing itself, in the 1950's, was undergoing 
a process of change. A more traditional conception of 
markets was being supplemented by a more complex character-
isation of the consumer. Thus, 
"the classical description of the market in 
terms of age, class, and sex is supplemented 
by the provision of a picture of these groups 
as personalities. Motivation research can show 
how they feel and what they think of a 
product." (6) 
A division of labour was considered to follow 
in which older and newer marketing practices shared 
responsibility with advertising for the realisation of the 
more "total selling operation" (7). The sharing of tasks 
was seen by one proponent to be distributed as follows. 
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"Essentially the creative artist's problem 
is that of communication with the pUblic. 
Classical market research is essential to 
find out with whom communication has to be 
established: motivation research is essential 
to find out what to communicate." (8) 
Marketing becomes understood as, 
" th . f d ... e sClence 0 pro uct creation, design, 
packaging, promotion and sale. When properly 
applied it starts with the consumer, ascert-
aining his requirements and desires. Then it 
shapes the product and sets the production 
line in motion." (9) 
It is set to "take its place alongside finance and 
production as one of the big three of business" (10), a dev-
elopment which has been in progress, beginning in the United 
States, since the 1940's (11). 
The development of marketing in the direction of 
motivation research, is crucial to the process of subordin-
ation of advertising to marketing. 
Kelvin considers that motivation research acts 
as a bridge between the terms of traditional market research 
and the 'intuitive ability' of the 'creative artist" (12). 
" ... motivation research ... [investigates] in 
detail the consumer as a human being in 
relation to the product." (13) 
The task of the 'creative artist' becomes that of 
encoding in an appealing way the material produced and 
uncovered during these investigations. It is this specific 
coordination of research with gradually improving techniques 
of presentation that makes advertisements into more complex 
artefacts which deserve a close scrutiny, especially in that 
moment of transition constituted in the late 1950's. That 
complexity can be located in presentation, content and 
function. Marketing began to conceive the relation between 
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the system of economy and the processes of subjective 
behaviour in a more methodical and more sophisticated way. 
Advertising becomes a vehicle by means of which 
a market-based understanding of social and economic proc-
esses can be imbricated with the opinions and practices of 
local modes of behaviour. Advertisements begin to operate 
as elements of a "system of market control" (14). 
The direction in which marketing moved i.e. 
towards a 'psychological' understanding of motivation, 
nevertheless causes some difficulties in establishing the 
boundaries of marketing. Is it the social subject who is 
under investigation, in as far as the consumer is a social 
subject, or is it the consumer who is under investigation, 
in as far as the social subject acts, at times, as a consumer? 
The problem is to define specifically consumption behaviour. 
This is doubly difficult in as much as consumption behctviour 
is interwoven with other forms of behaviour. There is a 
theoretical labour, in other words, implicit to market 
research which defines in what consumption behaviour and 
the consumer consist. In the years since the 1950's the 
conception of those 'objects' of research have been modified. 
In 1956, for example, it is clear to Harry Henry that, 
"Motivation research uses psychological 
techniques - not because it is itself a 
branch of psychology, but because these 
techniques provide the only way of 
'getting below the surface' ... construct-
ive and useful Motivation Research is 
only concerned with getting sufficiently 
below the surface to do the necessary 
job - there is no need to plumb right 
down to the depths of the human soul!" (15) 
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Such modest limitations, which state that market-
lng is not and cannot be a social science, have been exceeded. 
The problem for marketing is that, 
" ... a full understanding of consumption 
decisions in these geographical areas 
(North America, Japan, Australia, Europe) 
would require the study of a person's 
entire lifetime of experiences. Also, 
in the broadest sense, consumer behavior 
and human behavior would be nearly identical 
fields of study because the consumption of 
economic goods pervades almost every activity 
in which humans are involved." (16) 
Given such a perspective it becomes possible to 
construct a world in which, 
"National characteristics exist - who can 
deny it - but they are negligible compared 
with the similarities between people of 
different nationality, especially in their 
role of consumer." (17) 
For marketing, then, consumers are everywhere 
and are, basically, identical. Cultural variations are 
negligible, given this fundamental identity. 
Consumers are everywhere and consumers are 
sovereign. Thus, even Harry Henry himself, is not above 
making hyperbolic statements in relation to both consumption 
behaviour and consumers. He considers that, 
"A revolution is today changing the policy 
and the productive pattern of British 
industry, and is transforming the shape of 
its future. The revolution has arisen out of 
the development of what may be called consumer 
sovereignty - consumer democracy, if you prefer -
whereby the choice of what goods shall enter 
into final consumption is no longer the pre-
rogative of the manufacturer who makes them or 
the retailer who sells them. Instead it is 
vested firmly in the final consumer, whose 
decision to buy or not to buy reflects back 
along the manufacturing and distributive chain 
with a speed unparalleled in history." (18) 
- 36 -
The argument is a tantology, based on the 
ambiguous use of the term consumer and the total identif-
ication of consumer and social subject. The previously 
cited major problem for marketing can be recognised again 
at this juncture: how is the consumer to be defined? 
Even within marketing discourse it is recognised that the 
consumer stands for more than one function. In an article 
in 'Printer's Ink' it is argued that, 
"As a practical business function, market-
ing is the total procedure of creating 
customers efficiently ...• Because a market 
does not exist until a customer is created 
i.e. until consumer demand is developed 
and fulfilled. Profits result from 
creating customers efficiently." (19) 
It can be deduced from this statement that market-
ing is set two orders of problem. The first 1S that of 
creating consumers and the second is that of creating 
customers. That "consumer demand" has to be developed is 
not dwelt upon at length in the published texts of marketing 
practitioners in the 1950's. They would prefer to discuss 
the 'fulfillment' of an assured demand. 
The problem for marketing is that social subjects 
are not simply consumers. The desires of social subjects 
are not simply those of consumer demand. Social subjects 
have to be constituted as consumers. They have to learn 
patterns of consumer behaviour as Block and Roering indicate 
(20). Social subjects learn complex patterns of behaviour 
which may involve consumption behaviour but in which con-
sumption aspect is not prioritised. The role of marketing 
becomes that of making social subjects recognise the con-
sumption aspect of their behaviour and, consequently, to 
- 37 -
modify that behaviour, in ways prescribed by marketing 
through advertisements. 
There is some indication that marketing pract-
itioners have achieved some success in disseminating 
their conception of consumption behaviour and the consumer. 
For example, Raymond Williams can claim that by 1960 in Britain, 
"it is as consumers that the majority of people are seen" 
(21). He argues that the term consumer has become "a way 
of describing the ordinary member of capitalist society in 
a maln part of his economic capacity" (22). 
The implicit political and cultural horizons of 
marketing, which are relayed through a specific conception 
of economic social practice, concern the re-definition of 
social practices in terms of their economic aspect. People, 
living in historical, social conjunctures and in determinate 
local situations have to be informed of how it is possible, 
and indeed beneficial, for them to consider themselves as 
consumers. This involves a reinterpretation of the terms 
used by those people to conceptualise and organise their 
behaviour, to the extent that they formalise it. 
For marketing to begin to be effective at the 
level of buying and selling, in the way in which the 
practitioners require, people must be made to see the 
rel~vance of consumption behaviour, and their own role as 
consumer, to their own existence, which is constituted 
through strategic interaction. That relationship is not 
obvious and cannot be taken for granted, as marketing 
practitioners might wish. 
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How people are to be educated and informed in 
their role as consumers is, and always has been, a major 
problem for marketing. It is a problem upon which advertise-
ments can and do operate. Advertisements are necessarily 
instructional. Otherwise they cannot be effective either 
culturally, in the sense examined in the analyses in terms 
of ideology, or in the sense the practitioners intend, i.e. 
economically and commercially. 
The implication is that consumption behaviour is 
not simply buying commodities, nor is it simply reading 
advertisements in order to decipher what product is being 
presented and what 'values' is that product being given. 
Consumption behaviour involves inter-relating both of those 
modes of action, in making one reason in the context of the 
other. 
But consumption behaviour is more than these two 
actions. It implies also the pleasure or enjoyment of read-
ing the advertisement and the enjoyment of the product or 
service itself. It involves constructing a coherent 
character as consumer which inter-relates action, enjoyment 
and reasoning in a reiterative system. It is that reiterat-
ive system which marketing seeks to gain access through 
research both of a more traditional kind and of a more 
motivational or 'psychological' kind. 
Products are constructed in accord with the find-
ings of research. The object of research, i.e. the consumer, 
is encoded, both as addressee and as the one who will derive 
pleasure, in the forms of the commodity. The consumer, then 
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is an institutionalised intentionality inscribed, through 
marketing, in the product. That intentionality can be 
realised by social subjects in as far as they are constituted, 
and allow themselves to be constituted as the consumer. That 
intentionality can be reiterated, and altered, by advertise-
ments. 
Marketing practitioners would prefer to conveive 
of advertisements as formulae, such as in Tandy's character-
isation: 
"The function of the advertising man is to 
produce a formula, made up of many com-
ponent parts, which will sell his client's 
goods." (23) 
But this response to the advertisement, i.e. in 
terms of buying a product condenses the more complex set 
of processes set out above. Social subjects have to learn 
that buying is a suitable response to an advertisement. 
That is one component of consumption behaviour, i.e. to 
recognise specific presentations as advertisements, to 
decode them and to respond by buying the product shown. 
Buying is the response which is considered relevant by 
marketing practitioners. 
Marketing is engaged in how to construct that 
response and how to lend it social validity. Reading 
adver~isements is not a sufficient response for marketing 
practitioners, since "the consumer still has to be induced 
to pux.chase" (24). In the context of this particular problem 
one of the main functions of advertising can be seen as 
being "to get the consumer into the shop" (25). In other 
words, 
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"Having decided who the advertising should 
be primarily addressed to, the planner must 
next consider what sort of appeals are most 
likely to influence those people in favour 
of the product - and persuade them to buy 
it." (26) 
Reading advertisements is to take place in a 
particular practical context, that of the constitution of 
consumption behaviour. Consumption behaviour, in turn, is 
a complex set of processes, which cannot be restricted to 
buying a product. However, the restricted understanding 
of consumption behaviour, in terms of buying seems to have 
a wide currency. In 1982, Philip Kleinman can argue that, 
" ..• it is pointed out that the usual purpose 
of advertising, at least from the client's 
point of view, is not to edify the public, 
but to sell it something. An ad of small 
artistic merit which shifted a lot of 
widgets would be a better ad than a minor 
graphic or filmic masterpiece which sold 
none." ( 2 7 ) 
The perfunctory view of advertisements, that they 
are formulae which can sell products and as such are strictly 
an "economic phenomenon" (28) is contested here on the basis 
that consumption behaviour is not and cannot be simply 
economic. Advertisements, therefore, in intervening into 
consumption behaviour are not simply economic phenomenon. 
Specific, consumption-based, responses to advertisements are 
complex and have to be learned. That specific response can 
always be re-worked by understandings and modes of 
projective behaviour other than consumption. 
It is to critical responses to advertising and 
advertisements that the thesis now turns. To read advertise-
ments as a consumer is to construe them within the horizons 
of a project of consumption behaviour. Marketing practices 
dominate the popular understanding of consumption. Such 
- 41 -
practices would seek to emphasize the 'economic' character 
of consumption. Yet even in marketing discourse, albeit 
implicitly, it became obvious that consumption behaviour 
is never simply economic. Consumption behaviour consists 
of a complex set of competences in which reading advertise-
ments, as a cultural achievement, is joined in specific 
ways to commercial exchanges. An ideology of consumption 
is articulated through constructing the inscribed intent-
ionality of marketing in advertisements. 
To read advertisements as an analyst and as a 
critic, is to problematise the inscription of advertisements 
in a context of consumption behaviour and to problematise 
the specific understanding of consumption realised in and 
through marketing. Reading advertisements, for example, 
becomes an end in itself, which already undermines the 
marketing-dominated concept of reading, i.e. as a prelude to 
buying. 
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The distinction between considering advertisements 
as a functional, economic phenomenon and consider-
ing them as having potentially some 'artistic' 
merit in themselves is one which pertains to the 
division of labour between the practitioners 
of marketing and the practitioners of advertising. 
The former group tend to favour a self-description 
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28. 
which stresses their interest and engagement 
in quantitative methods of research, objective 
standards, statistical criteria, all of which 
is articulated in a pseudo-social scientific 
mode of discourse. The latter group emphasize 
their having 'insight' which evades quantificat-
ion. They emphasize their qualitative, individ-
ualistic, intuitive and creative approach to 
those phenomena which research treats as 'data'. 
" (Wal ter Taplin) wanted to consider advertising 
as an "economic phenomenon" and in doing so 
would confine his investigations to the field 
indicated by the definition of economics as 
the "application of scarce means to alternative 
ends". In economic jargon advertising was a 
service which arouses intentionally subjective 
feelings within the readers of the advertisement. 
The fundamentals of advertising were human wants, 
in all of which social elements are involved .... 
From this came the importance of considering 
motivation in human wants." 
Taplin speaks to the Creative Circle. Advertiser's 
Weekly, 30 November 1956. 
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2.2 CRITICAL PRACTIONERS 
Critical interest in the modern form of advertis-
ing, as a conjuncturally determined and qualitatively novel 
form of social practice, begins in the 1950's, alongside 
the rise of advertising itself. This critical interest 
develops in the context of the United States and Western, 
European nations. 
Critical approaches can be divided into two major 
categories, those which concern themselves with the cultural 
form of advertising in general in its relation to the cap-
italist economy and those which concern themselves with an 
analysis of advertisements in their concrete specificity. 
Writers who concern themselves with advertising 
tend to take a number of critical positions, which may be 
inter-related explicitly or implicitly in any particular 
text. What is at stake is a politics of critical inter-
pretation. Advertising can be criticised, for example, 
from a socialist position. It is criticised for being one 
element of a capitalist economy. This approach focuses 
upon the kind of economic production of which advertising 
is but one part, i.e. production for profit, on the one 
hand, and for private consumption of products, on the other 
hand (1). If a socialist position names the broad area of 
critical appraisal, this position contains a number of 
significant variants. The socialist critical position can 
be academicised, for example, towards marxism (2), towards 
feminism (3) or towards a combination of marxism and 
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feminism (4). Alternatively, the socialist position can 
be academicised in a liberal direction, towards some 
variant of economic discourse or anthropological discourse, 
in which are constructed anthropologically informed theories 
of consumption behaviour (5). 
Critical analyses, either of the institutional 
site of advertising generally or of advertisements specif-
ically, draw upon one or other of the available political 
perspectives of interpretation in order to give cohesion 
and direction to their surface discourse. Thus, a great 
deal of recent work whose focus of attention has been the 
semoisis of advertisement texts tend to rely upon some kind 
of marxism and/or feminism in order to theorise the inter-
relatedness of text and context. These adduced theoretical 
frameworks permit a certain understanding of how the 
semiosis of advertisements operates in the social, to 
constitute and to intervene (6). 
Occasionally, the links between surface analysis 
and the theoretical resources which are drawn upon are 
set out clearly in the critical text. For example, Victor 
Burgin, in a series of articles in which advertisements are 
used as illustrations (7), sets out clearly the marxian, 
semiological and psychoanalytic premises from which he 
begins. Judith Williamson, but all too briefly, performs 
a similar process of framing using the theoretical discourses 
cited by Burgin, to which she adds a certain feminism (8). 
Janice Winship makes an effort to set out the feminist and 
marxist presuppositions which ground her analyses (9). 
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In recent years, the complexity of theoretical 
apparatuses and theoretical presuppositions has become so 
dense that an elaboration of the critical positioning in 
respect of the object of study, which itself requires 
explicit definition, has become a necessity. Section 3 of 
this thesis sets out the preconstructed theoretical ground-
ing by which the analyses enacted in Section 4 are premised. 
Both the general approach and the specific approach 
to advertising and advertisements have some relevance to 
the current study, although those texts which focus textual 
analysis are of more immediate interest, since the stress 
is_upon the specificity of advertisements in their 
being read. The institutional site is no more than charact-
erised in outline. 
However, one major theoretical concern is to show 
the context at work within the text, to adopt a Derridean 
formulation (10). Texts are not considered to constitute 
an essential interiority, whether formally or semantically, 
to which an exterior can be opposed simply. Text and context 
are interwoven. They re-mark one another. They are not 
separated, parallel levels. The text is already complex, 
articulating its own contexts, a notion encoded in the use 
of the depiction of advertisements as semiotic resources 
for textual practices. Contexts can be generated from 
given semiotic resources. The social is conceived as that 
complication and intrication of texts and contexts to con-
stitute systems of, materially dense, differentiation. 
The density itself may account for the impression of sub-
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stantiality which may overcode concepts of the social. 
To develop this theoretical point, about text and 
context, a little more clearly, the relationships constituted 
through reading, by and for a social subject, are 'real' 
enough. It is important not to oppose social relations 
constituted through reading, as a mode of material, social 
practice, to other social relations which are somehow more 
'real'. The theoretical difficulty is to construct a 
satisfactory conception of the relationships between social 
relations constituted through reading and other forms of 
social relations. Thus, for example, the point made by 
Williamson requires a careful interpretation if it is not 
to be understood as articulating an opposition between a 
'real' and an 'epiphenomenal'. 
"It is important to outline the social and 
economic relations in which advertising as 
an apparatus functions, before going on to 
discuss the way they are misrepresented, ex-
cluded, or obscured within advertisements, 
because it is these real relations which 
have to be changed - not advertisements" (11). 
Goffman constructs an approach to reading advertise-
ments which is of interest in as far as it allows for that 
multiple reference, first, to relations established in 
reading, second, to relations established in local historical 
situations, and, third, to relations established through the 
structural articulation of a social system. If Goffman is 
open to criticism, from the position adopted in this thesis, 
it is that he seems to prioritise, on occasion, those sit-
uations defined as "arrangements in which persons are 
physically present to one another" (12). 
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The perspective taken up here is that reading 
reiterates or re-marks in practice all those modes of relation-
ship cited above. The subject is (re-)constituted in reading 
relations through suture,local historical situations through 
deixis and performativity, and structural relations through 
overdeterminations. Physical proximity plays a necessary 
part in the constitution of these relations, but all modes 
of relationship co-determine one another, in conjuncturally 
specific forms. 
In short, the contexts of local historical sit-
uation and of overdetermining structural relations are at 
work within the advertisement texts. It is through a read-
ing of their semiotic resources that such modes of social 
relationship, discursive, local and structural and realised 
and are interwoven. 
Goffman provides useful insights by way of the 
notions of framing and display. What remains problematic 
is whether his concept of communication does not prefer the 
face-to-face interaction as the ideal mode of interaction. 
His stress upon what he calls "small behaviours" (13) may 
be used to construe a certain understanding of reading. 
Small behaviours are considered to constitute displays. 
Displays serve as spatial metaphors by means of which 
features of the structural organisations of the social are 
depicted microecologically. It is those displays of small 
behaviours which, Goffman argues, are reiterated photo-
graphically. 
Such displays, as Goffman insists, are not simply 
representational of social structure. They may be compen-
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satory (14). They can be used to intervene in local 
situations upon social structures. They are in Goffman's 
term, symptomatic rather than simply portraits (15). A 
similar point, it must be insisted, holds true for the 
photographic reiteration of local situations. They do not 
simply provide protraits. They intervene to modify -
iteration alters, to cite Derrida again (16). 
The local historical situation, in which physical 
proximity figures largely, is no more 'real' than the 
relations constituted discursively through reading nor the 
relations constituted through the overdetermination of any 
given social practice, in its local and discursive forms. 
Reading advertisements is but one concrete instance of these 
processes of realisation. 
In terms of theoretical orientation, Goffman makes 
a telling intervention. His central argument in relation to 
advertising is as follows. 
"I want to argue now that the job the advertiser 
has of dramatising the value of his product is 
not unlike the job a society has of infusing its 
social situations with ceremonial and with ritual 
signs facilitating the orientation of particip-
ants to one another. Both must use the limited 
"visual" resources available in social situations 
to tell a story; both must transform otherwise 
opaque goings-on into easily readable form. 
And both rely on the same basic devices: intention 
displays, microecological mapping of social 
structure, approved typifications, and the 
gestural externalization of what can be taken 
to be inner response." (17). 
Goffman also makes a crucial observation in 
relation to the qualitative/quantitative distinction, in the 
analysis of image structures and display structures. He 
states that, 
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"Whereas in traditional methods the 
differences between items that are to 
be counted as instances of the same 
thing are an embarassment, and are so 
in the degree of their difference, in 
pictorial pattern analysis the opposite 
is the case, the casting together of 
these apparent differences being what 
the analysis is all about." (18) 
Goffman highlights a major problem for certain 
kinds of 'content' analysis. It is with such an area of 
difficulty that Trevor MilIum's book 'Images of Woman' 
struggles. 
While 'Images of Woman' deals precisely with the 
area of concern of this thesis, reading advertisements, it 
is not used to any great extent. This is due to a difference 
in the conception of how the project of analysing advertise-
ments may be pursued. 
It is considered that reading can be construed as 
classification, as interpretation, or, in a radicalisation 
of these two conceptions as a production. It is the adoption 
of anyone of these horizons which determines how the concept 
of analysis is understood. 
MilIum, for example, endeavours to incorporate in 
his study, first, a more traditional content analysis, 
which stresses the quantitative assessments of elements that 
are to be counted as the same. This approach is in difficulty 
when arguing that specific material presentations which are 
different are nevertheless to be counted as articulating an 
identical content. Second, MilIum seeks to incorporate 
the more qualitative concerns of, on the one hand, semiological 
analysis and, on the other hand, art history (19). Content 
analysis, Barthesian semiology and Panofskian iconographic 
- 52 -
analysis make uneasy partners in this analytical deal. 
The crucial difficulty concerns the character 
of the productivity of texts when being read. The over-
all tendency of MilIum's method is to prefer a classificat-
ory conception of production, wherein texts either denote or 
connote preconstructed meanings or contents (20). MilIum 
seeks to provide a rigorous and complete classification of 
the forms and contents which advertisements articulate (21). 
Panofskian iconographics might conceivably be forced into 
this scheme. However, the case of Barthesian semiology 
is more problematic. 
Semiological analyses tend to focus the moment 
of productivity of reading itself. In that moment, semiotic 
elements enter into the structuration of the reading, in a 
conjunction with the reading subject. While that moment of 
construction may instance already constructed meanings, new 
meanings may be produced and, in a complex passage of read-
ing, those new meanings may cause novel signifying configurat-
ions to be recognised. 
A system of classification of preconstructed 
signifying elements and meanings will be constitutionally 
unable to deal with the novel configurations which arise. 
MilIum's aim is to establish an objective restatement, in 
terms of a classification of forms and contents, of advert-
isements. The aim inscribed in this thesis is to under-
stand the productivity of advertisements as texts. They do 
not simply articulate already fixed forms and meanings. 
Advertisements innovate. It is the limited character of that 
innovation which is of interest here. It constitutes an 
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important part of what will be defined as the ideological 
productivity of advertisements. 
Analysis in the form of reading as classification 
or objective restatement can be distinguished from reading 
as interpretation. Interpretation encodes a certain con-
ception of reading as extending or making more 'full', the 
previously given understanding. In this thesis, which 
follows recent semiological theorisations, interpretation 
is radicalised towards a concept of production. Reading as 
production can be distinguished into a moment of construction, 
of already grasped and of novel configurations from pre-
constructed semiotic resources, and a moment of deconstruct-
ion. The distinction between construction and deconstruction 
is at the level of strategy. The relation between construct-
ion and deconstruction is that of an edge. They border one 
another. Both use semiotic coding conventions and institut-
ional, discursive intentionalities, but they use them to 
different ends. 
The total comprehension, as classificatory scheme, 
of advertisements is not attempted. What this thesis seeks 
to understand is the moment of productivity of advertise-
ments in being read, and to grasp that productivity as 
ideological in character. 
What is required, then, is a conception of the 
different kinds of determinations by means of which different 
readings are produced. This will include the structural 
elements of presentations and the citational structure in 
relation to preconstructed meaning formations, but cannot 
be limited to them. MilIum's analytical approach implies 
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an idealised historical distance. If pursued in a certain 
direction, through that ideal, it could become a study of 
the fixed range of formal elements which articulate the 
fixed range of preconstructed elements during a given period 
in a given place. It is not adequate, however, as a 
methodological strategy for understanding how those meanings 
may be reiterated and altered in a practice of reading. It 
may not serve as a means by which to understand how advertise-
ments operate ideologically in the social. In this thesis, 
their operation in and through reading practice is crucial. 
How, then, are those factors of determination of 
reading to be theorised, without falling into the temptation 
of constructing a wholly external contextual account of 
advertising in which a functional conception is adopted that 
reduces advertisements to the operation of the institution-
alised site of the advertising agency and which collapses 
advertising into marketing. To have a functional perspective 
upon advertising, as a total institutional site, is not 
necessarily to have a coherent view of the discursive 
operations of advertisements in relation to the realisation 
or otherwise of that institutional intentionality in dis-
course. 
Advertisements, in being part of the total 
institution of advertising, do concern consumption. However, 
as Myers perceives, an analysis of advertisements as part 
of a theory of consumption, on the one hand, and as part of 
a theory of social communication, on the other hand, need 
not be polarised. 
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"A theory of consumption would be enriched 
by incorporation into a broader theory of 
social communications. This would mean 
getting out of the ghetto of 'cultural' as 
opposed to 'economic' analysis and the 
polarities of production/consumption or 
encoding/decoding. The role of advertis-
ing cannot be inferred simply from a 
knowledge of economic interests nor deduced 
from structuralist or language-based 
theories." (22) 
If consumption behaviour, from one perspective, 
can be understood as one of Goffman's 'small behaviours', 
instances of that mode of behaviour can be understood both 
in terms of display, in Goffman's sense of providing 
spatial metaphors for social structures, and in terms of 
sense making. Thus, consumption as behaviour can be under-
stood in the following way. 
"If it is said that the essential function 
of language is its capacity for poetry, we 
shall assume that the essential function 
of consumption is its capacity to make 
sense. Forget the idea of consumer irration-
ality. Forget that commodities are good for 
eating, clothing and shelter; forget their 
usefulness and try instead the idea that 
commodities are good for thinking ... " (23) 
Reading advertisements can be considered to be 
part of consumption behaviour. It reiterates, alters and 
extends consumption behaviour. The point made by Douglas 
and Isherwood, in the last cited passage, is considered 
of crucial importance by Kline and Leiss (24) for an under-
standing of advertising and consumption behaviour. They 
consider that, 
"The idea of the symbolic constitution of 
utility is indispensible for a critique 
of consumer behaviour in an industrially 
advanced society." (25) 
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One of the ambiguities of the term consumption 
can be perceived in this context, i.e. between consumption 
as a form of economic behaviour, in a narrow financial 
sense, and consumption as a form of cultural behaviour, 
as a practice of reading. Myers, again, is keen to this 
difference, 
"It is important to make the distinction 
between the ability of an audience to 
comprehend or decode an advertisement in 
terms of its product message, and the 
possibility that the audience will react 
or respond to it by buying the product. 
Agency consumer research is geared to 
understanding the relationship between 
advertisement comprehension and purchase." (26) 
Advertising as comprehension is focused in this 
thesis. Reading is construed in terms of decoding and in 
terms of enacting a practice. This is the limited strategic 
project which determines how the term advertising is being 
understood here. Again it is this strategy which differs 
from those other projects which contextualise advertising. 
For example, Pateman theorises advertising in the following 
context. 
"What I am sketching out in this essay belongs 
to a wider endeavour by many theorists to re-
think the theory of the (formal) organization 
of texts and images in terms of a theory of 
the active comprehension of text and images in 
context, and thereby to complement theories of 
formal systems (linguistics, semiology) with 
a general theory of communication, itself a 
part of a general theory of action." (27) 
Kline and Leiss, alternatively, construe their 
study to be part of a larger project as follows, 
"Our study of advertising is intended to lay 
the basis in part, for new approaches to a 
theory of social change. In the social 
science models that celebrate the "consumer 
society", general increases in consumption 
levels - understood as increased access to 
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commodities - are regarded as prima facie 
evidence of social progress. Needless to 
say, we do not accept this view ... " (28) 
While Kline and Leiss are critical of those who 
propose the simple benefits of higher levels of consumption, 
and the consequent higher levels of marketing activity such 
as advertising, they reject what they conceive to be the 
central theme of radical critiques of consumer society and 
consumer culture. They consider this to be economic deter-
ministic conception of advertising, and culture generally, 
and a theory of ideology based on the concepts of commodity 
fetishism and false consciousness. 
Kline and Leiss situate their debate in the con-
text of one about the character of 'consumer society'. The 
construction of the so-called consumer society has proceeded 
gradually. The construction of a 'mass' audience, from the 
heterogeneous groupings of modern social formations, for 
consumption as both an economic and cultural form has pro-
ceeded unevenly. 
Ewen (29) charts the pre-history of modern advert-
ising in the United States. He considers it to begin in the 
1920's and 1930's, as do many American historians (30). He 
situates the post-second world war development of advertising 
in the United States and in other Western, capitalist countries 
ln the context of a complex field of strategies and social 
conflicts. The contours of those strategies and conflicts 
could be discerned first ln the 1920's. Consumerism, of which 
advertising is a major part, did not have, at first, the kind 
of "passively accepted legitimacy" (31) which it has achieved 
since the 1950's. 
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Ewen locates advertising as one element of a 
change of strategy on the part of industrial managers in 
the 1920's. It is implicated closely with the novel poss-
ibilities which a system of mass production permitted. 
The strategy involves the institution of a mass consumer 
market. This, Ewen argues, had two functions. It could 
serve as a device to overcome resistance to capitalism, as 
a system of production and as a social system, and it could 
serve as an outlet which sustained the continued production 
of commodities by certain means. The strategy, according 
to Ewen, was ideologically motivated and of a more functional 
character at one and the same time. 
The strong version of this thesis, of the ideol-
ogical character of advertising in the 1920's and 1930's 
has been challenged. Advertising it is argued, because 
addressing initially a highly restricted audience, could not 
have served to incorporate ideologically a resistant working 
class to a dominant social order (32). However, this does 
not invalidate some weaker and modified version of the ideo-
logical character of advertising from being constructed in 
relation to its operation in the post-1945 period (33). 
Ewen argues that advertising, in its most grand-
iose conceptions, was perceived as a tool of social order 
which sought to nullify the custom of ages and to break down 
and redefine individual habits (34). It was to superimpose 
new conceptions of individual attainment and community desire, 
while parrying anticorporate sentiment. 
While this was the explicit social aim of industrial 
leaders, Ewen indicates that these imperatives were constrained 
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by the strictures of economic possibility. Hence, in the 
1920's the consumer ethic could be addressed only to a 
small proportion of the American populace. Many sectors 
were ignored, especially those who were the poorest, a 
distinction which articulates cultural, racial and gender 
implications. 
Thus, the development of an ideology of consump-
tion responded both to the issue of social control and to 
the need for commodity distribution. As such, as Ewen 
clearly states, its development exhibited historically and 
structurally constrained limits and possibilities. 
It was not until the period of the post-1945 
economic boom that the social policies, first mooted in the 
1920's, began to make significant in-roads into the every-
day realities of American, and other Western, societies. At 
that juncture, consumerism could be articulated more closely 
to the securing of a specific form of social order. 
For Ewen, then, the ideological importance of 
advertising is as part of an immense cultural mobilisation, 
orchestrated by state intervention, which sought to establish 
the legitimacy of consumer-oriented, market-based, social 
democracy. That process of mobilisation began to incorporate 
elements of oppositional discourses and politics, such as 
feminism, socialism, syndicalism, and anarchism. They were 
used as material resources from which was constructed the 
affirmative vision of social democracy. Such incorporation 
encoded oppositional forms, as subjected to an ideological 
process of resolution which served as part of the complex 
articulation of an hegemonised social order. Advertisements 
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served as an apparatus whereby such incorporation could be 
achieved discursively while being distributed widely. 
That dominant ideological articulation attested 
social amelioration by way of the market and the satis-
faction to be achieved by way of market-based expectations. 
From the late 1960's, Ewen argues, that hegemonised order, 
which is dominated by a collusion of state and corporate 
forms, was beginning to be challenged severely. Social 
tensions began to be pursued through strategies of open 
conflict in the United States. The major agents of such 
challenges were the black movement, the student movement, 
the New Left and a re-vitalised feminism. 
That pattern of conflicts has been reiterated in 
other Western, capitalist countries, to some extent, although 
the specificity of the conflicts has been inflected by the 
colonial heritages which such nations possess. In the con-
text of the United Kingdom challenges to the hegemonised 
social order are rendered yet more complex in as far as the 
United Kingdom finds itself in a relation of subordination 
to the United States. State and corporate dominance in the 
united Kingdom finds many of its determinants in policy-
making decisions carried out effectively outside the bounds 
of the nation as such. 
In relation to critical challenges to advertising 
itself, these have been articulated most cogently through 
the marx ian discourses of the new left, and the new new left, 
and the various discourses of feminism. Most recently, 
challenges are being formulated more forcefully upon the 
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grounds of ethnicity. The United Kingdom increasingly lS 
perceived as 'multicultural' (35). 
The concerns of a marxisant socialism and feminism 
can be perceived, whether together or separately, in critical 
works produced since the early 1960's, in the United Kingdom 
and in other European countries (36). The debate on advertis-
ing has tended in recent years to articulate a series of 
interrelated issues. These focus on language and represent-
ation, ideology, the constitution Df social 
subjects, the character of the social order to which advertis-
ing belongs i.e. an hegemonised order, and the kinds of 
social control which such an order exhibits. 
The inter-related themes of language, discourse, 
representation and ideology have tended to occur in the 
context of explicity feminist critiques of advertising. 
Janice Winship's text, 'Advertising in Women's Magazines' 
(37), is an example of this strand. She argues that, 
"Ads as a means of representation and 
signification of 'woman' therefore con-
struct an ideology of femininity anew 
but in a mode which is determined by 
and relates to the material position of 
women 'outside' the ad, i.e. within the 
discursive and non-discursive practices 
of patriarchal relations of capitalist 
society. Insofar as the ads interpellate 
us as feminine subject(s) they are 
reciprocally 'effective' in establishing 
the particular modes through which we 
inhabit our economic and political place." (38) 
Other variants of feminist theorisations of advert-
ising, and of other systems of constitution and represent-
ation, have drawn upon a Lacanian conception of the social 
subject. This can be perceived clearly in Judith Williamson's 
'Decoding Advertisements' (39). 
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The use of Lacanian concepts, however, is not 
limited to specifically feminist critiques. Victor Burgin 
articulates a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective to 
semiology, which in itself is a Lacanian direction, and to 
marxian discourse. This articulation can be perceived to 
develop, from an initial positioning in the terrain of con-
ceptual and minimalist art practice, through a sustained 
consideration of photography. 'Photography, phantasy, 
function' (40) sets out the clearest exposition of his 
adaptation of the concept of suture, for the project of 
analysing photographically articulated discourse. 
The current study begins from that ground con-
structed by those challenges to advertising. The issues 
of representation, language, ideology, social order and 
the subject articulate the domain of what is understood to 
be referred to by the terms advertising and advertisements. 
It is proposed at this juncture to discuss two 
theoretical positions on reading advertisements in some 
detail. This is done in order to demonstrate what is at 
stake in pursuing a particular analytical strategy, i.e. 
that of deconstruction. This direction of analysis is to 
be distinguished from analysis as classification and analysis 
as interpretation. Deconstructive analysis does indeed 
incorporate a moment of interpretative (re-)construction, 
but rearticulates that construction, admitting other 
interests, desires and reasonings than what is construed 
as the inscribed intentionality. 
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The texts selected for more detailed discussion 
are 'Decoding Advertisements' by Judith Williamson (41) 
and 'How to do things with images?' and 'How is understand-
ing an advertisement possible?' by Trevor Pateman (42). 
They constitute two very different approaches to advertise-
ments. The aim of considering them is not to unify them but 
to use their conjunction as a principle of theoretical pro-
duction. Each approach entails a very different order of 
presupposition. In their conjunction, a set of problem-
atical issues become apparent for a study which endeavours 
to theorise advertising and advertisements as a discursive 
social practice and a textual resource. 
The conjunction of Judith Williamson's approach 
and Trevor Pateman's approach highlights reading as pro-
ductivity while indicating that a number of strategic 
decisions remain. Williamson is shown to articulate a 
deconstructive position but only occasionally. Her method 
posits, but holds in check a great deal of what becomes 
necessary for an analytical reading which deconstructs. 
Pateman is shown as bringing to attention the categories 
of determinants by means of which an intersubjectively 
acknowledged, inscribed intentionality can be realised by 
a reader of that inscription. The strategy of constructive 
interpretation is defined, and in that sense serves as a 
useful analytical tool for a possible deconstructive 
rearticulation. 
Through the conjunction of Judith Williamson's 
and Trevor Pateman's texts, a number of problematical issues 
~erge to which Section 3 is addressed. This provides an 
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aperture through which the selected advertisements are 
approached analytically, i.e. by way of the concept of 
suture itself, as an opening for entry, and a division 
which joins all the same. 
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2.21 DECODING ADVERTISEMENTS 
Decoding Advertisements is perhaps the most 
difficult text to read,from the position taken up in this 
thesis, given that it approaches so closely in places what 
is required o~ a deconstructive reading of advertisements. 
However, crucial methodological steps taken in the text of 
Decoding Advertisements prevent that objective, of decon-
struction, from being realised. The text is taken to con-
stitute overall a method of reading advertisements inter-
pretatively, as a critic, even though at certain points the 
text seems to suggest the possibility of doing more than 
that. 
The metaphor which structures the text of Decoding 
Advertisements is to liken the advertisement to the dream, 
that is, the dream as in a Freudian conception. The advert-
isement is understood as a set of manifest elements organised 
into a cohesive whole. The work of analytical interpretat-
ion is to take those elements and to resolve what are the 
other latent senses which they articulate. This work of 
interpretation undoes that previous work which has already 
gone into constructing a seemingly coherent whole, the 
manifest dream or the manifest advertisement. Thus the 
analytical interpretation lays bare the real, but latent, 
contents of the dream and advertisement, as distinct from 
the more illusory senses and coherence presented manifestly. 
On the basis of this organising metaphor, the text 
of Decoding Advertisements is divided into two parts. The 
first concerns the overt presentational forms and devices. 
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The second concerns the latent contents which are ordered, 
articulated, and _"manipulated through the structure of the 
presented forms and devices. 
Accordingly, advertisements, in presenting a 
whole whose sense is illusory, are interpreted in terms of 
the "referent systems" (1) they draw upon as a resource. 
Such referent systems are considered to be ideological. 
They are exterior to the advertisements and they pre-exist 
the advertisements. The advertisements simply refer to them. 
Referent systems provide the "basic 'meaning' material" (2) 
for advertisements. Referent systems draw their signific-
ance from areas outside of advertising. 
The topic of Part I of Decoding Advertisements is 
the way in which the structure of the advertisement orders 
the references made to such meaning material. However in 
the text it is hoped that, 
"it will be made clear that this process of 
meaning, the work of the signifiers, is as 
much a part of ideology and social convention 
as the more obvious signifieds". (3) 
Significantly advertisements may order and make reference to 
pre-existing meaning material but they may not be character-
ised as creating meaning. They cite and they re-order but 
they do not create: 
"the advertisement does not create meaning 
initially". (4) 
This is the major account of the way in which 
advertisements articulate meanings in Decoding Advertisements. 
They refer to basic meaning material. such material is 
ordered into distinct referent systems. Referent systems 
are ideological: 
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"A system of meaning must already exist ..• 
and this system is exterior to the ad - which 
simply refers to it ... 'Referent Systems': the 
subject of Part II ... are clearly ideological 
sys terns" (5) 
Advertisements become ideological because they depend upon 
reference to the meanings which constitute referent systems, 
which are "clearly ideological systems". The work of advert-
isements is to refer and to re-order, not to create, meanings 
and ideology. Part I of Decoding Advertisements, "an invest-
igation of signifiers and their systems in ads" (6), examines 
the work of advertisements in terms of structures of refer-
ence and citation and in terms of the organisation of such 
structural devices into manifest presentational wholes. 
While this is the major account of meaning in 
Decoding Advertisements, the one which structures the text, 
it is not the only one. A tension is set up between the 
structuring account and the other accounts of meaning which 
are implicit to the text. To simplify, the arena of con-
flict is between, on the one hand, an account of meaning 
primarily in terms of reference to pre-existing, exterior 
systems of meanlng material and, on the other hand, accounts 
of meaning which focus the production of meaning, in the 
advertisement itself for example. This conflict can be 
realised as a difference between two concepts of the object 
of study itself, the advertisement. This may be character-
ised as a difference between a concept of the advertisement 
as a formal entity and a concept of the advertisement which 
priorities its symbolic, social and institutional mode of 
operation. This issue becomes recognisable as the text of 
Decoding Advertisements unfolds. The potential conflict 
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can be realised in Decoding Advertisements in relation to 
the use made of three theoretical apparatuses therein. They 
are, first, a semiological vocabulary to depict the advert-
isement and its (formal) workings (i.e. signifier, signified, 
sign, signification, reference); second, an Althusserian-
derived account of ideology (i.e. ideology constitutes 
individuals as subjects in an imaginary relation to their 
real conditions of existence); third, a Lacanian-derived 
account of the subject (i.e. the reader of the advertise-
ment is reconstituted as subject through an engagement with 
the advertisement). 
The major criticism of Decoding Advertisements, 
from the position taken in this thesis, could be stated as 
follows. The advertisement in that text tends to be conceived 
predominantly as an evacuated, formal space. Its working is 
conceived in terms of formal manipulations. Meanings, 
ideology and the subject are exteriorised from that space. 
This makes it difficult to account for the operation of 
advertisements in re-constituting concrete individuals as 
subjects, in the first instance, and constituting subjects 
for ideology, in the second instance. While that formal 
conception predominates, it is in conflict with the actual 
procedures recommended in Chapter 2 for analysing advertise-
ments. In that chapter, the object of study is a space 
more complex than a simply formal one. The use of Althusserian 
and Lacanian concepts implies that the advertisement is an 
institutional space, in and through which subjects and 
objects are constituted. Furthermore, the use of semiological 
concepts, especially in as far as they are semiological con-
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cepts reworked by Lacan, conflicts with the notion of 
reference to pre-existing meaning material as an account of 
meaning. Semiological concepts, as reworked by Lacan, 
-
emphasize the production not only of signification but also 
of meaning through discourse, and hence consequently the 
production of the subject through discourse. In the meta-
phorical method of Decoding Advertisements, advertisements 
become likened to discourse, through the Lacanian reworking 
of a model inaugurated by Freud. While a resolution of 
these perspectives on meaning might be possible, for example 
one which incorporates a concept of the preconstructed as 
that which is called upon through the productions of 
signification and meaning, no explicit attempt is made in 
Decoding Advertisements to do so. As such, the text remains 
to be developed. 
The conflict becomes evident even from the choice 
of a model for conceiving the advertisement, i.e. Freud's 
conception of the dream. The term 'advertising work' (7) 
is chosen deliberately as the title for Part I because of 
Freud's insistence upon the operation of the elements of 
the dream. The implications of the stress upon work and 
operation, however, within the dream and correlatively within 
the advertisement are not followed through. The work of the 
signifiers is treated as a formal play and, as such, relatively 
unimportant. Thus, for example, the use of colour in advert-
isements is dismissed as "simply a technique" (8). Further-
more, 
"The use of colour is not significant in 
itself; it is the significance of the 
correlation it makes that forms the basis 
of my theory." (9) 
- 74 -
The signifiers are considered but only in as far as they stand 
for correlated signifieds. It is the signifieds which are 
considered to be important. The signifieds are organised as 
referent systems, the text asserts. This statement of 
principle brings to attention the first theoretical apparatus 
mentioned above, semiology, and the attendant problems of 
using that framework. 
Semiological accounts of meaning are constructed 
in order to emphasize the production of significations through 
the operation of codes in specific presentations. Some strict 
versions of semiology, such as Umberto Eco's Theory of 
Semiotics, stress the autonomy of such production with respect 
to any given decoder. Eco prioritises coding and sign-
production above the recognising of fully constituted signs. 
Such an approach stresses the constitutive role of signifi-
cation, i.e. not only in constituting signs but in inaugur-
ating novel coding practices. This approach is not over-
anxious to stress the pre-existence of signifieds, and is 
willing only to discuss signification, not any more broadly 
conceived notion of meaning. It is an approach more concerned 
to stress that when a given coding practice has been evoked 
and is being used signs can be generated from the presented 
material. Both new signifying forms (or signifying functions) 
and signifieds can be generated. This is counter to the 
assumptions stated in Decoding Advertisements. 
Furthermore, such extreme forms of semiological 
theory proceed without explicit reliance upon a concept of 
the subject. (10) The text of Decoding Advertisements, how-
ever, seeks to conjoin a semiological account of the sign and 
a more pragmaticist account of the sign: 
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"A sign is something which stands to somebody 
for something else, in some respect or 
capacity" (11) 
In some forms of semiological theory, but not all, the 
concept of the subject is treated with suspicion and avoided 
if at all possible. The productivity of signification is 
elaborated without reference to the subject. The problem 
of meaning, i.e. meaning for a subject, tends to be_ put 
in reserve as beyond the boundaries of semiological theory 
which concerns itself with signification more properly. 
Those semiological theories which do attempt to 
incorporate a concept of the subject, for example those of 
Lacan, Kristeva and Derrida, in turn render the assumptions 
of strict signification-based semiology problematic. It 
is precisely the Lacanian semiology which is selected to 
elaborate the work of advertisements in Decoding Advertise-
ments. 
The Lacanian semiology raises problems for the 
referential model, as set out on p. 19, which structures 
the text because that particular theoretical practice 
refuses explicitly to reduce discourse to being a process of 
formal manipulation. Nor, for that matter, is the Lacanian 
semiology pragmaticist in design. Lacanian semiology seeks 
to discuss discourse in its symbolic function, i.e. in its 
role of constituting a subject and its objects. (12) 
Indeed, in practice the text of Decoding Advertise-
ments moves a certain distance beyond its own stated struct-
ure when the Lacanian semiology is used to develop the under-
standing of advertisements. Four of the sections of Chapter 
2 set out to describe, 
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"firstly, how we create the meaning of a 
product in an advertisement; secondly, how 
we take meaning from the product; thirdly, 
how we are created by the advertisement; 
and fourthly, how we create ourselves in 
the advertisement." (13) 
This scheme implies a different conceptualisation of the 
advertisement than that set out in Chapter I, where it is 
defined primarily as an empty, formal space. The space the 
advertisement occupies now is considerably more complex 
(i.e. "we create ourselves in the advertisement"). 
Once more, however, the features of the advertise-
ment itself are projected onto an exteriority which con-
flicts with the implications of the notions of how we are 
created by the advertisement/how we create ourselves In the 
advertisement. Thus, it is stated that, 
"Every ad necessarily assumes a particular 
spectator: it projects into the space out 
in front of it an imaginary person composed in 
terms of the relationship between the elements 
within the ad. You move into this space as 
you look at the ad, and in doing so 'become' 
the spectator." (14) 
What is at stake here can be theorised through the concept 
of suture. (15) The overall implication is that the advert-
isement is more than a formal unity. The subject, already 
constituted in the symbolic, approaches the space of the 
advertisement and becomes sutured in the signifying chain 
which the advertisement presents. The subject thereby 
becomes deconstituted and reconstituted in the symbolic 
through the institutional space of the advertisement. The 
subject becomes part of a production of signification and 
of meaning. Thus, to rephrase the above quoted passage, 
'you' become not so much the (exterior) spectator of the 
advertisement as the advertisement itself, given that the 
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advertisement is conceived as a material, institutional 
site in and of the symbolic and the advertisement is conceived 
to constitute a discursive chain. 
The concepts of the symbolic, discourse (which is 
not used explicitly), and the subject remain difficult in 
the text of Decoding Advertisements. For example, it is not 
stated clearly enough that the subject is not the concrete, 
'skinbound biological individual ' . (16) Individualism and 
egotism are misrecognitions of the subject. The concrete 
individual is, more properly, a collectivity of subjects 
which do not constitute a unity. These recognitions are 
suggested in Decoding Advertisements through the discussion 
of Lacanian concepts, but they exist in an uneasy relation-
ship to an earlier definition in which it is stated that 
the term 'subject' is used, 
"to mean an individual who feels that he 
or she is an agent, acting out freely the 
dictates of a coherent ego" (17). 
The statement is ambiguous. It may be recognised to incor-
porate a critical assertion, to the effect that ego and 
individual are fictions, such as is stated clearly subsequen-
tly, 
"Part of the myth of individualism is the 
idea of a consistent identity" (18) 
They are fictions, however, which operate as misrecognit-
ions in the field of the symbolic and hence the social. The 
definition on p. 40 of Decoding Advertisements does not 
distinguish clearly enough the concept of the subject, as 
a field of relationships, from the notion of the individual, 
as a biological entity, on the one hand, and as a motivated 
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misrecognition, on the other hand. The third site of 
difficulty for the text of Decoding Advertisements emerges 
in relation to the use of these concepts, of subject and 
individual. 
The relation between the concept of the subject 
and the notion of the individual is considered through the 
lens of an Althusserian discussion of ideology. In that 
discussion, the subject is defined ln the following terms. 
"The relationship between 'ideology'and 
'subject' is one of simultaneous inter-
dependence. Thus when I refer to ideology, 
this also means the creation of a subject; 
and when I speak of the subject, this 
naturally involves his 'having' an ideology, 
as well as being created by it." (19) 
This must be taken as a reiteration, in other words, of 
Althusser's argument to the effect that "Ideology Inter-
pellates Individuals as Subjects" (20). 
"I say: the category of the subject is 
constitutive of all ideology, but at the 
same time and immediately I add that the 
category of the subject is only constitut-
ive of all ideology insofar as all ideology 
has the function (which defines it) of 
'constituting' concrete individuals as sub-
jects. In the interaction of this double 
constitution exists the functioning of all 
ideology, ideology being nothing but its 
functioning in the material forms of exist-
ence of that functioning." (21) 
The value of this scheme is that it stresses the material 
existence of ideology. Through its formulation advertise-
ments may be recognised as one of the material forms of 
existence of the functioning of ideology. It is the material 
existence and operation of advertisements that Decoding 
Advertisements approaches so closely yet exteriorises onto 
the subject and onto referent systems. The advertisement 
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becomes conceived as a formal space and not a material and 
institutional space through which ideological operations 
are realised. 
The third site of difficulty for the text of 
Decoding Advertisements exists as a conflict between 
different ways of conceiving ideology. The account of 
ideology constructed in Chapter 2 is primarily in terms of 
the interdependence of the concepts of subject and ideology 
in the tradition initiated by Althusser. In one sense, 
given this account, the term ideology does not have a 
pejorative use: 
"This is not pejorative: ideology may be 
'good' or 'bad'. But we must undo its 
transparency before we can even begin to 
decide what we think of it." (22) 
Ideology consitutes subjects for good or ill. Advertisements, 
however, have been designated as ideology previously because 
they refer to systems of values, called referent systems. 
Referent systems are ideological and hence so are advertise-
ments, in referring to them. (23) 
In yet another place in the text advertisements 
are said to, 
"obscure and avoid the real issues of society, 
those relating to work: to jobs, and wages and 
who works for whom. They create systems of 
social differentiation which are a veneer on 
the basic class structure of our society." (24) 
In saying this, is not a concept of ideology invoked which 
does imply a pejorative use? This construal of the operation 
of advertisements, in terms of a veneer, develops a point 
made in the Introduction: 
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"The fundamental differences in our society 
are still class differences, but use of 
manufactured goods as a means of creating 
classes or groups forms an overlay on them. 
This overlay is ideology ... " (25) 
Hence, advertisements are ideology in the following senses. 
First, advertisements obscure and avoid the real issues of 
society by creating an overlay or a veneer on them. That 
overlay is ideology. Second, advertisements refer to 
referent systems which are ideological systems. Advertise-
ments become ideological because they re-order those 
established senses. Third, advertisements constitute sub-
jects in an imaginary relation to their real conditions of 
existence. 
The difficulty is not that these three senses 
cannot possibly be resolved but that an account of how they 
are to be resolved is lacking in Decoding Advertisements. 
It is into that 'lack' that readers of that text are drawn 
and sutured into its discourse. What becomes obvious 
through that suture is that the use of the term ideology 
slips between being neutral and being pejorative and is for 
that reason difficult. It is a different proposition to 
assert that all (social) subjects are (necessarily) con-
stituted in an imaginary relation to their real conditions 
of existence than it is to assert that such an imaginary 
relationship operates as a process of mystification. 
It is implicit to the marxian, critical, sense 
of ideology that the process of mystification operates in 
the social to secure the dominance of certain social groups 
and classes in a definite social order. Such domination, of 
one part of a society by another, becomes the object of 
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critical attention. It requires the intervention of another 
form of consciousness, for example the revolutionary class 
consciousness of the proletariat, to overcome that form of 
consciousness imposed as ideology by the bourgeoisie. 
Althusser attempts to rework the concept of consciousness 
and ideology in terms other than that of ideas. In stress-
ing the material existence and operation of ideology he is 
following Gramsci. In building his case, however, Althusser 
overstretches the concept of ideology. Ideology becomes a 
necessary part of any society. The critical and more 
restricted sense of more traditional marxian accounts 
becomes weakened. It is that problem of overgeneralisation 
which troubles the text of Decoding Advertisements. 
There are many problems raised by any use of the 
term ideology. The assumption of a revolutionary truth 
implicit to the marxian concept, the positing of a true 
consciousness so to speak, itself raises problems. Is not 
the assumption of truth unKarranted? How is such a true 
consciousness possible given the generalised process of 
mystification? (26) Is ideology to be used as a synonym 
for 'bourgeois ideology'? (27) 
Any use of the term ideology, then, requires 
explicitly stated qualifications. The text of Decoding 
Advertisements introduces and sets the problem of how to 
conceptualise the advertisement as a complex institutional 
space whose operation may be characterised as ideological. 
What is required now is a development of that theoretical 
position. 
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2.22 THE PRAGMATICS OF ADVERTISING 
Judith Williamson, in Decoding Advertisements, 
brings to attention several important elements which con-
tribute to an understanding of how advertisements might be 
said to operate as a discursive space and as a social, 
institutional resource. The issue of meaning production 
is raised, in relation to theories of semiology; the issue 
of the constitution of the subject through reading is 
raised, in relation to psychoanalytically informed semio-
logical theories; the issue of the ideological inter-
pellation of subjects through reading is raised, in relation 
to marxian theories informed by both semiology and psy-
choanalysis. Furthermore, a conception of reading advertise-
ments which indicates that they may constitute an institut-
ional, discursive practice is raised, even if it does need 
developing. 
Trevor Pateman, in two essays on advertisements 
(1), takes a step towards providing a development of the 
ground opened up in Decoding Advertisements. In relation to 
semiological theories of meaning production, he raises the 
issue of the relationship between syntactic and semantic 
determinants, on the one hand, and what he calls pragmatic 
determinants, on the other hand. The general issue is one 
that concerns the contextual determinations of meaning pro-
duction from utterances, discourses or presentations. The 
issue of practice, or as Pateman terms it activity type 
(2), is also raised. Reading advertisements is conceived 
to constitute a particular activity type, a concept which 
- 85 -
encodes some of the features of what is being theorised 
in this thesis as discursive social practice. 
The general import of the points which Pateman 
raises is not rejected. ~hat is disputed, ho~evEr, 
is whether the theoretical apparatuses drawn upon in the 
two essays are capable of giving access to the kinds of 
recognitions sought in this thesis. Specifically, it is 
considered that Anglo-American philosophy of language finds 
it difficult to respond to problems of the order of ideology 
and to problems of the order of the unconscious (3). The 
concepts of performative act, pragmatic knowledge, and intent-
ion and the account of meaning production constructed from 
them are considered to rely too much uron the con-
scious ego of the rational agent to allow the issues which 
concern this thesis to be stated (4). Similarly, the 
reciprocal recognition and exchange of conscious intentions 
between associated rational speakers and hearers is con-
sidered not to provide a suitable or adequate theoretical 
basis for conceiving the kinds of 'communication' processes 
being enacted through reading advertisements. Advertisements 
are not elements in a conversation, and this is not for the 
reason that they are not spoken. 
The perspectives to which these two problems, of 
ideology and the unconscious, give rise do not permit the 
concept of intention, especially in the form of the self-
conscious intention of the rational agent, either to anchor 
meaning production or to anchor action. It is sought in 
this thesis to understand intention more in the form of a, 
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relatively dispersed, discursive and institutional inten-
tionality, rather than in the form of a fully-coherent, self-
conscious rational intention. Acts, or modes of action, 
may not be conceived, consequently, to be derived solely 
or fully from the forms of intention of rational egos. Act-
ions become conceivable as enactments of discursive and 
other kinds of institutional practices, and the modes of 
intentionality that such practices permit. Enactments are 
not simply conventional or rule bound. They are strategic. 
(5) New grounds and premises for institutional and dis-
cursive practices may be constituted through strategic 
enactments. 
Discursive and institutional forms of intention-
ality, or predispositions, may indeed take self-conscious 
forms. Intentionality, however, is not essentially self-
conscious nor is it essentially undivided (6). Intention-
ality is constituted through the enactment of social pract-
ices by subjects, whether in a discursive or a nondiscurs-
ive mode (7). The self-conscious awareness of that enact-
ment, and the intentionality entailed for subjects, may take 
different forms. Differences of awareness may give rise to 
different reasons being given for the enactment, and to 
different interests being formulated and constituted. As 
has been stated, problems of the order of ideology and of 
the order of the unconscious arise when these recognitions 
are made explicit. 
Pateman's accounts of reading advertisements 
introduce important elements for an understanding of read-
ing advertisements as a discursive social practice. While 
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his solutions are not accepted as they stand, his texts 
are shown to lead to the threshold of the theorisation 
of reading advertisements proposed in this thesis. 
Central to both of Pateman's accounts is a process 
of recognising correctly or identifying. In the first 
account, the process takes the form of identifying the primary 
speech act performed. This identification determines the 
referential content of the utterance or presentation. Further-
more, it guides the working out of the implications generated 
by what is uttered or presented and permits a construction 
of the relationships between what is implied and what is 
stated explicitly. 
In the second account, the concept of speech act 
has been reassessed and replaced (8). The function which 
that concept fulfilled is now taken by activity type (9). 
Utterances or presentations are identified as belonging to 
certain activity types. That identification takes place as 
a process of anticipation. It is a projective activity. It 
proceeds as an active anticipation using certain minimal 
cues to decide what is the situation being constructed (10). 
Reading advertisements, as enacting an instance of advert-
ising, is one such form of anticipatory activity. 
Once an utterance or presentation has been ident-
ified as being of a particular activity type, for example a 
given presentation is identified as an instance of advert-
ising, a certain pragmatic knowledge is implied. In the case 
of advertising, the minimal knowledge required as to its 
point or purpose is that an advertisement is for some product. 
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The product, therefore, becomes the structuring principle 
of the discourse uttered or presented (11). 
The ascription of an utterance or presentation to 
an activity type is crucial to all of the subsequent acts 
of recognition performed by the knowledgeable agent upon 
the discourse. It is that decision, as to what activity 
type the discourse belongs and therefore what situation is 
being enacted, which permits a knowledgeable agent to 
decide what is the purpose of the utterance and hence to 
select from what is uttered or presented that which is 
topical or thematic. To return to the case of advertising, 
the product is the theme. That ascriptive decision, 
furthermore, permits the knowledgeable reader to construe 
the relevance of the remaining elements of the discourse to 
the topic or theme. 
It is important to both of Pateman's accounts that 
the decision as to what activity type is being enacted be 
recognised as a form of pragmatic knowledge. It is realised 
as a set of pragmatic implications from a given discourse. 
This is a major element in realising the objective of the 
two essays. That objective is to show that accounts of 
meaning production which begin from a consideration of 
syntactic structures and semantic systems are inadequate 
in that they fail to acknowledge the pragmatic features of 
the situation which determine how those structures will be 
recognised and be worked upon. Examples of such a method, 
which begins from syntax and semantics, are structuralist 
analyses and semiological analyses. Pateman argues, in a 
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general sense, for a greater recognition of the importance 
of contextual determinants upon meaning production. The 
conception of activity type is designed to focus the import-
ance of pragmatic knowledge, concerning the contexts In 
which utterances operate, for meaning production. Such a 
concept also stresses the operational aspect of utterances, 
i.e. they work in given situations, over and above their 
representational function. He contends that "knowledge 
about the relations which standardly exist between "signs 
and their users", utterances and their utterers" (12) plays 
an important part in determining how a given utterance may 
operate and may represent in a particular context. 
The theoretical issue being developed through 
the two essays is consequent upon the recognition that advert-
isements are not so much instances of language, and hence 
open to a systematic analysis, as instances of discourse, 
and hence open to a more pragmatically sensitive analysis 
(13). Systematic analysis is of a less probabilistic 
character than is the analysis of pragmatic implication, 
which focusses the conditions of possibility of the uttered 
discourse. In Pateman's terms, 
"pragmatic implications of an utterance are 
worked out by hearers on the basis not only 
of linguistic knowledge, but on the basis of 
assumptions they make about the speakers 
intentions, the principles (e.g. relevance) 
governing the conversation,activity type, 
point or purpose, and so on." (14) 
This reiterates a point made in How to do things with images, 
wherein it is argued that, 
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"All syntaxes and semantics are prag-
matically modified, or, more precisely, 
have a pragmatic component." (15) 
From the position adopted in this thesis, there 
can be little difficulty in accepting the general point 
constructed in these two essays, i.e. that contextual 
components cannot be reduced to an exteriority or a second-
ary status in relation to syntactic and semantic features 
when discussing the determinants of meaning production. 
Meaning production depends in a crucial sense upon pragmatic 
decisions as to what is the situation, the explicit inten-
tionalities encoded in the utterance, etc .• What proves 
difficult to accept is that the theoretical apparatuses add-
uced in those two essays are the only, or even the most 
adequate, to enable the issue to be stated. 
In the first essay, Pateman seems to be preferr-
ing Anglo-American philosophy of language to Franco-Italian 
semiotics (16). It would be misleading, however, to consider 
that How to do things with images constructs a comparison 
between two theoretical schemes. Rather, Pateman seems to 
be exploring the possibility of using some concepts derived 
from philosophy of language to construct an understanding of 
what have become known as "images" (17). Advertisements are 
used as an example or a case of images (18). Images have 
served as a knotty problem for certain forms of philosophical 
discourse. 
Little consideration is given to Franco-Italian 
semiotics other than to contrast one essay on an advertise-
ment "image by Roland Barthes to a collectively established 
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tradition whose major figures are L. Wittgenstein, J.L. 
Austin, J.R. Searle, H.P. Grice, and which is supplemented 
by Chomskyan and neo-Chomskyan linguistics (19). It is 
hardly surprising that Franco-Italian semiotics is found 
wanting (20). Certain early versions of semiological theory 
may indeed have paid too little attention to the pragmatic 
features of the situation in which utterances are performed 
or enacted. The choice of so specific a text does not 
invalidate the entirety of Franco-Italian semiotics. For 
example, later semiological theories, which incorporate a 
psychoanalytic-derived component, could be shown to encode 
a recognition of the importance of context, albeit a very 
different notion of context to that of philosophy of language. 
Those later semiological theories shift their attention 
4i" ., ~ 
away from the enonce, what is uttered, towards enonciation, 
the act of uttering. Metz characterises this mode of attent-
ion in the following terms, 
"consideration of enonciation involves not 
only the social and psychological, i.e. non-
linguistic context of enonces, but also 
features of langue itself, ways the latter 
structures the possibility of enonciation ... 
The relation between enonciation and enonce is 
the relation between the speaker, his context 
and what he says; that is, the question of the 
subject's place in language." (21) 
Nor, indeed, can Franco-Italian theorisations which are 
informed by semiology be reduced to the horizons of a 
formalistic semiotics. 
Even if a more representative sample of Franco-
Italian theories were to be considered it would still prove 
difficult to construct a simple comparison such that they 
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might be preferred clearly to philosophy of language. 
This also presupposes that the institutional space for such 
a, presumed to be neutral, comparison exists and that the 
institutional space does not already encode a structure of 
preference toward the one or the other. Derrida points to 
some of the difficulties of finding an institutional site 
for a debate between the discourse of Anglo-American phil-
osophy of language and that of certain forms of French-
language philosophy. In responding to Searle's essay, 
Reiterating the differences: a reply to Derrida (22), 
Derrida indicates that Searle's uses of the adverbs evidently 
and obviously had aroused his suspicions. He, rather dis-
engenuously, remarks that, 
"I would have liked to quiet my suspicions 
in order to enjoy such condour unreservedly." 
(23) 
More significantly, he continues, 
"Loyalty and the absence of simulation are 
so rare in French-language polemics, which 
are characterised by the use of elision, 
ellipsis, self-censorship and a strategy 
that is both artful and indirect." (24) 
What arises is an incomensurability of argurnentational 
strategies, even while the confrontations take place, which 
leads one side to attest that the confrontation never quite 
takes place (25). 
It would seem that what Derrida seeks to provoke, 
with his artful and indirect strategy, is an impatience which 
releases moral indignation and moral censure in order to 
demonstrate that certain philosophical traditions encode 
metaphysical premises which are fundamentally moralistic 
(26). His strategy is to draw out those presuppositions by 
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forcing the hand of those philosophical discourses such that 
their evaluative decrees become explicit. 
Searle is not the only 'opponent' to have objected 
vehemently to Derrida's prose and procedures. Foucault, for 
example, who is hardly a philosopher of language in the 
Anglo-American tradition, reacts irritatedly to what he calls 
the "'textualisation' of discursive practices" (27), which 
he alleges may be found in Derrida's work. He defines that 
process as, 
"the reduction of discursive practices to 
textual traces; the elison of the events 
produced therein and the retention only of 
marks for a reading; the invention of voices 
behind texts to avoid having to analyse the 
modes of implication of the subject in dis-
courses; the assigning of the originary as 
said and unsaid in the text to avoid replac-
ing discursive practices in the field of 
transformations where they are carried out." (28) 
Such procedures constitute, according to Foucault, a "histor-
ically well-defined little pedagogy" (29). 
What is difficult to assess is at what point does 
an impatience with the texts of Derrida become a valid 
response. For while Derrida may pay a great deal of 
explicit attention to the principle of contextual deter-
mination (30), does he at any point discuss clearly how 
determinate contexts have intervened to arrest and fix 
discursive procedures at given concrete, historical con-
junctures. Does he, consequently, discuss how certain forms 
of discourse, when located in distinct institutions, operate 
differently even while partaking of an identical set of pro-
cedures. Derrida may be unsuccessful in realising, through 
artful and indirect argumentation, some very important 
aspects of contextual determination. 
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Thus, for example, Derrida tends very often ln 
practice to restrict the content he considers relevant to 
other texts (31). He tends to construct a homogeneous 
world in which lIall metaphysicians ll (32) may be likened to 
one another. Thus, 
IIAll metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, 
Descartes to Husserl, have proceed in this 
way ... 11 (33) 
The context here is discursive strategy and the 'doing' is 
constructing arguments. Foucault's criticism seems to 
have some validity, i.e. that differently located discursive 
practices, constructed with different objectives and enacted 
ln distinct institutionalised situations are being reduced 
to an identical textual procedure. Derrida emphasises one 
context excessively, i.e. the metaphysical presuppositions 
drawn upon by constructed discourses, the system of 
entailments thereby introduced into the discourse, and 
hence the pre structuring of the text as metaphysical. In 
proceding thus, does not Derrida construct the very structure 
he claims to discover (34)7 
Thus, while there remaln serlOUS problems with 
Foucault's 'archaeology', of which Derrida is an astute 
critic (35), it may be more productive in the long run. For 
even while Derrida criticises Foucault for relying on an 
extra-textual, morally authentic, privileged position, 
Derrida himself still requires the textual space for an 
authentic mode of utterance, a kind of privileged statement 
his strategy sets out to question (36). Foucault's position 
may be more productive, then, in that his practice permits 
a greater attention to be paid to the II particular institut-
ionalisations of a theoretical discourse" (37). 
95 
Derrida is conscious that the deconstruction of 
theoretical discourses need not necessarily have an immediate 
political effect at the level of the institutional order of 
the social. His position is that excessive haste to achieve 
political results should not place limitations upon theoret-
ical deconstruction. The deconstruction of metaphysical 
presuppositions is not in itself a sufficient critique of 
current institutions (38). 
Derrida's approach may permit a relatively abstract 
account of processes of legitimation and authorisation in 
discourse. Foucault, alternatively, gives access not only 
to the constitution of the subject in textual discursive 
spaces but also provides accounts of the relationships 
between such discursive practices and the more complex 
institutional domains in which discursive practices operate 
and, to a limited extent, determine. These accounts may be 
faulted in terms of what they presuppose but they are 
undoubtedly useful. The archaeology of knowledge (39), 
for example, concerns itself with the constitution of dis-
cursive formations as sets of inter-related statements. 
Discursive practices are constituted through the use of 
these statements, by legitimated subjects, to act upon and 
to act in a given institutional domain. The birth of the 
clinic and Discipline and punish (40) document changes of 
strategy which are at once discursively and nondiscursively 
institutional. 
Foucault works towards a theorisation of the 
imbrication of certain discourses, those which claim to 
produce knowledge, in fields of strategies. Such dis-
courses take up a role in the construction and maintenance 
of relationships of power both within specific institutional 
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spaces and in the extended institutional order of the 
social formation by which the specific institution is con-
textualised (41). Foucault, in concentrating closely upon 
this field of relationships, is sensitive in his writing to 
the historical limits of certain regimes of 'truthful' 
discourse. He is acute in discussing the relationships 
between specific forms of discourse and the concrete instit-
utional and social conjunctures in which they operate. 
It is important to note, then, that while Foucault 
and Derrida engage in a polemic to expose one another's 
shortcomings, i.e. Derrida's 'textualisation' of discursive 
practices and Foucault's presupposition of a 'meta?hysical 
moralism', they are both keenly aware of the notion of con-
textual determination in respect of discourses. Furthermore, 
they both point to what might be recognised as one of the 
major weaknesses of speech act theory, Anglo-American 
philosophy of language and pragmatics, which is to say the 
inability of these theoretical apparatuses to reply to 
problems related to ideology and the unconscious. 
Other examples of Franco-Italian theories could be 
cited, such as those of Bourdieu, Pecheux, Gramsci, and, to 
a limited extent, Eco which encoded a recognition of the 
principle of contextual determination. It may be recognised 
also that these varieties of theory develop more articulated 
conceptualisations of context than has been attempted so far 
from within the tradition of philosophy of language (42). 
The characteristic limitations of Anglo-American 
philosophy of language, then, would not be solved at a 
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stroke by adopting Derrida's position or Foucault's position. 
The different ways of conceiving problems and objects of 
study employed by these two writers, however, might suggest 
paths round the over-reliance, found in philosophy of language, 
upon the conscious, rational ego as the one who speaks and 
acts on the basis of conscious intentions. The difficulties 
which arise for philosophy of language in relation to those 
acts which were not recognised immediately, either by speaker 
or hearer, but were subsequently recovered and recognised 
to have unintended consequences might begin, at least, to 
be formulated more explicitly (43). The concepts of intent-
ion, speaker, context, situation, pragmatic knowledge, per-
formative act, and illocutionary force (44) might lose their 
simplicity when thought through a Foucauldian or Derridean 
theoretical approach, but they might gain consequently in 
rigour and clarity. 
While Pateman's general point about contextual 
determination has validity, then,it is not obvious that the 
limitations imposed through the presuppositions implicit to 
philosophy of language, which he draws into his essays, 
have been overcome. It is to be granted that Pateman does 
begin to tackle some of those presuppositions in the second 
essay, How is understanding an advertisement possible? For 
example, he tackles the assumption of immediacy and the 
assumption of pure reciprocity. In the first essay, the 
position taken is that, 
"I only wish to point out that advertiser 
and consumer are locked together in a 
dialectical argument, possessing its own 
rhetorical style, and governed by the co-
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operative principle of conversation. There 
are right and wrong ways of doing things with 
advertising images. The criteria are to be 
found not only in the rhetoric of the image, 
but in what we might now decide to call the 
pragmatics of advertising." (45) 
In the second essay, however, this view has been modified to 
accommodate a recognition of "the anonymous and non-reciprocal 
character of the communication" (46) process in which advert-
isements partake. It is to be recognised that advertisements 
are relatively decontextualised as discourse. They are open, 
therefore, to different reading strategies. The concept of 
strategy replaces that of rule. 
The concept of strategy remains ambiguous in 
Pateman's conceptualisation of the 'communication' process. 
First, it may be seen to be reducible to the notion of game 
strategy. In a game, strategy is worked out within the 
rules. the concept of strategy required in relation to 
reading advertisements may not be so easily conceived. 
There are no simply fixed rules for reading advertisements 
which may be consulted by the participants. Such an order 
is not guaranteed. Second, "strategic action" (47) might 
be conceived as being an inferior form of action. It is 
not clear whether "communicative action" (48), a term 
borrowed from Habermas, is being proposed as communication 
proper, so to speak, while strategic action is that mode 
of action which can only aspire to such fullness and proper-
ness (49). It is important, as far as the position taken 
in this thesis is concerned, not to make strategic action 
internal to a fully regulated, autonomous game, nor to make 
it inferior to a higher form of action. Pure reciprocity, 
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such as it is possible, must itself be recognised as 
strategic in character. 
Reading advertisements is not, then, to be conceived 
as a process of extraction by readers, i.e. as consumers, of 
what has been put in as content by advertisers. Reading 
advertisements is not a 'communication' process in that sense 
(50). Consumers and advertisers may not be conceived as 
if they were rational individuals engaged in a cooperative 
conversation. First, because the intentionality of advert-
isers is not constituted as the conscious intention of an 
individual. It is constituted in and through a mode of 
practice. Its intentionality is of an institutional and not 
an individual or a conscious order. Second, because readers 
are not all constituted equally as consumers. 
Through the institutional practice of advertising 
certain effects are sought in readers, as Pateman indicates. 
But this is not simply "manipulation" (51). Readers are 
aware of the effects desired when they constitute a textual 
presentation as an advertisement. Readers, however, do not 
all know of those desired effects to the same degree or care 
to adhere to them to the same degree. Readers are not all 
equally consumers from two inter-linked perspectives. First, 
they do not all have equal linguistic and semiotic skills 
as subjective resources to realise the effects sought by 
advertising, and consequently to dis-implicate themselves 
from those effects. Second, they do not have equally the 
material economic and financial resources which advertisers 
seek to mobilise through spending on represented products 
and which, conversely, would make them as readers interested 
in reading texts as if they were advertisements. 
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In short, there is no guarantee that the advert-
isement will be read properly, such as the guarantee provided 
by the cooperative principle of conversation cited by Pateman. 
There is no guarantee that the reader will identify with the 
inscribed addressee, the consumer. To read advertisements 
properly would be to realise the institutional intentionality 
of marketing and advertising through an equally institutional 
practice of reading. Advertisements may have unintended 
consequences. 
In Pateman's earlier account, the reader is 
unambiguously identified with the consumer: 
"advertiser and consumer are locked together in 
a dialectical argument" (52) 
"the impli'cations worked out by the consumer" (53) 
In the later account, the two terms are more dissociated: 
"there is little readers can do to reduce 
their uncertainty about the implications 
of an advertisement" (54) 
"Advertisers get consumers to do their dirty 
ideological work for them ... if the consumers 
refused to play the game advertisers would have 
to change direction" (55) 
When it is clearly acknowledged that the reader is not 
necessarily the consumer, the relevance of Pateman's 
accounts for this thesis becomes more conspicuous. What 
may be derived from those two essays is an understanding 
of how a reader may identify with a subject position 
inscribed in the advertisement as textual construction and 
as institutional resource. The reader becomes sutured 
into a textually articulated discourse. To identify with 
the inscribed position is to accept the authority of the 
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advertisement. The reader is not bound to accept the 
authority or legitimacy of the inscribed intentionality, 
an intentionality which is of a discursively institutional 
character. 
It is for that inscribed subject position that the 
product is the theme of the discourse. Identifying with the 
consumer, as inscribed subject position, is correlated to 
the identification of the discourse, as belonging to a 
particular kind of practice and therefore to be elaborated 
according to particular strategies (i.e. not rules) and 
procedures. 
Pateman's theorisation becomes an account of what 
might be called the secondary revisions required in order 
to make of particular presentations a centred, thematic 
discourse, i.e. a rational discourse for a conscious ego. 
The topic of that discourse is the product. That rational 
discourse is to be constructed from the set of textual 
elements which are the instituted resources of the present-
ation. The question of the image structure lS also dealt 
with succinctly by Pateman's approach, In that graphic and 
pictorial elements are to be construed as contributing 
to a rational, thematic discourse. 
While Pateman's accounts focus upon the rational 
ego as the means by which the institutional intentionality 
of marketing and advertising is realised discursively, the 
object of study in this thesis is the constitution of the 
consumer as discursive subject. Furthermore, the aim 
inscribed in this thesis is to resist the simple realisation 
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of that intentionality. This is where the differences between 
Pateman's essays and the current thesis may be located. 
The "denial of responsibility" (56) which is avail-
able as a strategy to advertising practitioners, i.e. to deny 
that any particular interpretation was intended, is responded 
to by a second strategy. In that strategy the symbolic re-
sources which are distributed throughout the presentations 
are recognised. The possibilities of their being formed into 
one or a number of narrativised, pictorialised, or dramatised 
wholes is similarly recognised. Those variously rationalised 
wholes are consequently re-read, this time deconstructively. 
This second reading involves a structured play with the 
different contexts which can be adduced, and which can be 
generated from the presentations. 
Pateman's two essays are important for opening up 
a debate concerning the character of the contextual deter-
minants of meaning production and for introducing a notion 
of enacting a particular activity type. What needs to be 
drawn out more explicitly, however, are the elements of the 
notion "socially constituted" (57) which is embedded in the 
definition that Pateman cites of activity type. Simply 
stated, it is sought in this thesis to construct a recognit-
ion of how regularised social practices, such as the dis-
cursive social practice of reading advertisements, are over-
determined in an extended institutional order. The notions 
of activity type and language game, or even strategic action 
as used by Pateman, (58) presume too great a degree of 
autonomy for practices. Social practices are not fully 
autonomised games. Their strategic possibilities are con-
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ditional both in respect of the constituted interiority of 
the practice and the exteriorites which they re-mark (59) 
and which serve as the conditions of existence of the pract-
ice. The concept of social practice permits a recognition 
of a degree of autonomisation and regularisation for practices, 
but it also encodes a conceptualisation of the constraints 
imposed upon partially autonomised practices. 
The orientation taken up in this thesis, to consider 
reading advertisements as a form of discursive social practice, 
gives rise to problems concerning the subject of discursive 
social practice, the interpellation of that subject by and 
for ideology, and the constitution of what might be termed 
an 'unconscious', as a resistant residue. Decoding Advertise-
ments engaged with these problems from one perspective, employ-
ing semiology, marxian discourse,and semiciogically-influenced 
psychoanalytic theory. How to do things with images and How 
is understanding an advertisement possible? tackle related 
issues, employing philosophy of language, some semiology, 
pragmatics and linguistics. The means by which these latter 
two essays approach reading advertisements may not be pursued 
directly in this thesis. The concepts of communication, 
intention, activity type and pragmatic knowledge are all 
critically re-assessed in the light of theoretical frame-
works associated with Foucault and Derrida, amongst others. 
Nevertheless, the issues raised in those two essays are 
pursued indirectly, through a concern for contextual determ-
ination and the enactment of regularised social practices. 
It is to an explicit theoretical elaboration of this field 
of problems that the thesis now turns. 
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Pateman, T. How to do things with images: an 
essay on the pragmatics of advertising. Theory 
and Society, vol. 9 1980, p. 603-622. 
This is referred to in these notes as Pateman, T. 
(1980a) • 
Pateman, T. How is understanding an advertisment 
possible? (In Language, image, media; edited by 
H.H. Davis and P. Walton. Blackwell, 1983. p. 187-
204) . 
This is referred to in these notes as Pateman, T. 
(1983) • 
The first essay may also be found in Pateman, T. 
Language, truth and politics. 2nd edition, Lewes, 
Sussex: Jean Stroud, 1980 p. 215-237. 
This book is referred to in these notes as Pateman, 
T. (1980b). 
This concept lS introduced by Pateman in the second 
of the cited essays. See Pateman, T. (1983), p. 189. 
The unconscious: while not a thoroughly Freudian 
concept, this term bears the mark of a Freudian 
heritage from which it has been exised. The 
unconscious as used herein is a semiological con-
cept first and foremost. 
See Derrida, J. Limited Inc abc ... Glyph, 2 1977, 
p. 162-254. 
In this long essay Derrida discusses the character-
istic limitations of philosophy of language in 
terms such as the following: 
" .•• at the "origin" of every speech act, there 
can only be Societies which are (more or less) 
anonymous, with limited responsibility or liabil-
ity *Sarl - a multitude of instances, if not of 
"subjects", of meanings highly vulnerable to 
parasitism - all phenomena that the "conscious ego" 
of the speaker and the hearer (the ultimate 
instances of speech act theory) is incapable of 
incorporating as such and which, to tell the 
truth, it does everything to exclude." 
Limited Inc abc .•. , p. 216. 








This is not the concept of strategy used in 
Pateman's essays, in the form of strategic 
action, a term derived from Habermas. The 
concept of strategic action seems to imply a 
sense of manipulation. It also seems to be 
implied that such "manipulation" is inferior to 
communicative action. Furthermore, the definit-
ion of strategic action presupposes speakers and 
hearers in an ideal speech situation: 
" ... strategic action (manipulation) is defined 
in terms of intention to achieve an effect 
where the successful achievement of the effect 
is partly dependent on the hearer's non-recognition 
of the intention to achieve that effect ... " 
Pateman, T. (1983), p. 200-201. 
Strategic action, in this thesis, is not simply 
distorted or defective communicative action. 
Such a possibility as communicative action must 
itself be conceived as strategic in character. 
Intention is not being discarded simply. The 
simplicity of intentionality is being put in 
question, in the manner in which Derrida conceives 
the notion of iterability: 
"What is limited by iterability is not intent-
ionality in general, but its character as being 
conscious or present to itself (actualised, 
fulfilled, and adequate), the simplicity of its 
features, its undividedness" 
Limited Inc abc ... , p. 249. 
This distinction between discursive and nondis-
cursive is developed in the theoretical section, 
Section 3. 
See Pateman, T. (1980b), p. 237. 
"To say, as I do, that 'advertising is to be 
thought of as a class of speech act' is pretty 
implausible. For Searle, speech acts are the 
minimal units of linguistic communication, 
whereas an advertisement is plainly not a 
minimal unit - it may be made up of speech acts, 
but it is not itself one." 
See also note 12 of Pateman, T. (1983), p. 203. 
Pateman takes the concept from Levinson, whom he 
quotes as follows: 
"I take the notion of an activity type to 
refer to a fuzzy category whose focal members 
are goal-defined, socially constituted, 

















setting, and so on, but above all on the 
kinds of allowable contributions. Paradigm 
7xamp17s would be teaching, a job interview, a 
~ural lnterrogation, a football game, a task 
ln a workshop, a dinner party, and so on." 
Pa ternan, T. ( 1983), p. 193. 
Pateman adds 
by Levinson. 
advertising to the list constructed 
Pateman, T. (1983) , p. 188. 
Pateman, T. (1983) , p. 192. 
Pateman, T. (1980a) , p. 606. 
Pateman, T. (1983) , p. 187. 
Pateman, T. (1983) , p. 199. 
Pateman, T. (1980a) , p. 611. 
See Pateman, T. (1980a) , p. 603. 
"Undertaking the wholesale transfer of concepts 
and theories from philosophy of language permits 
an analysis of images at least as interesting 
and probably more precise or intersubjectively 
verifiable than the image analysis which has 
come out of recent Franco-Italian semiology and 
semiotics." 
Pateman, T. (1980a), p. 603. 
Pateman, T. (1980a), p. 603. 
Pateman, T. (1980a), p. 603. 
In a footnote to How is understanding an advertise-
ment possible?, Pateman acknowledges that even 
Barthes himself was aware of the notion of context-
ual, 'pragmatic' determination, even if his earlier 
essay, Rhetoric of the image, was not concerned to 
stress those features of meaning production. 
Metz, C. The imaginary signifier. Screen, vol. 
16(2) Summer 1975. p. 14-15, note 2. 
Searle, J. Reiterating the differences: a reply 
to Derrida. Glyph, 1 1977, p. 198-208. 
Derrida, J. Ope cit., p. 176. 











See Derrida, J. Ope cit. , p. 174-176. 
See Derrida, J. OPe cit. , p. 173. 
Foucault, M. My body, this paper, this fire. 
Oxford Literary Review, 4 (I) Autumn 1979, p. 27. 
Foucault, M. OPe cit. , p. 27. 
Foucault, M. Ope cit. , p. 27. 
For example, see Derrida, J. OPe ci t. , p. 220. 
"the import of context can never be dissociated 
from the analysis of a text, and that despite or 
because of this a context is always transform-
ative-transformable, exporative-exportable." 
"Every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken 
or written (in the current sense of this opposition), 
in a small or a large unit, can ... break with every 
given context, engendering an infinity of new 
contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimit-
able. This does not imply that the mark is valid 
outside of a context, but on the contrary that 
there are only contexts without any center or 
anchoring." 
and Derrida, J. Ope cit., p. 198. 
"To treat context as a factor from which one can 
abstract for the sake of refining one's analysis, 
is to commit oneself to a description that cannot 
but miss the very contents and object it claims 
to isolate, for they are intrinsically determined 
by context. The method itself, as well as con-
siderations of clarity should have excluded such 
an abstraction. Context is always, and always 
has been, at work within the place, and not only 
around it." 
For example, see Derrida, J. OPe cit., p. 173, 
where it is asserted that the authors of the 
'reply to Derrida', Searle + n, seemed not to 
be aware of "the other texts that form the context 
of Sec and endow it with a certain meaning." 
(Derrida, J. Ope cit., p. 173.) Sec refers to 
Derrida's essay 'Signature event context' which 
can be found in Margins of philosophy. Brighton: 
Harvester Press, 1982. p. 307-330. 
Derrida, J. Limited Inc abc ... , p. 236. 





The issue is stated clearly by David Wood: 
"Does not the deconstruction of the history 
of philosophy of presence already posit as a 
history, as a series of expressions of the 
same theme. Does it not, in other words, at 
the very moment at which it discovers the 
pervasiveness of presence, thereby making 
'presence' present, display it as a unity of 
the series of its appearances. Derrida's list 
goes on like this: 
" •.• (presence of the thing to the sight as 
eidos, presence as substance/essence/existence 
(ousia), temporal presence as point (stigme) of 
the now or of the moment (nun), the self-
presence of the cogito, consciousness, sub-
jectivity, the co-presence of the other and of 
the self, intersubjectivity as the intentional 
phenomenon of the'ego, and so forth" ... the con-
dition of the unity of the list is surely the 
way in which each of its elements exemplifies 
the essence of presence." 
Wood, D. Derrida and the paradox of reflection. 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 
vol. 11(3) October 1980, p. 230-231. 
It is not possible, for example, for Foucault to 
write the history of a silence as if from an 
authentic position of interiority. See Bennington, 
G.P. Cogito incognito: Foucault's 'My body, this 
paper, this fire'. Oxford Literary Review, 4(1) 
Autumn 1979, p. 7. 
See also Derrida, J. Limited Inc abc ... , p. 173. 
"Signature event context analyses the metaphysical 
premises of Anglo-Saxon - and fundamentally 
moralistic - theory of the performative, of speech 
acts or discursive events. In France, it seems 
to me that these premises underlie the hermeneutics 
of Ricoeur and the archaeology of Foucault." 
See Wood, D. Style and strategy: Heidegger and 
Derrida. Monist, vol. 63 1980, p. 506: 
"Finally, self-reflection, or perhaps better, 
self-commentary. This includes all those remarks 
in which Derrida explicitly explains the problems 
of his kind of texts, the need for strategy, the 
risks of sterility, the debts he has to other 
thinkers, etc .• What is so important about them 
is that they seem to themselves occupy a privileged 









SERIOUSLY, even URGENT, and yet they are part of, 
and necessary parts of texts that question the 
very possibility of such a privilege of the 
serious and the literal." 
Culler, J. On deconstruction. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1983, p. 159. 
See Culler, J. Ope cit., p. 156-179. The title 
of this section is 'Institutions and inversions'. 
Foucault, M. Archaeology of knowledge. London: 
Tavistock, 1972. 
Foucault, M. The birth of the clinic: an archaeology 
of medical perception. London: Tavistock, 1973. 
Foucault, M. Discipline and punish: the birth of 
the prison. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. 
See Foucault, M. Discipline and punish, p. 27-28. 
"Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition 
that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist 
only where the power relations are suspended and 
that knowledge can develop only outside its 
injunctions, its demands and its interests." 
"We should admit rather that power produces 
knowledge ... ; that power and knowledge directly 
imply one another; that there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field 
of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations. These 'power-knowledge relations' are 
to be analysed, therefore, not on the basis of 
a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in 
relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, 
the subject who knows, the objects to be known 
and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded 
as so many effects of these fundamental implicat-
ions of power-knowledge and their historical trans-
formations." 
Unless, by some perverse overturning, Habermas were 
to be included in that tradition. See Rasmussen, 
D.M. Communicative action and philosophy: 
reflections on Habermas' 'Theorie des kommunikativen 
handelns'. Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 
9(1) 1982, p. 2-28. 
See Derrida, J. Limited Inc abc ... , p. 216. This 
passage is quoted in note 4 above. 
See also Graham, K. Illocution and ideology: 





(In,Issues in ~a~xist philosophy. Vol. 4, 
Soclal and polltlcal philosophy; edited by 
J. Mepham and D.H. Ruben. Brighton: 
Harvester, 1981. p. 153-192). 
Note especially: 
"Skinner himself argues thus: recovery of 
illocutionary force is a necessary stage in 
the explanation of utterance and other acts; 
illocutionary force is defined by the speaker's 
intentions; what someone can meaningfully 
intend depends on what he believes; therefore, 
there is a necessary stage in the explanation 
of such actions which must make reference to the 
agent's beliefs ... But the conclusion will no 
longer follow if, as I have suggested, the link 
between illocution and intention is broken. On 
the contrary, if illocutionary redescription is 
a necessary stage in the explanation of action, 
and if some illocutionary redescriptions do not 
depend on the agent's intentions, then there will 
be a necessary stage in the explanation of some 
action which does not rest on the agent's inten-
tions. And then it further follows that if the 
reason we must pay attention to the agent's 
beliefs is that they place a constraint on what 
he can intend, then there will be a stage in the 
explanation of some action which does not require 
attention to the agent's beliefs, even though it 
is a stage at which what he is doing is in question." 
Graham, K. OPe cit., p. 162-163. 
Keith Graham argues to the effect that there is not 
a definitional link between intention and ill-
ocutionary force. Illocutionary force cannot be 
explained by reference to intention alone. 
The notion of illocutionary force is derived from 
Austin's categorisation of linguistic acts into 
locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. 
Austin uses the notion of illocutionary force to 
establish that when a discourse is uttered some-
thing is not only said but also done. Uttering 
discourse is conceived as a form of doing. 
Strawson develops the concept, but Graham approaches 
it through the work of the historian Quentin 
Skinner. He uses the notion to locate texts in 
their historical contexts, by trying to establish 
what was their illocutionary force, given what 
was possible in terms of their operation as 
'meaningful', as both saying and doing. 
Pateman, T. (1980a), p. 621. 















Pa ternan, T. (1983), p. 200. 
Pa ternan, T. (1983), p. 200. 
See the definition of strategic action cited 
in note 5 above. 
See Derrida, J. Limited Inc abc •.. , p. 220. 
Pa ternan, T. (1983), p. 200. 
Pateman, T. (1980a), p. 621. 
Pateman, T. (1980a), p. 620. 
Pa ternan, T. (1983), p. 200. 
Pa ternan, T. (1983), p. 200. 
Pateman, T. (1983), p. 200. 
Pa ternan, T. (1983), p. 189. 
For activity type, see Pateman, T. 
For language game, see Pateman, T. 
For strategic action, see Pateman, 
p. 200. 
(1983), p. 189. 
(1980b), p. 237. 
T. (1983), 
Re-mark: this is a concept taken from Derrida. 
"What is announced here, as I tried to indicate 
in "la double seance" (double science, double sense, 
double scene), is again the operation of the double 
mark or the re-mark. The concept of matter must 
be marked twice ... : in the deconstructed field -
that is the phase of overturning - and in the 
deconstructing text outside the oppositions in 
which it has been caught (matter/spirit, matter/ 
ideality, matter/form, etc.) By means of the 
interval between the two marks, one can operate 
both an overturning deconstruction and a positively 
displacing, transgressive, deconstruction." 
Derrida, J. positions. Chicago: University of 




3.1 PRACTICE AND PRODUCTION 
A number of features may be recognised to have 
emerged as important in relation to understanding the adver-
tisement as an institutional, discursive resource and 
reading advertisements as the enactment of a relatively 
regularised discursive social practice. These may be named 
as follows: the concept of meaning as the discursive pro-
duction of readings; the constitution of the subject, In 
its intersubjective and its object relations, through read-
ing; the interpellation of constituted subjects by and for 
ideology; the contextual determination of meaning production 
from utterances or presentations; the enactment of discurs-
ive meaning production as a (relatively) regularised activity 
or, in the term preferred herein, practice. 
Furthermore, a number of specific difficulties 
have been seen to arise in relation to these important 
features. These may be sketched in the following way. The 
character of the discursive space of reading advertisements 
needed to be settled more precisely, otherwise it might tend 
to be conceived as a formal space. The character of the sub-
ject needed to be distinguised more clearly from what it is 
not, i.e. the subject is not an essential unity centred upon 
(individual) consciousness, the biological body, or the 
rational identity as ego. A problematic featuring the sub-
ject, not the individual, raises difficulties in relation to 
the character of intentionality. If intentionality is 
recognised to be institutionally and discursively dispersed, 
- 113 -
the problem arises of a certain unconscious, for want of 
a better term. Individual and conscious intentionality 
may be recognised as specific forms of institutional and 
discursive resource, but they are not conceived as origins. 
The concept of ideology, in relation to consciousness and 
intentionality, raises a series of interlocking problems. 
These concern the social, institutional and discursive 
character of ideology, and the conditions of existence and 
the mode of existence of ideological processes. The problem 
of context becomes entang1ed with those which concern both 
ideology and practice. utterances and presentations are 
to be understood in the context of specific forms of dis-
cursive practice which are themselves imbricated in an 
ideologically overdetermined order of practices, both 
discursive and nondiscursive in mode, a distinction which is 
elaborated presently. 
If utterances tend to be understood in convention-
ally constituted relevant contexts, the practice of reading 
developed in this thesis tends to complicate matters by 
introducting contexts which are relatively irrelevant, by 
conventional standards. In that shift of relevance and 
context, the relatively regularised practice, is, first, 
recognised as non-unitary. Its stability is not guaranteed. 
Second, it becomes open to a production which transgresses 
conventionally constituted order. It is an important theoret-
ical point that this shift is achieved through use of the 
elements of the textual presentations and the social, text-
ually articulated, resource which such presentations constitute. 
New contexts can be generated from the elements of the text 
itself. 
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Again, a certain unconscious is recognised, as 
the possibility of alternative order and productivity, in 
relation to the conventionally constituted dominant order. 
Order itself, in relation to both ideology and practice 
becomes a difficult concept when considering the relation-
ships between such effects of dominance and subordination. 
Similarly, the concept of a totality, of explicitly and 
implicitly recognised elements, phenomena and processes, 
becomes problematic. The ideal of the total context (1) 
might be seen to remain, whereby it is imagined that an 
utterance or presentation may be understood ultimately or 
comprehended fully. While a concept of totality does 
operate in this thesis, it is not one which carries with it 
the implication of ultimacy, an issue which is discussed 
in what follows. 
The position taken is that there is no 
ultimate context by means of which an utterance or present-
ation may be finally resolved. There are only contexts 
which are indeed illimitable(2). Yet there are definite 
regimes whereby meanings have become stabilised, if not fixed, 
such that they seem not to be part of a system of production. 
They seem to be simple correlates, fixed such that a number 
of manifest elements are united by and to an essential 
identity. 
It is to a theoretical resolution of the range of 
problems set out above and to other implicit problems gener-
ated, given the general principle sketched, to which 
attention is turned now. First, a precaution should be stated 
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concerning the status of theory as conceived in this 
thesis. The tenor of how theory is understood is derived 
from Foucault who states that, 
cretic. 
"The 1 f th t d ro e or eory 0 ay seems to me to be 
just this: not to formulate the global system-
atic theory which holds everything in place, 
but to analyse the specificity of mechanisms 
of power, to locate the connections and exten-
sions, to build little by little a strategic 
knowledge." (3) 
The theorisation constructed is not syn-
It is strategic and interventionist in character. 
A working knowledge of advertisements is articulated, 
a knowledge constructed in and through d~scursive 
practice. Advertisements are worked, or marked (4), con-
ventionally and reworked, or re-marked, deconstructively 
(5). Advertisements are not classified, as if from a 
position of transcendence or of total comprehension. What 
follows, then, is an outline of the theoretical apparatuses 
and the elements derived from them which constitute the 
strategic knowledge constructed in this thesis. This is 
followed in section 4 by a development of that conceptual 
framework in practice through a series of readings of 
advertisements. 
Foucault and Derrida have been introduced ln 
relation to a consideration of the principle of the cont-
textual determination of meaning production from utterences 
or presentations. They also recognise that discourses do 
more than simply represent objects and communicate intentions 
( 6) • 
Both of these writers participated in the constit-
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ution of a theoretical conjuncture In Paris in the late-
1960's which drew together elements from so-called structural 
analyses, linguistics, semiology, marxian discourse and 
psychoanalytic discourse. That conjuncture may be considered 
to have been dominated by the production of a seemingly 
coherent alliance between linguistics, marxism and psy-
choanalysis, these theoretical practices in turn being repre-
sented by Saussure, Althusser and Lacan respectively (7). 
It is characteristic of Foucault and Derrida to 
mark out a critical distance between their own discursive 
practices and those of philosophy, psychoanalysis, marxism, 
linguistics and semiology. They both establish a cautious 
distance from marxist discourse especially. Foucault seeks 
to avoid the more rigidly deterministic formulations of 
certain kinds of marxist discourse where they theorise 
social order. While he is critical of certain marxist 
formulations, concerning, for example, the concepts of 
ideology, political power and political repression (8), 
he does concern himself with issues that are recognisably 
similar to those which are thematised in marxist discourse. 
The manner in which Derrida portrays the relation between 
his writings and marxist discourse is even more cautious 
than Foucault's. There is no easily grasped series of 
implications between Derridean and marxist discursive 
practice. Themes are articulated in very different ways 
in each discourse. 
Houdebine, in an interview with Derrida (9), 
tries to make the relationships between the Derridean text 
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and marxist discourse more explicit. It is an opportunity 
which Derrida declines (10), insisting upon the limited 
character of the theoretical work he undertakes (11). 
The major point of articulation which Derrida 
concedes between his own work and marxism is a mutual concern 
to overturn the tenets of a metaphysical concept of history, 
as the linear or circular history of meaning (12). Derrida 
cites the work of Althusser as contributing to a critique of 
that metaphysical concept, through his critical analysis of 
the notion of an expressive totality (13). There is not, then, 
a single history, aligned to a system of teleological and 
eschatological implications, but only stratified, different-
iated, and contradictory practical series (14). 
In relation to the way in which the problem of 
meaning production from advertisements has been introduced 
above, the relevance of the Derridean and the Althusserian 
interventions concerns the character of the historical con-
texts, as a field of differentiated historicities, and the 
social contexts, as a field of differentiated modes of 
practice, which determine the meaning production. The 
theory being constructed here differs from that of Althusser, 
but there is a sufficient debt to justify a brief sketch of 
those aspects of Althusser's theorisation from which the 
current one has developed. The focus of the current theory 
may be characterised as distinctly post-Althusserian. 
The historical ceases to be conceived as the 
unfolding of a singular process of development of progress-
ively higher meanings. Similarly, the social becomes con-
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ceivable through a theory of practice. This latter concept, 
of practice, arises in relation to Althusser's critique of 
both humanism and historicism (15). The social is not con-
ceived in the form of a society, as a monolithic structure, 
nor in the form of interaction, between individuals or human 
beings, nor in the form of communication, of intentions 
between the rational egos of human beings. The social is 
conceived upon the basis of the conjunctural articulation 
of specific, differentiated modes of practice which are 
unevenly developed (16). 
The concept of an expressive totality and the 
concept of a linear, or circular, history are criticised 
by Althusser. Neither society nor history may be theorised 
using an essentialist logic and mode of explanation (17). 
Nevertheless, some concept of structure and of totality 
remains. It is in thinking through these concepts in a 
critical discourse that Althusser can be recognised to 
construct elements which are useful in the context of this 
thesis. These theoretical elements are reworked to a small 
extent, but Althusser may be said to contribute the follow-
ing concepts: structural causality, overdetermination, com-
plex totality, conjuncture, structure in dominance and 
practice/production - to name the most prominent. 
According to Althusser, while the social may con-
stitute a totality, this is not a totality which is centred 
on nor derived from an essence. All of the elements of a 
complex social totality exist in relationships of over-
determination, taken to refer to the effects which the 
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constituent practices of a complex totality have upon that 
totality, and conversely the effects which the structuring 
totality reiterates upon those practices. Those practices 
themselves are never simple expressions of an essence, but 
are realised through specific forms of antagonisms, struggles 
and contradictions. The complex totality constitutes the 
conditions of existence for any given practice, while it 
overdetermines the forms which the struggles and outright 
contradictions within those practices take (19). 
Practices may be understood as processes of pro-
duction and transformation (20). Through practice specific 
forms of 'raw material' are worked into distinct social 
products. The characteristic feature of practice is that 
it implies productive work. Through productive work, sub-
jects are constituted as social, both in relation to one 
another in intersubjectivity and in relation to determinate, 
objectifiable projects. Work implies the constitution of 
desire and the structure of deferral through which it lS 
realised in relation to the achievement of specified, 
desired goals. The specificity of work can be glimpsed in 
Rossi-Landi's characterisation: 
"Activity is expenditure without a product; 
work aims at something" (21) 
In complex social formations, productive work is 
always a re-working of already constructed social products. 
Work is a non-originary concept. Through work, as struct-
ures and processes of iteration and alteration, the repro-
duced product is transformable. The issue of control over 
- 120 -
social transformation and social reproduction is developed 
in the discussion of ideology and hegemony set out in what 
follows. Similarly the notion of desire is developed ln 
the discussion of the category of the subject below. 
Althusser specifies four dominant categories of 
practice (22). This scheme is not adhered to strictly in 
what follows, as is shown presently. Social products are 
not the result of simple causes but are produced, and 
hence are explicable, only in and through a system of com-
plex structural causality. Products are in no sense 
simple expressions of an essence, whether that essence be 
conceived in humanist, historicist or idealist terms. 
Social products are the outcomes of material social practices 
as processes of transformation. 
Finally, in relation to Althusser's theoretical 
contribution, while a social totality may not be said to 
have an essence or a centre, it does have a dominant element 
and a direction of determination. At any given conjuncture -
a concept which refers to the balance of social forces and 
the state of overdetermination of social processes and 
struggles at a specific moment - one particular element may 
dominate the complex social totality (23). The development 
and articulation of the material forces and relations of 
production determines which of any of the elements of the 
social totality dominates at any given conjuncture (24). 
The dominant element achieves a degree of relative 
autonomy, in that it is not the result of strict determin-
ation. But that relative autonomy is overdetermined in 
relation to the complex relationships of the totality (25). 
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It is this general theorisation which prepares the 
ground for Althusser's intervention into the theory of 
ideology. The topic of ideology is discussed after two 
points of difference have been stated in relation to Althusser's 
position. These points are, first, the introduction of a 
concept of symbolic production, in order to counter a 
possible, residual economism in Althusser's formulations (26), 
and, second, the introduction of the notion of cultural pro-
duction, in order to reserve for the concept of the 
ideological a more specific use. 
In respect of Althusser's conception of practice 
and production, it is considered theoretically necessary 
to introduce a concept of symbolic production from which 
specifically economic, political, ideological and theoretical 
production may be distinguised. Symbolic production, in 
relation to the other mentioned, is relatively undifferent-
iated. In the symbolic, economic, political and other 
practical, social functions tend to be performed at one and 
the same time. 
It is necessary to introduce this concept in order 
to prevent Althusser's conception of the materiality of pro-
duction, as a determining moment, becoming economistic, and 
hence the concept of overdetermination becoming a theorisat-
ion of economic determinism in another guise (27). It is 
necessary theoretically to assert that the structure in 
dominance is (over-) determined by the material relations 
and forces of production, i.e. that there is a direction 
of determination even in conditions of overdetermination, 
but it is equally necessary to state that these are not 
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essentially economic in form. Economic, as a term, would 
have to be disengaged from the mercantile assumptions which 
define economic rationality as, "the maximisation of 
individual or group profit in competition in a society 
reduced to a mere market (of goods, power, values, etc.)." 
(28) • 
The specifically economic, ln the modern, market 
sense, is to be differentiated from the more general economy 
of material, symbolic production. T he concept of the sym-
bolic is derived from a certain tradition of anthropological 
discourse. It has been reworked in the context of psycho-
analytic discourse by Lacan and consequently finds its way 
into certain later-semiological theories of language and 
discursivity (29). 
In the theorisation being ~onstructed in this 
thesis, the concept of the symbolic is being related to the 
materialist premises encoded in marxian discourse. In such 
marxian discourses, the materiality and the importance of 
social relations are stressed, in contradistinction to 
those conceptions of the social and the subjective which 
emphasize substantive and essentialist definitions of 
phenomena. The concept of the symbolic is taken to refer 
to that moment in practice through which social relation-
ships and social products are constituted. Social relation-
ships are understood as a form of social product. This has 
repercussions for both a theory of practice/production and 
a theory of the subject. 
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The symbolic is taken to refer to the moment of 
self-grounding of practice (30), wherein, first, the social 
is constituted as a field of relationships between subjects, 
second, as a field of constituted objects which have been 
produced and may enter into specific social strategies, and, 
third, as a sub-system within but relatively autonomous with 
respect of a contextualising eco-system, however it is con-
ceived culturally. Symbolic production, as the triple labour 
alluded to above, provides the grounding, which is enacted 
through practice, for 'communication', 'intentionality' and 
meaning production through, for example, discourse. It does 
so by constituting the social and symbolic relations which 
serve as the practical grounding for these more differentiated 
phenomena of inter-subjectivity. 
It should be noted that while symbolic production 
is conceived of as relatively undifferentiated, in that a 
number of different social functions can be performed at 
one and the same time, it is not unmarked by distinctions 
(31). Markings of race, gender and generation can be con-
sidered as symbolic productions (32). It is the relatively 
unarticulated distinctions of the symbolic which are re-
marked (33) in the more complex differentiating systems of 
industrialised social formations. Thus, racial, gender 
and generational markings are re-worked, in an overdeter-
mined way, by, for example, class, national and other more 
local institutional status markings. 
These re-markings are not reflectively constituted. 
While they reiterate the markings of the symbolic, they alter 
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them (34). Such re-markings are a constitutive element of 
what is termed here the pragmaticisation of practice and pro-
ductive work. ~he other major features of pragmaticisation 
can be set out as follows. 
First, there are the processes of autonomisation 
and individuation of social subjects. Through these pro-
cesses are constituted ego-based imaginary identities which 
can enter into consciously reasoned association with one 
another to form specific interest groupings. 
Second, productive work comes to be organised in 
relation to the goals negotiated between those competing 
and cooperating interest groupings who are engaged in 
realising specific projects. The defining of pragmatic ends, 
which are objectifiably realisable and which are worked 
towards in daily reiterated practice, produces a set of 
concrete procedures whereby tasks may be recognised to con-
tribute, properly or improperly, to the goals specified. 
Third, such regularisation of productive work 
allows the construction of separate institutions, limited in 
their social projection. 
In concrete social practice, symbolic and pragmatic 
overdetermine one another. Neither can be characterised as 
a simple essence. Both are complex. The pragmatic is 
realised as a sUb-system of the symbolic, through which the 
symbolic can be extended. 
The pragmatic can be characterised as that domain 
in which social differentiation increasingly takes the form 
of an economisation of productive practice around established, 
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quantifiable objects and procedures. This economisation, 
in turn, is comrnercialised in terms of daily reiterated 
practice and the functioning of institutions. The commercial 
system is dominated by the system of capital, which con-
stitutes relationships of power. This operates in terms of 
the institutional dominance of the economic in the extended 
order of the social formation and in terms of relations 
between institutionally situated social subjects. 
The concept of pragmaticisation, leads to those 
of ideology and hegemony, wherein class relationships are 
recognised to be specific relationships of power which over-
determine how social practices are enacted. 
The theorisation of practice adopted here is 
that it is self-grounding and relatively autonomous in 
relation to the series of its ecological environments. The 
form of practice is constrained environmentally but it is 
not essentially determined by environmental factors. This 
is a non-naturalistic conception of the determination of 
practice. Similarly, the theorisation of the subject 
~6opted is not essentialist or substantivist. The subject of 
social practice is constituted in and through social relation-
ships, themselves constituted as a product, or an outcome, 
of practice. This is not to deny the processes of auto-
nomisation and individualisation by means of which social 
subjects are overdetermined. 
Social subjects may indeed become formed as 
'individuals', capable of acting on what they perceive to 
be their own reasons and interests. Nevertheless, this 
formation of reason and interest, it is argued, is constituted 
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In and through symbolic and more pragmaticised modes of 
practice. Before proceeding to a sketch of thos more 
pragmaticised forms of practice, a brief characterisation 
of the category of the subject is called for. 
The subject is theorised as being produced, as 
inherently social, in and through the processes of different-
iation of practice. The subject is constituted as a relatively 
autonomous sub-system, in differential relation to the Other, 
to use a Lacanian formulation (35), which is the environment(s) 
In which the subject is formed. The subject is constituted 
in and through a field of intersubjective relations. This 
lS constituted through what Lacan terms the processes of 
'separation' and 'alienation' (36). 
The distinction between subject and Other is 
produced as a result of the formation of the unconscious. 
The unconscious is conceived as an active break and as a 
process of tracing. The unconscious is the medium through 
which the subject is formed and is that which separates 
the subject from the Other. 
The Other, as conceived here, differs In detail 
from that specified by Lacan. The Other is not defined 
in terms of Language (37). The Other is not univocal. The 
stress which Lacan places upon the Other as the domain of 
the symbolic is retained. However, the symbolic is recog-
nised to be overdetermined by more pragmaticised forms of 
practice. 
The Other is conceived of as that system of 
heterogeneous practices to which the subject belongs, as 
sub-system, yet from which the subject is distinguishable, 
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through the formation of the unconscious. The Other, then, 
is the domain of symbolic processes and practices which are 
always, in modern, industrialised social formations, over-
determined by pragmaticised institutional forms. 
The constitution of desire in and through the 
unconscious, then, is not simply structured as a Language, 
to paraphrase Lacan (38). Desire is formed, through the 
unconscious, as the reiteration of structures of preference -
relations and power-relations in the Other. The unconscious 
is not so much the discourse of the Other (39) as the 
reiterated transformation of the (overdetermined) practices -
discursive or otherwise - of the Other. The Other is that 
complex series of environments which structures the uncon-
scious and the possibilities for intersubjective recognition. 
Neither the unconscious nor the Other are concepts which 
encode a notion of origin. 
Desire, then, does not simply reflect the struct-
ures of preference and power of the Other, but reiterates 
them through the separation and re-working of the uncon-
scious. Given this perspective, it can be recognised that, 
"The history of the individual as subject 
in and for a given social formation is 
never finished." (40) 
Even if desire is characterised as the desire of the Other, 
as in Lacan (41), the Other is conceived as a differentiated 
and conflict-laden domain of preference- and power-relat-
ions. While desire may be denied a simple structure, never-
theless, it lS constituted in relation to the Other, as the 
realisation of the processes of the (structural) unconscious. 
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The unconscious, then, is the name given to the 
active break with the environments of the Other, to found 
a relatively autonomous sub-system, which, in turn, allows 
the possibility of forming a subject. The subject is con-
ceived as a moving principle in a field of intersubject-
ivity. The subject is constituted, with the unconscious, as 
a network of traces. The field of intersubjectivity is 
sustained through structures of recognition and desire. 
The separation in which is formed the subject and 
unconscious serves as the medium through which emerges the 
ego. The ego is formed as the imaginary coherence of a set 
of identifications through which the subject passes as a 
moving principle. The process of ego-formation Lacan terms 
alienation, completing, with separation, the constitution 
of the subject (42). The process of suture names the 
passage over points of identification and the unification 
of that passage as a definite structural formation, an 
achieved unity. 
The ego is misrecognised as a stable identity, 
as the origin and destination of reason and interest. The 
ego is, more properly, a representation upon which an 
imaginary identification is based. The processes of ident-
ifying, unifying and cohering, i.e. those of suture, remain 
unacknowledged. The ego is a complex product which is 
misrecognised as a simple origin. 
Suture, then, is the process of joining a subject, 
as moving principle, to determinate practices of represent-
ation, of which the discursive practice of advertising is 
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being taken as example. Such practices are overdetermined 
as symbolic and pragmatic. The most highly differentiated 
forms of practices of representation, and consequently of 
communication as will be discussed presently, are dis-
cursive or signifying practices. They encode the possibility 
of reflexivity in the practice of representation itself, 
and hence the possibility of re-working the processes of 
suture. Suture takes place as a limited re-structuring of 
the subject. 
Discursive practices of representation, such as 
advertising, are overdetermined in relation to the social 
formation in which they are situated. They suture the ego 
in specific structurations. They engage the subject, as a 
moving principle, and the structural unconscious. Through 
the structural unconscious are engaged the overdetermined 
desires of the subject, which are, in turn, constituted in 
relation to the Other, in which the extended institutional 
order of the social formation is dominant. 
Reading, therefore, takes place as a complex 
labour which goes beyond the ego-based, pragmatically situated, 
processes of reasoning and calculation. Reading implies 
the movement of the subject through the processes of suture, 
but also of the formation of desires through that same move-
ment. Reading is determined by the structures of the text, 
the form of the suture, the prior constitution of the subject, 
the structures of the unconscious and the structures of the 
Other in relation to which desire is constituted. Reading is 
at once a symbolic and pragmatic practice. The topic of 
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reading is pursued later, in relation to the concept of 
textuality. At present, it is to be noted that in articulat-
ing specific forms of suture with specific structures of the 
unconscious, texts may mobilise ideological interventions 
into the extended institutional order of a given social 
formation. They do so by providing textual constructs 
which represent the subject for him/her self. The subject 
is sutured to a determinate practice of representation and 
communication by means of which specific forms of imbricat-
ion are constructed. The subject is imbricated to determin-
ate situated worlds, which come to operate as real in the 
context of the overdetermined order of a social formation. 
In that way, certain relationships of power, symbolic, 
pragmatic and ideological,are (re-)constituted and confirmed. 
Having briefly sketched the category of the subject, 
it remains now to conclude the discussion of Althusser's 
theoretical contribution. 
Althusser's categories may be related to this con-
ception of the symbolic by arguing that the kinds of practice 
he specifies, i.e. economic political, ideological and 
theoretical, are constituted through processes of different-
iation realised as symbolic production. They thus emerge 
as specific, relatively autonomised and relatively distinct, 
domains of practice. They become relatively self-sufficient 
regions of practice which encode explicity formulated aims 
and regularised procedures. In modern, industrialised 
social formations, they become separated from one another as 
institutionalised functions (43). 
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It is argued that the categories specified by 
Althusser can be taken as pragmaticised forms of social 
practice. The pragmatic forming of practice is dominated 
by reasoning and behaviour constituted as instrumental and 
utilitarian. These forms rework symbolic practice. In 
this moment, of the pragmatic, the production of social 
relationships is not recognised to be coeval with the pro-
duction of more objectified social products. Pragmatic 
forms of practice tend to stress the objective forms of 
social product over the intersubjective. Not all forms of 
pragmatic practice do this to an equal extent. 
Economic practice, that is in its pragmatic sense, 
may be distinguished from political practice and from cultural 
practice - this last term is justified presently - in terms 
of their objective products and the ways in which intersub-
jective social relationships are perceived and developed. 
The most extreme forms of objectification occur in economic 
practice. It is this form of objectification which has 
become dominant institutionally in modern, industrialised 
social formations. 
As has been noted, the term cultural practice has 
been substituted for ideological and theoretical practice in 
the scheme derived from Althusser. This becomes necessary 
theoretically in order to reserve for the concept of the 
ideological a more specific role. The major forms of prag-
matic practice are considered to be economic production, 
political production and cultural production (44). 
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The choice of the term cultural indicates that 
certain pragmatic projects may be conceived whose primary 
pragmatic purpose is to construct products whose focus is 
intersubjective social meanings and intentionalities. 
They are made possible through the intersubjectivity con-
stituted in the symbolic and the patterns of association 
by means of which these are reworked in the pragmatic. 
While that cultural production may operate, in the conditions 
of existence of a complex totality, in a manner which may be 
characterised as ideological, it is important to concede 
that ideological aims need not be foregrounded pragmatically. 
The distinction is one between ideological effectivity (45) 
and ideological aim or purpose. It becomes important to be 
able to distinguish between forms of cultural practice, 
some of which encode ideological aims explicitly while 
others do not. It may be shown subsequently that all forms 
do indeed have an ideological component, even if this is not 
foregrounded. 
What is being suggested here is the material and 
operational character of the ideological. Ideology is not 
being thought through using an essentialist conceptual-
isation. Thus, for example, forms of cultural practice are 
not essentially ideological, even while it may be shown that 
in all forms and to some extent they do operate ideologically. 
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of labour and simple reproduction, the material 
and symbolic, the mode of production and the mode 
of domination, cannot be separated." 
(po 215) 
Subsequently, he argues, power becomes objectified 
in institutions such as the church or the market. 
Writing, in this theoretical context, comes to be 
conceived as one of the instruments of the object-
ification of power relations. The growth of an 
autonomous economic sphere leads to the development 
of a relatively autonomous symbolic sphere and to 
the conditions, eventually, of class struggle, which 
are realised, in part, as a struggle between 
orthodox and heterodox symbolic systems. 
This categorisation is used by Colin Sumner In 
Reading ideologies: 
"Social practices can be, and often are, usefully 
dealt with in three different types: economic, 
political and cultural. The criterion of the 
classification is rarely made clear. I would like 
to continue this trichotomy on the basis of the 
criterion of the produce of the practices. Thus, 
economic practices are distinguished from others 
by the fact that they result in use values ... ; 
political practices are distinguished by the fact 
that they result in forms of institutionalised 
social power; and cultural practices are dis-
tinguished by the fact that they result in the 
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expression of forms of signification (or 
ideologies)." 
Sumner, C. Reading ideologies. London: 
Academic Press, 1979. p. 212. 
It is not accepted in this thesis that forms 
of signification are simply equivalent to ideolog-
ies. Neither does Colin Sumner accept such an 
identification fully as can be catheredfrom other 
parts of the book. -
Sumner explains that, 
"In most societies, cultural practice means art, 
music, science, the dissemination of news, ritual, 
the dissemination of beliefs, literature, drama, 
dance ... " 
Sumner, C. Ope cit., p. 213. 
It is argued here that none of these are in 
any simple sense ideological, while all of them 
may come to operate ideologically. 
Poulantzas also uses the notion of culture in 
relation to ideology: 
" ... if we abandon the conception of ideology as a 
conceptual system (in the strict sense of both of 
these terms) we can say that it encompasses what 
is often described as the 'culture' of a formation: 
provided, of course, that we do not fall into the 
mistake of eti"'.nological cuI turalism which generally 
uses this term to cover a 'social formation' in 
its ensemble. As Gramsci clearly realised, 
ideology encompasses not merely scattered elements 
of knowledge, notions, etc., but also the whole 
process of symbolisation, of mythical transposit-
ion, of 'taste', 'style', 'fashion', i.e. of the 
'way of life'in general." 
Poulantzas, N. Political power and social classes. 
London: Verso, 1980. p. 208. 
Finally, in relation to the use of the term 
culture, Goran Therborn acknowledges that, 
"the concept of culture may be useful alongside 
a broad definition of ideology. It may, for 
instance, be employed either as a short-hand for 
the ensemble of everyday activities and ideologies 
of a particular group or class, or as a more gen-
eral, inclusive concept for ideology, science and 
art and, possibly, other practices studied from 
the point of view of their production of meaning." 
Therborn, G. The ideology of power and the power 
of ideology. London: Verso, 1980. p. 6. 
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45. The term effectivity is used by Althusser. See, 
for example, Althusser, L. Appendix to Contradition 
and overdetermination (In For Marx. 2nd ed, London: 
New Left Books, 1977. p-.-87-128). esp. p. 117. 
"Engels has just shown that the superstructures, 
far from being pure epiphenomena of the economy, 
have their own effectivity ... But this poses the 
question as to how, under these conditions, we 
should think the unity of this real, but relative 
effectivity of the superstructures - and of the 
determinant principle 'in the last instance' 
of the economy? How should be think the relation 
between these distinct effectivities?" 
See also Althusser, L. For Marx, p. 250-251, for 
a definition of effectivity. 
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3 . 2 . IDEOLOGY AND HEGEMONY 
What roles are being reserved for ideology and the 
ideological, then, given the uses and distinctions set out 
above? 
The conception of the ideological is pursued in 
the following terms. To recap briefly, symbolic, material 
production, as the self-grounding production of relation-
ships and differences, becomes overdetermined by specific-
ally delimited pragmatic projects. While the development of 
the precise form of the material productive capacity encodes 
a directional determination upon the social formation, this 
determination is not to be interpreted as a linear causality, 
an essentialist logic of development, or an economistic 
determinism, economic taken at this point in its instru-
mental and utilitarian senses. The material productive cap-
acity of a social formation is at once symbolic and prag-
matic, each instance modifying the other, producing inter-
subjective social relations, interpersonal associations, 
social purposes, social projects and objectified constructs. 
It is through the institutional separations that 
occur in the pragmatic that specifically economic projects 
have achieved dominance. In modern, industrialised social 
formations, the purposes and projects of pragmatic, economic 
practice are accorded preference. This dominance and this 
preference are realised through the extended intersubject-
ive social relationships (1) which are constituted in and 
through the complex totality of the social formation. Further-
more, it is in relation to that region of pragmatic, economic 
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practice that social relationships in the form of class 
relationships begin to be constituted. The specifically 
economic form of class relationships itself comes to be 
overdetermined in the social totality. Class relationships, 
however, exert a complex determination upon symbolic and 
pragmatic forms of social production (2). 
The constitution of social classes, as inter-
subjective groupings, politically and economically pragmatic 
associations, and as a pervasive, determinate kind of social 
relationship produced in and through prolonged social practice, 
is taken to be 'correlative with the development of a part-
icular formation of the ideological (3). It is that specific 
form of the ideological, constituted in and through the dev-
elopment and the reiteration of a certain overdetermined 
system of production which is relevant. 
The constitution of a particular kind of social 
order, an order dominated by a particular system of pragmatic, 
economic production, and the constitution of a particular 
kind of intersubjective social relationship are taken to be 
the referential horizons of the concept of the ideological. 
The ideological is not taken to be a structural level of any 
social formation whatsoever. The specificity of the use of 
the term ideological pertains to the operation of certain 
forms of social practice in an industrialised and, as is 
discussed presently, hegemonised social order. What is of 
especial interest is the operation of particular kinds of 
discursive social practices as ideological, either to sustain 
and reiterate an hegemonised order or to resist and subvert 
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it (4). Discursive social practice, as is discussed below, 
may be used to constitute extended social relationships (5) 
and hence to permit ideological interventions into the local 
forms wherein is constituted social order. 
Four theoretical points concerning the concept of 
the ideological should be stated clearly at this juncture. 
First, the moment of the ideological which is of relevance 
here concerns the constitution of extended social relations 
as class relations. These may be understood as complex 
social relations and domains of intersubjectivities con-
stituted in the prolonged operation of the social totality. 
In this instance, local historical dispositions are engaged, 
more or less successfully, by and with structural positions 
determined by the operation of the social as a complex 
system (6). Class relations overdetermine and corne to 
predominate over other forms of symbolically and pragmatic-
ally constituted social relationship. 
Second, while specific forms of practice, whether 
discursive or non-discursive in mode - a distinction dis-
cussed in what follows - may operate ideologically in a 
complex totality, they may not be reduced to the conscious-
ness, utterances or actions of the class agents in whose 
interests those practices operate overall. This is to 
propose a non-class reductionist and a non-economic reduct-
ionist conception of the ideological. The class membership 
of any given utterer or agent does not in any simple sense 
determine the ideological import of the utterance or action. 
Practices which are ideological do not reflect in any 
- 145 -
simple manner the class consciousness or the class interests 
of constituted social subjects (7). 
Third, any form of practice, in whatever mode, 
may come to operate ideologically. The concept of the 
ideological operates in a processual and systematic theoris-
ation of the constitution of social order. The ideological 
is not simply a level in the social formation. Hence, the 
ideological is not epiphenomenal to a more 'real' basis, or 
to an ontologically prior ground (8). The ideological, as 
is the case with the other categories mentioned which con-
stitute the complexity of the social, has a material exist-
ence and is realised in and through the reiterated practices 
of that social totality (9). 
Fourth, the ideological, ln not being epiphenomenal 
but material and practical, does not constitute a domain of 
representations, in any simple sense of this term, which 
are false or inadequately mimetic. The ideological is not 
opposed to the true, or to true knowledge (10). The ideol-
ogical is taken to refer to the constitution of subjects 
for an extended social order, in whose hegemonised order 
specific regimes of discursive practice may be accorded the 
status of articulating socially validated truths. Particular 
groups may use such discursive forms in order to make 
ideological interventions in the social, while claiming for 
those utterances a certain truth. The constitution of 
truthful statements becomes a matter of the interrelation-
ship between utterance, discursive formation, situation and 
strategic purpose. Truth is never simple or pre-social, 
nor is it simply guaranteed by a system or a method. 
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Class relationships may refer in one strong sense 
to differences articulated in and through pragmatic, economic 
practice, but they may not be treated as essentially deter-
mined by economic relations (11). The formation of social 
classes is overdetermined by pragmatically political and 
cultural forms of practice, through which economic relations 
are reiterated, and in being reiterated are both trans-
formed and become relatively autonomous. Class, therefore, 
while encoding a strong sense of material, economic interest 
and of economic power relations through extended social 
relationships, is overdetermined by political forms of power 
relations and cultural forms of authority. Economic 
wealth, political power and cultural authority are all com-
ponents of the concept of class relationships. 
Economic, material wealth is a dominant pragmatic 
form of power, but it is not an essence. Power, in any 
case, is defined relationally (12). The political organis-
ation of the state, it follows, does not simply encode 
reflectively economic relationships. Political relationships 
reconstrue relationships of economic power, even while they 
cannot simply overturn them. Political 'rights' and 'free-
doms', for example, are not simply reflections of economic 
positions. The categories of the juridical, political and 
cultural apparatuses are relatively autonomous in respect of 
economic ones, and hence are transformable by means other 
than those based on economic interest alone (13). 
The economy is not an essence of power relations 
and neither is the state (14). Both of these institutional 
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orders, however, overdetermine the more localised power 
relations of the social (15). The state cannot be considered 
as a simple class instrument, but neither may it be considered 
as a neutral or representative administrative institution. 
Power relations are not derived from a centre which extends 
its influence over all aspects of the social totality (16). 
Social hegemonies arise through the articulation of more 
local powers, overdetermined in the operation of a social 
system. Neither local historicity nor systematic operation 
may be designated as the origin of power. The system itself 
is not homogeneous. The overall order of the system is 
changed through the disarticulations and rearticulations of 
power relations, within the limits of possibility of the 
system (17). 
The concept of hegemony, and the processes whereby 
hegemonisation is achieved, becomes relevant as a means of 
characterisating relatively stabilised social formations, 
wherein ideological and class conflicts have not ceased but 
are managed, contained and domesticated (18). The concept 
of a dominant ideology (19), in conditions of hegemonisat-
ion, is not to be thought of as a centralised ideological 
formation which addresses and adumbrates all social subjects 
in a social formation (20). The dominant ideology comes 
to stand for the characteristic means by which ideological 
tensions and conflicts are resolved and managed such that 
they operate, overall, as one means of securing the hegemonised 
order. The dominant ideology does not come to replace wholly 
other ideological forms, but works to contain, marginalise 
and otherwise disperse the effectivity of subordinated and 
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resistant ideologies in the social. The dominant ideo-
logy is not a central core of ideas and values which command 
universal adherence throughout the social (2l), nor indeed 
may ideological incorporation be considered as the major 
means by which a social formation is made unified - but 
never unitary - and social subjects constituted for that 
order (22). 
What is of interest in this thesis is the way in 
which certain discursive social practices, such as reading 
advertisements, which utilise particular forms of textual 
resource, may operate as a constituent element of the 
dominant ideological formation. They become so by affirming 
an adherence to the hegemonised order of the social totality 
for the social subjects constituted through reading and 
hence constituted in extended social relations. The issue 
is approached in the following way. 
In determinate conditions of industrial production, 
the objective products of practice, having been divided in 
social perception from the coeval production of relation-
ships, become alienable from the specific practice of which 
they are an outcome. The products become economised instru-
mentally and can be expropriated from local historical 
situations. They may be relocated as elements in the extended 
social relationships which are dominated by the institutional 
forms of specific markets. Symbolically constituted marks 
or distinctions and locally pragmatic divisions may be 
further re-marked in terms of market values. Market values 
tend to become substantivised in the form of capital. The 
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money form, itself only a general equivalent of exchange and 
hence still a relational concept, is overdetermined by form-
ations of capital accumulation, which exert relationships 
of power over determinate markets (23). 
Those social classes in a structurally determined 
position to expropriate the symbolically and pragmatically 
marked product and to accumulate such products in the form 
of alienated private wealth and in the form of capital 
become the dominant intersubjective economic group. Such 
intersubjectivity is constituted in the form of extended 
social relationships. Such groups acquire the power to 
re-locate social products in the social. They are thereby 
enabled to make interventions which are ideological in 
character in the social. 
That dominant class itself may be sustained sign-
ificantly by a system of extended economic relations realised 
through market mechanisms. However, class cohesion may be 
made more explicit and comprehendable to the members of that 
class by the articulation of political strategies and 
cultural strategies. Class cohesion may be constituted in 
part through discursive means. Discourses may operate to 
clarify and to put a rationalised order into the material, 
economic interests of determinate classes. This allows 
the construction of strategies which are at once economic, 
political and cultural and which serve to secure the dominance 
of that class, through the articulation of differentially 
located power relations. 
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Discourse may operate to constitute subjects for 
a determinate class, in terms of constituting a clear form-
ulation of the interests of that class, but it may also 
operate to intervene in the ideological strategies of other 
classes (24). What is at stake here is struggle over, 
first, the intersubjective meanings of the symbolic, second, 
the pragmatic constitution of instrumental utilities and, 
third, the formulation of strategies for securing or sub-
verting political power in an hegemonised order. 
Thus, ideological interventions may be made through 
the two dominant modes of public discourse, i.e. the 
bureaucratised production of official government and legal 
discourse and the institutionalised production of the dis-
cursive forms textually articulated in the media of 'mass' 
communication. While official and mass communication dis-
courses may not be considered as simple expressions of class 
interests and class consciousness, they can and do operate 
to secure hegemonised social order by developing the material 
realisation of extended social relations (25). Subordinated 
classes are not hindered simply by unequal access to those 
institutions wherein official and other public discourses are 
produced but also by the institutional modes of intent-
ionality of which those agencies are capable. Such agencies 
are overdetermined in relation to the complex social totality. 
They are not agencies whereby information, pure and simple, 
may be constructed and disseminated. 
Institutional agencies such as, for example, those 
which constitute the media of mass communication cannot be 
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considered to be wholly dependent upon or subordinate to 
official institutions and discourses. They may permit the 
construction of counter-hegemonic discursive strategies. 
However, it is argued that their overall institutional mode 
of operation and their ideological effectivity is to affirm 
and to secure the hegemonised social order (26). 
Given the conditions of a relatively stable hege-
monised order, the media of mass communication become one 
important means whereby dominant class groupings may inter-
vene in the symbolically and pragmatically constituted local 
historicities of practice (27). The social subjects con-
stituted in local historicities may be interpellated by and 
for the ideological formation of hegemonised social order. 
It is argued t.h.at advertisements are one con-· 
stituent element of the media of mass communication, one 
which is a prominent media form. Through the dominance of 
the media of mass communication in the public awareness of 
discourse, advertisements receive a disproportionate amount 
of public attention, given their relative unimportance and 
even if that mode of attention is relatively distracted. 
This is the general theoretical framework in which 
advertisements are being considered. At this juncture a 
more precise theorisation of their material textual and dis-
cursive characteristics becomes appropriate. Before moving 
onto this topic, it should be stated that it lS assumed that 
the complex social reality which is constituted as class 
dominance may not be conceived in the form of a repressive 
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apparatus, nor is the hegemonised order every wholly secured 
(28). It is therefore a possible and a valid project to 
pursue a deconstructive reading of one of the means by which 
that dominance is secured (29), as part of a project of 
refusing to assent to that hegemonised order. It is to be 
acknowledged constantly that such a project is a very limited 
project of resistance, not to repression but to hegemonisat-
ion. Its mode of intentionality is not essentially constituted, 
but is discursive and strategic. 
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See Smith, D.E. Textually mediated social 
organisation. International Social Science 
Journal, vol. 36(1) 1984, p. 59-75. 
The phrase 'extended social relations' is used 
on p. 70 of the above cited article. This is 
a useful introductory article for understand-
ing the relations between discourse and ideology, 
an issue developed presently. 
"In a class society, all the products of a given 
agent, by an essential overdetermination, speak 
inseparably and simultaneously of his class - or, 
more precisely, his position in the social 
structure and his rising and falling trajectory -
and of his (or her) body - or, more precisely, 
all the properties, always socially qualified, of 
which he or she is the bearer - sexual properties 
of course, but also physical properties, praised, 
like strength or beauty, or stigmatised." 
Bourdieu, P. Outline of a theory of practice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977. p. 87. 
This is to accept certain limits upon the concept 
of ideology, such as those suggested by Larrain. 
The limits are intended to prevent an over-
generalised use of the term and hence a lessening 
of its critical value. 
"There is no need for a class system for (myth) to 
exist. Myth exists largely in primitive classless 
societies with very simple social relations. 
Ideology on the contrary, emerges when the com-
plexity of social relations has produced a system 
of classes." 
" •.. Godelier universalizes ideology to the point 
that it represents all forms of consciousness 
accompanying social relations." 
Larrain, J. The concept of ideology. London: 
Hutchinson, 1979. p. 153. 
The theory of ideology being constructed needs to 
take account of the following series of inter-
related issues: ideology and truth/epistemology; 
ideology and ontology; ideology and power; ideology 
and interest; ideology and economy; ideology and 
the state; ideology and class; ideology and over-
determination; ideology and hegemony; ideology 
and dominance/resistance; ideology and conscious-
ness; ideology and discourse. 
"Every use of discourse is at once a judgemen~ about 
its relation to dominant forms of power and elther 




Frow, J. Discourse and power. Economy and Society, 
Vol. 14(2) May 1985, p. 204. 
See Smith, D.E. Textually mediated social organisat-
ion. International Social Science Journal, vol. 36(1) 
1984, p. 64: 
"Discourse itself is a textually mediated social 
organisation. Notions such as that of inter text-
uality direct us to an investigation of the ways 
in which a given text depends on others. In 
recognising how texts function as constituents of 
social relations or social courses of action, however, 
our interest is less in tracing back to the deter-
minations of its meaning structure through a given 
text than in explicating discourse as an active 
social process. Thus investigation cannot be con-
fined to the text alone, but must take into account 
the social processes, including sequences of talk 
which are integral parts of the discursive process." 
Smith argues that discourse interrelates and effects 
a movement between "the locally historic" and the 
distinct historicity of document time in relation to 
the instituional order in which such documents are 
founded and produced. In so acting, "discourse 
develops the ideological currency of society". 
Finally, "Ideological practices bind the local to 
the discursive through the interpretative circles 
whereby local instances index the text". 
All quotations are from Smith, D.E. Ope cit., p. 64. 
The distinction between the local and the structural, 
on the one hand, and between the local and the dis-
cursive, on the other hand, have been made by a 
number of writers in different theoretical vocabul-
aries. Habermas, for example, has distinguished 
between 'action' and 'discourse'. 'Action' refers 
to everyday contexts of social interaction, in 
which information is acquired through sensory exper-
ience and exchanged through ordinary language. 
'Discourse', on the other hand, designates a realm 
of communication which is abstracted from the con-
texts of everyday life. See Thompson, J.B. Universal 
pragmatics (In Habermas: critical debates; edited 
by J.B. Thompson and D. Held. Macmillan, 1982. 
p. 116-133). esp. p. 119. 
Elsewhere Habermas distinguishes the Lebenswelt from 
the social system. Lebenswelt provides the context 
for the objective, subjective, and social worlds 
of linguistic usage. Habermas equates the concept 
of Lebenswelt with that of material reproduction. 
See Rasmussen, D.M. Communicative action and 
philosophy: reflections on Habermas' Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns. Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, vol. 9(1) 1982, p. 2-28. 
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7. 
A similar distinction is cornmon in sociological dis-
course, between micro- and macro-sociologicalper-
spectives. Some recent theorisations have endeavoured 
to find ways of inter-relating the two theoretical 
contexts .. See Advances in social theory and method-
ology; edlted by K. Knorr-Cetina and A.V. Cicourel. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. 
Foucault and Bourdieu can be counted amongst those 
who endeavour to construct a theorisation sensitive 
to both micro-processes and macro-systems. Foucault 
adopts a perspective of the 'micro-physics of power'. 
Power, he argues, is not to be identified with the 
state. Power emerges in specific alignments of micro-
powers, which may be disarticulated and rearticulated. 
See Advances in social theory and methodology,p. 22-23. 
See also Foucault, M.The history of sexuality. Vol. 1: 
an introduction. Penguin, 1981. p. 92-96. 
Bourdieu develops the concept of habitus to deal 
with the local constitution of dispositions which 
may be articulated to the structural which are con-
stituted as the institutional order of the social 
system. Thus, as Garnham and Williams explicate, 
"the habitus is a family, group and especially 
class phenomenon, a logic derived from a COrnmon 
set of material conditions of existence to regulate 
the practice of a set of individuals in cornmon 
response to those conditions. Indeed Bourdieu's 
definition of class is based on the habitus." 
Garnham, N. and Williams, R. Pierre Bourdieu and 
the sociology of culture: an introduction. Media, 
Cultura and Society, vol. 2 1980, p. 213. 
Boudieu explains that social practice takes place 
as the more or less successful encounter between 
(structural) positions and the dispositions con-
stituted in the habitus, or in other words, as 
the interaction between objectified, instituted 
history and internalised, embodied history. See 
Bourdieu, P. Men and machines (In Advances in 
social theory and methodology; edited by K. Knorr-
Cetina and A.V. Cicourel. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1981. p. 304-317). esp. p. 313. 
The ideological cannot be deduced from, 
"the structure of economic forces or, directly, 
from the class positions of the real subjects 
of utterance" 
Furthermore, the concrete subject is not to be con-
sidered as the origin of the utterance. See Frow, 
J. Discourse and power. Economy and Society, vol. 






Frow argues that the theory of ideology should 
not be, 
"an ontology of discourse, deriving its effects 
of meaning from formal structure, but rather 
theorise the multiple and variable limits within 
which relations of power and knowledge are pro-
duced." 
Frow, J. op. cit., p. 203. 
In this context, Frow argues that, 
"There can •.. be no absolute ontological dis-
tinction (of the order 'material/immaterial' or 
'real/symbolic') between systems whose complex 
intrication constitutes the social structure." 
Frow, J. op. cit., p. 202. 
Frow uses the concept of "an overdetermined 
series of semiotic formations" to displace the 
notion of ontological dichotomy, i.e. between 
a real and an epiphenomenal. See Frow, J. op. 
cit., p. 202. 
The theme of the materiality of the ideological 
is both Gramscian and Althusserian. 
See Mouffe, C. Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci 
(In Gramsci and Marxist theory; edited by 
C. Mouffe. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 
p. 168-204). esp. p. 199. 
See also Althusser, L. Ideology and ideological 
state apparatuses (In Lenin and philosophy. 2nd. 
ed., London: New Left Books, 1977. p. 121-173). 
esp. p. 155, Thesis II: Ideology has a material 
existence. 
As has already been mentioned, Foucault points 
to this as one of the shortcomings of the marxian 
concept of ideology, i.e. that it presupposes 
some idealised notion of truth. See Foucault, M. 
Truth and power (In Power/knowledge; edited by 
C. Gordon. Harvester, 1980. p. 134-145). esp. p. 118. 
Frow reiterates Foucault's assertion by stating 
that a theory of ideology ought not, 
"to assert a relationship of truth to falsity 
(and so its own mastery over error) but concern 
rather the production and the conditions of pro-
duction of categories and entities within the 
field of discourse." 
Frow, J. Discourse and power. Economy and Society, 
vol. 14(2) May 1985, p. 203. 
"It can in fact be stated that Marx's analyses of 
social classes never refer simply to the econo~ic 
structure (relations of production) but a"ways to 







duction and social formation, and to the relations 
which are maintained there by the different levels. 
Let us anticipate and say that everything happens 
as if social classes were the result of an ensemble 
of structures and of their relations, firstly at 
the economic level, secondly at the political 
level and thirdly at the ideological level. A 
social class can be identified either at the economic 
level, at the political level, or at the ideological 
level, and can thus be related with regard to a 
particular instance. Yet to define a class as such 
and to grasp it in its concept, we must refer to 
the ensemble of levels of which it is the effect." 
Poulantzas, N. Political power and social classes. 
London: Verso, 1978. p. 63-64. 
A number of marxian and radical political theories 
encode relational conceptions of power. Foucault 
develops a novel concept of power as relational. 
See Philp, M. Foucault on power: a problem in 
radical translation. Political Theory, Vol. 11(1) 
February 1983, p. 29-52. 
This is still a marxian view of political power and 
the state. It is not functionalist, however. In 
no sense is ita liberal·-·c.err.ccratic, on the one 
hand, or liberal-pluralist, on the other hand, 
conception. Account is taken of Foucault's object-
ions to certain forms of marxism. 
In Rasmussen's terms, as he explicates Habermas' 
position, economy and state operate as dominant 
sUb-systems in the social. Thus, Rasmussen states 
that, 
"The great problem in Habermas' view is that the 
modern sub-systems, economy and state, interfere in 
the process of the symbolic reproduction of daily 
life. They act functionally. This means that the 
processes of mediation between system and Lebenswelt 
are perceived under imperatives of money and power 
in functional terms exclusive of communication 
interaction." 
Rasmussen, D.M. Communicative action and philosophy: 
reflections on Habermas' Theorie des kommunikativen 
Handelns. Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 9(1) 
1982, P.16 
See Bourdieu, P. Outline of a theory of practice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977. esp. Chapter 
2, Structures and the habitus. 
See Foucault, M. History of sexuality. Vol. I 




"power relations exist only in specific sites formed 
by an intersection of practices around specific 
policies; there is no one unified site or sites of 
power relations such as the social or the state and 
all such categories must be defined as specific 
groupings of practices which are repeated or 
represented in specific sites; strategies, tactics, 
techniques and technologies of power relations do 
not exist in or operate as meta-sites of power, 
incorporating smaller sites - they repeat the 
smaller sites within their boundaries and the 
smaller sites repeat them, or aspects of them, 
within them;" 
Wickham, G. Power and power analysis : beyond 
Foucault? Economy and Society, vol. 12 1983, p. 493. 
Some objection might be made to the use of the 
notions of repeating and representing. The con-
cepts of reiterating and altering might be of more 
value in this context. 
Instances of the use of the term hegemony are man-
ifold~ for example, 
"Gramsci states that the supremacy of a social 
group may manifest itself in two forms: 'domination', 
which is realised through the coercive organs of 
the state, and intellectual and moral leadership, 
which is objectified in and exercised through the 
institutions of civil society, the ensemble of 
educational, religious and associational institut-
ions. This latter form of supremacy constitutes 
hegemony ... 
..• Hegemony is therefore the predominance obtained 
by consent rather than force of one class or group 
over other classes ... " 
Femia, J. Hegemony and consciousness in the thought 
of Antonio Gramsci. Political Studies, vol. 23(1) 
1975, p. 30-31. 
This is not the place to discuss the development of 
Gramsci's own understanding and use of the term 
hegemony. For that, see Femia, J. Gramsci's 
patrimony. British Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 13 1983, p. 327-364. esp. p. 346-352. Femia 
points out that the term had currency in Marxist 
discourse before Gramsci~ development of it. 
"Hegemony ... signifies the control of social life 
(by a group or a class) through cultural, as 
opposed to physical means." 
Femia, J. (1983), p. 346. 
The implications for Marxist, socialist strategy of 
the concept of hegemony are that a 'war of position' 




existing institutions, rather than a 'war of move-
ment', i.e. direct frontal attack upon the governing 
apparatuses. A war of movement can be attempted and 
be successful only in very specific circumstances. 
See Fern i a, J. ( 19 8 3), P . 35 0 . 
"Any definition of hegemony is complicated by the 
use of the word in two diametrically opposed senses: 
first, to mean domination, as in 'hegemonisation'; 
and secondly, to mean leadership, implying some 
notion of consent." 
A Dictionary of Marxist thought; T. Bottomore ... et 
al, editors. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. p. 201. 
See also Mouffe, C. Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci 
(In Gramsci and Marxist theory; edited by C. Mouffe. 
Routledge and Regan Paul, 1979. p. 168-204). This 
article may also be found in Culture, ideology and 
social process: a reader; edited by T. Bennett ... et 
ale London: Batsford, 1981. p. 219-234. 
See also Buci-Glucksman, C. Gramsci and the state. 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1980. esp. Chapter 2, State, 
class and apparatus of hegemony. 
See also Williams, R. Marxism and literature. 
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977. esp. Part 2 
Chapter 6, p. 108-114. 
See also Hall, S •... et al Politics and ideology: 
Gramsci (In Working Papers in Cultural Studies 10: 
on ideology. Birmingham: Univ. of Birmingham, Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1977. p. 45-76). 
"Hegemony is a fragile and difficult process of con-
tainment." 
Frow, J. Discourse and power. Economy and Society, 
vol. 14(2) May 1985, p. 205. 
The notion of the 'domestication' of conflict is 
dealt with in Femia, J. Hegemony and consciousness 
in the thought of Antonio Gramsci. Political Studies, 
vol. 23(1) 1975, p. 47-48. 
"We can thus determine the precise meanlng of the 
relation between dominant ideology and politically 
dominant class in class-divided societies. In 
these societies the original function of ideology 
is overdetermined by the class relations in which 
the structures distribute their agents. The corr-
espondence between the dominant ideology and the 
politically dominant class is not due (any more than 
the specific internal coherence of the ideology is) 
to some kind of historico-genetic relation." 
Poulantzas , N. Political power and social classes. 
London: Verso, 1978. p. 209. 
See on this point Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and 
Turner, B.S. The dominant ideology thesis. London: 










See Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B.S. 
The Dominant ideology thesis. 
"In the Dominant Ideology Thesis, we noted the 
paradox that in late capitalism the ideological 
apparatus is greatly extended, while the economic 
and political subordination of people makes ideo-
logical incorporation increasingly redundant. 
There are two reasons why we believe ~hat ideo-
logical variation increases with the development 
of late capitalism: (1) 'dull compulsion' in 
everyday life is adequate for the subordination of 
the worker, and, (2) there is no economic require-
ment for a dominant ideology. In short, capitalism 
can 'tolerate' contingency better than any other 
mode of production." 
Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B.S. 
Determinacy and indeterminacy in the theory of 
ideology. New Left Review, no. 142 Nov. - Dec. 
1983, p. 65. 
See Wilden, A. System and structure. 2nd ed. 
Tavistock, 1980. p. 390-394. 
See Smith, D.E. Textually mediated social organisat-
ion. International Social Science Journal, vol. 
36(1) 1984, p. 66. 
smith indicates that the ruling apparatus makes 
use of ideological processes of inscription. 
See Smith, D.E. Textually mediated social organisat-
ion, p. 63. 
See Frow, J. Discourse and power, p. 204. Frow 
argues that ideology should be considered as a state 
of discourse in relation to the class struggle. 
Ideology would be thought through as a differential 
relation to power. 
Although, as has been indicated, Abercrombie, Hill 
and Turner argue that ideological incorporation 
becomes less necessary in the conditions of late 
capitalism. 
Foucault argues convincingly against the concept 
of repression, both in the context of marxist 
theory and in the context of psychoanalytic theory. 
See Power/knowledge, p. 118. 
On the ceaselessness of iedological struggle even 
under hegemonised conditions, see Hall, S ... et al 
Politics and ideology: Gramsci (In Working Papers 
in Cultural Studies 10: on ideology. Birmingham: 
Univ. of Birmingham, Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies, 1977). esp. p. 68: 
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29. 
"For Gramsci, there is no state or moment of 
"hegemony" which is not contested; none which 1S 
not the result of the ruling class alliance 
mastering the class struggle; no "hegemony" 
which does not have to be won, secured, constantly 
defended." 
As part of a 'war of position', in Gramsci's terms, 
which becomes a practical deconstruction, in 
Derrida's terms. 
See Femia, J. Hegemony and consciousness in the 
thought of Antonio Gramsci, p. 34. 
See Derrida, J. positions. 
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3.3 DISCURSIVE PRACTICE, TEXTUALITY AND DECONSTRUCTION 
There is no single, simple, hard and fast distinct-
ion between discursive practice and nondiscursive practice. 
They are distinguished theoretically and analytically on the 
grounds of a number of intersecting criteria. For example, 
they employ different degrees of semiotic articulation. 
Discursive practices tend to be more digitalised and to engage 
multiple articulation of significant elements as a principle 
of production. They employ, characteristically, different 
ranges of material semiosis and hence have distinct kinds of 
material effectivity in the social. They can be differentiated 
on the grounds of the distinct kinds of social action they make 
possible. 
In concrete instances of social practice, dis-
cursive and nondiscursive modes are interwoven. In both 
modes, social relations are produced, as are more objecti-
fied social products. Both modes may be pragmaticised, to 
serve explicit institutional ends. Thus, the social products 
of both modes can be understood as symbols, in constituting 
relations of intersubjectivity, as signs, conveying and pro-
ducing 'meanings', as utilities, active elements of production 
serving specific pragmaticised purposes, or commodities, pro-
duced for generalised exchange and exchanged for profit. 
Symbols are characteristically overdetermined as signs and 
utilities. The latter, given the current social conjuncture, 
are regularly overdetermined as commodities. It is in the 
articulation of these moments of overdetermination that ideo-
logical interventions become possible. 
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One crucial distinction between discursive and 
nondiscursive practices is the degree to which discursive 
practices can be made to reiterate and hence to Ire-think' 
for a subject other social practices, of whatever mode. Dis-
cursive practices tend to be more reflexive in character and 
that reflexivity can be extended in practice. It is the 
reflexivity of discursive practices which grounds the 
possibility for deconstructive reading practices,which are 
discussed presently. 
Discursive practices, then, do not simply construct 
representations of other social practices. Discursive practices 
reiterate the elements of other social practices and, in 
registering them in a reflexive order, submit them to possible 
alteration, both intentional and unintended. Discursive 
practices are not self-enclosed interiorities. They do not 
represent in the sense of being epiphenomenal to an ontologic-
ally prior 'real'. Like all social practice, discursive 
practice is self-grounding, but sub-tended in an overdetermin-
ing field of relationships to its contextualising environment. 
It has been argued that discursive practices do not 
simply or necessarily construct representations, whether of 
other social practices or of some objectively 'real' ground. 
Yet it is obvious that determinate textual presentations can 
be made to represent and, ln representing, to communicate. 
Textual presentations can be constructed using different 
reading methods enacted according to the strategies of dist-
inct discursive practices. 
What is of interest here are the ways in which 
advertisements, understood as textual presentations, are made 
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to constitute a communicative practice in which representations 
are constructed, as meanings, for a subject. The initial 
moment of such a reading method is the already mentioned process 
of suture. Through suture, textual elements are taken to 
constitute representations for a subject of him/her self. The 
set of representations are unified and cohered as an ego. 
This is the initial structuration of the subject in and for a 
reading of a given textual presentation. 
Suture constitutes the initial punctuation of a 
textual presentation. It positions the subject in relation to 
the signifying structures of the text, for further meaning -
production. 
Further meaning production is determined by the 
interaction between the signifying structures of the textual 
presentation and the already constituted structuration of the 
subject, his/her ego and his/her unconscious desire. Through 
that interaction, imbrications are constituted for the ego. 
Suture is a relatively abstract and text-based concept. 
Imbrication implies an overdetermined interaction. In imbricat-
lon specific representations, communications and expressions 
are formed for the ego, whose structuration is resolved through 
the processes of suture and imbrication. 
In imbrication, the processes of the Other, through 
which both subject and text are formed, are recognised, or mis-
recognised to follow Lacan's terminology (1), in the form of 
identified ego and other. Hence, communications can be per-
ceived to emit from a specified other ego, while representat-
ions of specified objects and ideas are constructed. Textual 
presentations can be understood as expressions emanating from 
the other ego. 
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In this way, distinct communication practices are 
constituted. Communication need not necessarily be conducted 
between two equal egos but the model of the dialogic con-
versation between equals has come to dominate concepts of 
communication. Communication is perceived as reciprocal 
exchange (2). 
In its most extreme form, as dialogue, communication 
takes place as a set of movements between the sutured ego and 
a speculary double constituted through the interaction of 
material semiosis of the text and the reading subject. Com-
munication takes place between the ego and his/her converse (3). 
The ego is imbricated, first, in the conversational structure 
and, second, in the situation of conversation. Imbrication 
names these processes of situating and positioning. 
Through suture and imbrication, then, the material 
semiosis of textual presentations can be disambignated as 
communication practices. The concept of overdetermination, 
in the context of suture and imbrication, indicates the 
further overcodings generated from the elements of the situat-
ion of communication, whether dialogic or otherwise. Given 
communications are determined in generated situations, but 
those situations, in turn, are constituted of institutional 
elements which generate contexts that overdetermine both 
situation and communication. 
Institutional contexts, implying ideological con-
flicts and hegemonised order, overdetermine the specificity 
of any communication. Reading takes place as a negotiated 
interaction between reading subject and textual presentation. 
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The dominant means of disambignating this complex process 
is enacted in the names given here, as suture, imbrication 
and overdetermination to constitute specific regimes of 
communication and representation. This takes place as the 
constitution of a double speculary or imaginary communication 
and representation process, for an ego. The overdeterminat-
ion of the subject and text, in relation to the Other, is 
(mis-)recognised in the form of the overdetermination of the 
communication for an ego, in an already hegemonised institut-
ional order. 
What remains, as discussed below, lS to deconstruct 
communication and representation practices in terms of the 
discursive practices they cause to be misrecognised. 
Discursive practices produce and depend upon a complex 
and heterogeneous field of material semiosis. Such a field is 
termed here textuality. Textuality is not understood here in 
a formalistic sense, such as that suggested by said, 
""Textuality" is the somewhat mystical and 
disinfected subject matter of literary theory. 
Textuality has therefore become the exact 
antithesis and displacement of what might 
be called history. Textuality is considered 
to take place, yes, but by the same token it 
does not take place anywhere or anytime in 
particular. It is produced, but by no one 
and at no time. It can be read and inter-
preted, although reading and interpreting 
are routinely understood to occur in the 
form of misreading and misinterpreting." (4) 
Textuality is the name given to the material semiotic 
resources which are the productive elements out of which dis-
cursive practices are generated. Discursive practices exploit 
the resources of textuality, in order to reduce the promethean 
ambiguity of their potential productivity and to place semiotic 
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elements in particular discursive formations (5). Discursive 
practices give strategic direction, in terms of possible pro-
cedures, for the use of the semiotic elements. 
Textuality as a concept displaces those of language, 
meaning and communication, and the conceptual framework to 
which these latter concepts belong. Textuality is constructed 
to evince the social character of discursive practice and 
material semiosis. 
The concept of textuality is intended to stress the 
production of meanings for a subject through the active con-
struing of semiotic structures. Textuality stresses the 
constitution of the subject, rather than assuming the pre-
constructed status of the ego. Suture, imbrication and over-
determination are the analytical moments through which the 
constitution of the subject in discursive practice is misrecog-
nised through the forms of the ego specific to communication 
and representation practices. 
By using the concept of textuality, the theory that 
language is a system which is used to construct expressions 
or statements that serve as representations is not replaced 
simply by another which argues that language, as discourse, 
is a way to do things, amongst which to represent is but one 
small part. Such a pragmaticist theory assumes that the ego 
who performs such acts, of speech or of discourse, is already 
constituted. The concepts of textuality and discursive 
practice, alternatively, encode a conception of the formation 
and unification of the ego, through suture. 
Textuality, then, is constituted by the set of 
semiotic elements, textual presentations, frames and situations 
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in which are interwoven elements from distinct semiotic 
systems. Verbal semiosis is one important, but not the 
essential form of such signifying systems. 
Reading a textual presentation, such as the advert-
isements in Section 4, need not follow the dominant means of 
disambiguation and meaning production. Hence, advertisements 
need not be read as if they constituted a communication practice 
whose situation of communication is consumption behaviour, a 
form of behaviour which is punctuated by frequent commercial 
exchange. 
The space for ideological operation opens here. 
While the ego-based calculation of the consumer concerning 
the product is based upon the pleasure and the use it might 
give and hence on the calculation of a certain form of mean-
ingfulness, the calculations of the advertiser, marketer and 
producer of the product are more firmly focused upon the 
commercial and economic aspect of the transaction. The 
character of the product as, at once, symbolic, significatory, 
utilitarian and commodity comes into play. What is important 
is how the complex character of the product is permitted to 
be recognised. In sum, could there not be some difficulty and 
discrepancy in resolving the advertiser's, marketer's and 
producer's overt statements to the effect that they are 
interested in satisfying the consumer's needs, wants, desires, 
etc., and .the calculations of the exchange value of the pro-
duct. No simple 'exploitation', can be deemed to be taking 
place. No simple 'expropriation' lS taking place. Yet both 
the (misrecognised) communicative exchange between advertisement 
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and consumer and seller and buyer are complex moments in 
which social order is reiterated and reproduced ideologically. 
In short, reading an advertisement cannot be a moment of 
simple communicative exchange. 
The potential of the textuality constituted by 
advertisements, alternatively, can be exploited by adopting 
a reflexive reading practice which reinstates recognitions 
of the processes of discursive practice in which communication 
practices are inscribed. 
This is to recognise that for readers the textual 
presentations constituted by advertisements are relatively 
open semiotic constructs. They must be worked by specific 
labours of reading in order to close down their indeterminacy. 
Suture, imbrication and overdetermination name the 
processes by which communication practices are disambignated. 
However, such communication practices may be met by a decon-
structive response which reasserts discursive production over 
communication. 
It is important to recognise that a deconstructive 
response is itself situated, contextualised, and overdetermined. 
It is not a universalised response. It partakes of that field 
of textuality out of which communication practices are pro-
duced. 
Deconstruction, then, refocuses discursive practice, 
over and above communicative practice and textuality over and 
above (formalistically conceived) text. The term deconstruct-
ion is used with three major reservations. First, there is 
the strongly Derridean tone which the term has acquired. The 
deconstructive reading practice enacted here is not simply 
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or wholly Derridean. It is not treating advertisements as 
exhibiting the structuring presuppositions of Western meta-
physics. It is the refusal to follow through the more local 
institutional intentions of marketing practice and a refusal 
to treat those intentions as authoritative. Second, the 
deconstructive practice developed here is deconstructionist 
in the sense which has taken hold in u.S. literary theory. 
It is not a new method for re-reading an established canon 
of texts. It stands on the borders of academic canonisation. 
The deconstructive practice enacted here is a specific 
response to a given set of texts which are taken to substantiate 
a determinate communicative and representation practice. That 
communicative practice is conceived to be part of more complex 
patterns of consumption behaviour, forms of behaviour which 
are overdetermined in relation to pragmaticised commerce. 
Third, and finally, the deconstructive reading 
enacted here is not an end in itself. There is a sense in 
which deconstruction does lead to further deconstruction and 
hence to the destruction of meaningfulness itself. However, 
it is recognised that the deconstructive reading practice 
enacted here is motivated and situated. Its horizons are 
not universal, but formed, through the unconscious in relation 
to the determining structures of the Other, i.e. the power-
relations of a determinate social formation. 
Thus, the deconstruction enacted here can be but 
one part of a larger strategic project, which concerns other 
modes of criticism, opposition and resistance in other 
institutional sites. The practice enacted here is the decon-
struction of the institutional practice of reading advertise-
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ments as a communicative and representation practice determined 
in the context of consumption behaviour. This practice is 
pursued in order to understand the institutions whereby a given 
hegemonised order is reiterated reproductively and hence 
sustains itself as an order. 
Deconstruc~ion is a strategic action upon texts. It 
lS not a unitary, regulated method. It is governed by the alm 
of instituting a novel yet critical discursive practice which 
rearticulates the communicative practice constituted, in the 
example used here, by a given set of advertisements. 
While that strategic intervention exploits the 
reflexive potentiality of certain forms of semiosis, the 
deconstructive reading practice cannot determine wholly its 
own meaning-production. In turn, that deconstruction becomes 
overdetermined in the social. The internalised self-understand-
ing which the deconstructive practice encodes does not con-
stitute a moment of final self-evidence. 
The novel practice is posed as a relation to other 
practices. It operates critically by articulating certain 
possibilities of reflexivity. As such, deconstructive read-
ing practice is without an 'originary centre', either as self-
authorising or as objectively caused. It is constituted in 
and through its critical relations and differences to other 
modes of discursive practice. While it may be said to be 
grounded in other discursive practices, deconstructive practice 
encodes its own self-grounding as an active break of diff-
erencing. 
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While deconstruction may not be characterised as a 
unitary method, it may, in being enacted, consist of a series 
of articulated movements whose overall aim, as has been stated, 
lS the instituting of a 'novel' discursive practice which 
nevertheless subsists in a critical relation to established 
discursive practices. Hence, deconstruction may involve the 
making explicit of the presuppositions of a given discourse and 
the conceptual framework by which they are organised. It 
may involve making explicit the implicature of a discourse (6). 
It may involve recognising what kind of 'activity type' (7) 
a discourse conventionally or normally consitutes. But, more 
importantly, it does imply the development of the existing 
discourse in order to constitute a 'novel' 'activity type'. 
The aim is to constitute the possibility for a 'novel' mode 
of social 'action' and hence 'novel' social acts. Deconstruct-
ion, then, refers to the development and extension, through 
differencing, of the conditions of possibility for 'action'. 
Such development is necessarily, of course, of a limited 
character. 
To read advertisements deconstructively, then, is 
to develop them critically. It is not to realise their fund-
amental 'truth' or to show the established 'knowledge' to 
which they give rise or which they disguise. It is to read 
advertisements strategically. That strategic reading con-
stitutes an active intervention into advertisements. The 
intervention is not to be assumed to constitute a proper or 
correct method. Intervention is neither 'reflectively' nor 
'expressively' correct simply. The aim is to set in motion 
'novel' yet critical ways of using advertisements,of enact-
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ing them through reading, 'beyond' what has become normal 
or conventional, or which has become authorised by specific 
institutional organisations. 
Deconstruction seeks to constitue a 'novel' discursive 
practice but does not seek to claim for that practice the 
prestige of being the mode of discourse, and the only one, 
through which proper 'knowledge' (i.e. of advertisements) may 
be produced. Deconstruction is a preparedness to act strateg-
ically. It renders problematic the relations between discourses 
and the relations between discourses and 'objects' of discourse. 
Deconstruction is a readiness to suspect any discourse assumed 
to provide certain knowledge. In mistrusting certainty, the 
character of knowledge itself is recognised to have a strategic 
purposiveness. 
Even while the tArms 'suspicion' and 'mistrust' have 
been used, deconstruction is not a programme of universal doubt-
ing. It is not a form of scepticism. Furthermore, in stress-
ing the critical as relatedness and difference, deconstruct-
ion is not utopian in its conception of 'otherness'. Otherness 
is conceived as that difference which may be recognised through 
relationship. It is not posed as an absolute exteriority (to 
an essential interiority). 
To read deconstructively is to read critically. The 
concept of the critical is developed as calculated, or strategic, 
resistance. It is a resistance to assuming as authoritative 
the inscribed reader position(s) and communicative structures 
which the advertisement gives rise conventionally. The critical 
moment as deconstruction is not the positing of an exterior, 
radical alteriority (assumed to be) in opposition to the 
inscribed reader constructed conventionally through an enactment 
of a reading. Deconstructing implies negotiation with the 
inscribed reader position(s), prior to dismantling or dis-
persing it/them as a means of developing the discourse. 
In admitting itself to be a strategic project of 
resistance, which proceeds through motivated actions, decon-
struction may not be considered simply as negative. Decon-
struction is not nihilist. While constituted through motivated 
actions, motivation which may be 'unconscious' in form, decon-
struction is not voluntarist. Nor does it rely upon a devolv-
ing of will onto desire simply. The 'subject' of deconstruction 
is not centred upon either a conscious nor an unconscious 
cogito. The 'subject' of deconstructive action exhibits only 
a discursive intentionality. Such an intentionality is dis-
persed throughout any mode of discourse. 
Furthermore, given the dispersion of intentionality 
throughout discourse, 'action' as a concept may not be 
limited to being the sole 'property' of 'subjects'. Advertise-
ments, as textual constructs, in articulating a discursive 
space throughout which is dispersed intentionality, may be 
said to act upon readers to re-constitute them as 'subjects', 
on the basis, it goes without saying, of their already-
constituted status as discursively and practically skilfull 
'agents' capable of enacting a reading. 'Actions' do not 
'originate' in subjects' essential intentions nor unconscious 
desires. Actions are made possible by social practices, 
whether discursive or nondiscursive. 
The concept of action, in the context of a decon-
structive project, takes the form of an attempt to break with 
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the dominant determinate context. Such an act seeks to 
re-negotiate its status, to become relatively determining, 
while admitting to its having been determined. A deconstruct-
ive act remains within contextual determination In general, 
yet seeks to break with any determinate contextual horizon 
which imposes an authoritative closure upon the discourse. 
In the case of advertisements, that dominant 
determinate context is that of marketing, in its institutional 
dominance over advertising. 
A deconstructive reading of advertisements inter-
weaves a concern for the material specificity of advertise-
ments' textuality, first with a concern for the communicative 
practice of reading advertisements performatively as a con-
sumer, and, second, a concern for the field of strategic 
ideological action by which that practice is overdetermined. 
In the case of advertisements, a deconstructive 
reading practice implies that the reader of the inscription 
may actively refuse to accept the dominant performance of 
understanding advertisements as being located as communications 
in the context of consumption behaviour. Advertisements may 
be refused the status of a directive in that context, a 
directive both to look and to buy. The programme of expect-
ations, which constitute consumption behaviour may be refused. 
A questioning of the consitution of market-based 
expectations is arrived at, alongside the questioning of the 
coherence of specific markets. What are re-focused in the 
proposed deconstructive reading, then, are the relationships 
between ego, subject, unconscious, and Other, especially the 
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relationships between the desire of the unconscious and the 
power-relations of the field of the Other. Desire operates 
as the transmuted iteration of power-relations, which 
structure both subject and the imaginary identities and 
representations of the ego. 
Deconstruction, then, reworks the processes of 
suture, imbrication and overdetermination. The project of 
deconstruction itself, while altering structures of suture 
and imbrication, cannot itself deny its own overdetermined 
status. It can but register the possibility of instituting 
a counter-hegemonic discursive strategy in the fields of 
ideological struggle. To increase its effectivity, it 
requires to be reiterated and amplified by other kinds and 
levels of ideological political and economic strategies. 
To read advertisements deconstructively is to chall-
enge the ways in which dominant marketing practices inscribe 
institutional forms of communication, intentionality and desire, 
through the subject and the unconscious, in and upon the form-
ation of the ego as consumer. Market-based expectations and 
desires, in this process, reiterate forms which contribute to 
the maintenance of a specific hegemonised social order. 
Deconstruction challenges that ideological operation. 
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4.1 TEXTUALITY 1 SUTURE 
The first four advertisement presentations are 
being read in relation to the concept of suture. Suture 
may be taken to signify one means whereby the field of 
productivity of textuality is given direction and becomes 
relatively closed down. Suture is a means of reducing the 
indeterminancy of textuality. 
Suture concerns the relationships between the 
inscribed reader positions, in the structures of the text, 
and the already positioned reader of the inscription. The 
reader of the inscription is already constituted through 
the relationships of the symbolic. Those relationships 
are enacted strategically in and through the heterogeneous 
domains of social practice. The overdetermination of 
symbolic structuration is pursued in subsequent sections. 
The concept of suture carries with it the 
implication that neither text nor reading subject are 
'complete' in themselves. In Heath's words, 
"the image is never complete in itself (if 
it were, there would be no place for a 
viewer, hence, finally, no place for any 
image) and its limit is its address (the 
limit where it enters the chain, completes 
with the subject it thus entertains)." (1) 
The context of Heath's discussion is the endeaviour to 
establish an analysis of cinema as discourse. He argues 
that one important moment of discourse, whether cinematic 
or otherwise, is realised as, 
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"the production at every moment through 
(the text) of a subject address, the spec-
ification of the play of incompleteness-
completion. What suture can serve to name 
is this specification, variously articulated 
but always a function of representation (the 
play for a subject, its taking place) .11 (2) 
Heath is evoking an explicitly Lacanian view of the con-
stitution of the subject. That subject, in Lacan's terms, 
is already in and of the symbolic. Cinema, and indeed 
photography, are not of the mirror phase (3). The moments 
of cinematographic and photographic subject address are 
'after' the symbolic (4). 
To generalise Heath's argument, any textual 
presentation, regardless of the semiotic material by 
means of which it is articulated, constitutes a multiple 
play in and of the symbolic. The subject is positioned 
multiply by the textual structures. The suturing function 
constitutes a junction between this symbolic multiplicity 
and an imaginary unity or coherence (5), focused, as a 
point of introjection and projection, upon the ego. 
Suture, in one of its aspects, closes discourse 
around imaginary structures in the form of fixities and 
identities. Hence, suture closes, to some degree, the sub-
ject as reader or as spectator. This moment of closure 
may be considered as the constitution of the ego, as imagin-
ary structure, from the systems and processes of the symbolic. 
The constituted ego, consequently, may be overdetermined in 
and through the complex processes of determinate discursive 
and nondiscursive social practices. It is important theoretic-
ally to recognise that, 
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"The ego is not to be confused with the 
subject: it is the fixed point of imaginary 
projection and identification." (6) 
The subject, as distinct from the ego, is a moving 
function. The subject is formed at one and the same time 
as the unconscious, in Lacanian terms. The unconscious is 
"forged on the trace of what operates to constitute the sub-
ject" (7), while, 
"The trace is the erasure of selfhood, of 
one's own presence, and is constituted by the 
threat or anguish of its irremediable dis-
appearance. An unerasable trace is not a 
trace, it is a full presence, an immobile 
and uncorruptable substance ... " (8) 
The unconscious is defined as the active break, as trace, 
between the subject and the Other (9). The Other, 
"is the locus in which is situated the chain 
of the signifier that governs whatever may 
be made present of the subject - it is the 
field of that living being in which the sub-
ject has to appear." (10) 
It is this perspective which permits the formulat-
ion of Lacan's major tenets, i.e. that the unconscious is 
the discourse of the Other, that the unconscious is structured 
as a language, and that the desire of the subject, as a moving 
function, is the desire of the Other (11). As Heath interprets 
Lacan, 
"The other is the domain of the symbolic 'as 
locus of the signifying cause of the subject', 
distribution-circulation of signifiers within 
which the subject is produced - 'the locus 
from which the question of its existence may 
be posed it." (12) 
Lacan's concept of the Other is construed herein 
In terms of the self-grounding, reiterated production of 
social practice. subjects, as loci of relations and as out-
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comes of practice, are conceived in terms of the symbolic 
as the domain of social production in general. They are 
not conceived primarily in terms of 'language', if that 
term is taken to mean a domain of verbal events determined 
by a univocal linguistic system. The relation of subject 
to practice is construed as a differentiation, as active 
difference, a conception not wholly dissimilar to the way 
in which Lacan poses the relationship between subject and 
Other (13). 
It is important to recognise that suture may be 
extended to the entering into and registering of the sub-
ject in any form of social practice. The specificity of 
discursive forms of suture may be recognised to be one 
instance of a wider range of processes. In the following 
readings, it is the processes whereby subjects are sutured 
into a spcific form of (overdetermined) discursive practice 
which are under discussion. This discussion does not take 
the form of proposing how subjects are sutured into 'language', 
as if to some absolute, unitary system which organises and 
determines discursive events. Subjects are recognised to 
be sutured into heterogeneous and conflict-laden fields of 
discursive practice. 
For Lacan and those who follow him, the principle 
devices of suture are spoken (14). Verbal, spoken devices 
are, however, only instances of suture. Other devices, 
using other semiotic materials, may be instanced. Heath dis-
cusses the use of the concept of suture in the context of 
cinematography, while Burgin extendes it to photography. 
According to Burgin, 
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"The primary suturing instance of the dis-
course of still photography takes the form 
of an identification of the subject with the 
camera position. As already observed, the 
look from this position will shift between 
the poles of voyeurism and narcissism: in 
the former instance subjecting the other-as-
object to an inquisitive and controlling 
surveillance in which seeing is dissociated 
from being-seen; and in the latter effecting 
a dual identification with both the camera 
and the individual depicted. Identification 
here is rarely the simple matter of like 
'identifying with' like implied in an every-
day use of the term; it is more often a matter 
of the selective incorporation of attributes .. " (15) 
In plates I to 4, two indices of suture may be con-
sidered to be dominant. One is the imaginary self-possession 
as 'I' of the subject in written discourse (16), writing 
understood in the traditional sense here and not the Derridean, 
which is discussed presently. The second is the identificat-
ion with the camera position and the identification with the 
character photographed, as instanced by Burgin ln the above-
cited passage. Alongside the dominant systems of suture 
may be noted a series of partial devices, such as illustrat-
ion,typographic variation, graphic devices, and effects of 
layout design. They may be taken to operate in the over-
determining contexts of photographically articulated 
structures, on the one hand, and verbal textual structures, 
on the other hand. These elementary devices serve as the 
basis for more complex suturing effects. 
Plate I uses the most readily recognisable instances 
of suture, which are the two already mentioned. If the sub-
ject, as the reader of the inscription, identifies, first, 
with the camera position and, second, with the photographic-
ally captured character, it becomes evident, by the structur-
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ing device of the returned look of the character, that 'I' 
who read and 'she' who is inscribed are, for the purposes 
of coherence, to become identical or undivided. 
In this movement of the subject, a suture may be 
realised in and through the photographic textual devices. 
The photographed character acts as a stand-in for the reader 
of the inscription may be entered into the chain of the 
signifiers constituted photographically as well as typo-
graphically and through effects of layout. This circulat-
ion or movement of the subject begins, as a reading, at 
the top of the textual frame of plate 1. There emerge a 
number of possible chains of signifiers. They may be limited, 
for example, to the photographically constructed chain. The 
chain of signifying elements may be extended into the other 
semiotic materials, wherein second order processes of suture 
may be recognised to occur. Thus, to summarise, 
"Suture names the relation of the subject to 
the chain of its discourse: we shall see that 
it figures there as the element which is lack-
ing, in the form of a stand-in. For while 
there is a lacking, it is not purely and simply 
absent. Suture, by extension - the general 
relation of lack of which it is an element, 
inasmuch as it implies position of a taking-
the place-of." (17) 
suture, as a concept, is restricted to that taking 
the place of the stand-in and movement of the subject through 
the chain of signifiers. While this may be achieved across 
a range of distinct semiotic material, suture is considered 
as the formation of the ego, as imaginary identity. The 
concept of suture is not used to cover the development of 
ego-based discursive processes, which are realised in the 
form of overdetermined discursive social practices. 
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In plate 1, then, the photographically sutured 
'I', wherein I see her and she sees me and we are considered 
not just to be in one another's presence but to be one's 
self-presence, can be joined to the verbally articulated 
discourse. This is achieved by the cohering of photographic 
self-presence to the imaginary self-presence of the verbal 
'I'. In effect,the photographic 'I' is sutured to the 
linguistic stand-in. The reader of the inscription becomes 
the imaginary identity in the phrase 'So I thought about it'. 
Two points of theoretical importance ought to be 
made at this juncture. First, in Heath's words, 
"the subject of the enounced and the subject 
of the enunciation never wholly come together, 
are always in the distances of the symbolic ... " 
(18) 
'I' who read, who engage with and am moved by the textual 
structures, am inscribed photographically and verbally. 
'I' am overdetermined typographically and by layout design. 
'I' may be made coherent. But that cohering, or suturing, 
is produced through the divisions and articulations of the 
different stand-ins. Hence, 
"The stake is clear: the 'I' is a division 
but joins all the same, the stand-in is the 
lack in the structure but nevertheless, sim-
ultaneously, the possibility of a coherence, 
of the filling in. At the end of the suturing 
function is the ego, the me: 'it's me!' .. " (19) 
This leads to the second point, which is that the 
subject is positioned in the textual structure a multi-
plicity of times. The subject is advanced through that 
positioning. The subject is not necessarily or essentially 
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unified or coherent. It is the processes of suture which 
produce cohesion and continuity as an outcome. Such process 
may be taken as the constitution of an ego, as has been 
posited already. The ego, in turn, may serve as a principle 
of further production, through the overdetermined production 
of discursive social practices. This revised production 
might be termed the production of 'empirical' discourses, 
as those which presuppose the unity of the ego and the sub-
stantial existence of that coherent ego. 
However, it is important to recognise that, 
"there is no ego without a subject, terrain 
of its necessity and its hold: function of 
the symbolic, suture is towards the imaginary, 
the moment of junction - standing~in, a taking 
place, a something, a some one there." (20) 
Hence, while it may be assumed that any reader approaches 
the textual presentation as a coherent ego, and only as a 
coherent ego, it should be recognised that the ego is con-
stituted through the multiple traces of the subject. It 
is through the modes of appearance of the subject, as 
moving function, in the textual structure that specific 
forms of the ego are realised. The ego, in other words, 
is modified in the structuration of the subject by the text. 
Reading, therefore is being conceived on the 
basis of difference and production, not identity and simple 
re-cognition. To signi~y this double movement of the sub-
ject in and out of the text, Derrida's concept of "differ-
ance" can be coined: 
"Differance is ... the formation of form. 
But it is on the other hand the being 
imprinted of the imprint." (21) 
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Or, indeed, Derrida's concept of the trace may be used: 
"The trace is the differance which opens 
appearance and signification" (12) 
In sum, the subject, as a moving function realised ln and 
through the processes of reading, is reconstituted through 
the addresses of the textual structures. That reconstitut-
ion has effect upon the ego, as a form or appearance and 
as a principle of further production, of signification and 
of meaning. The ego comes to limit both production and 
recognition while it seals suture. The ego is not a simple 
origin or foundation for meaning production in general. 
Thus far, the photographic look, as an admixture 
of two contrary currents (23), and the verbal-typographic 
address have been instanced as devices by means of which 
suture can be realised. The series of subject positions 
to be made coherent can now be scrutinised more closely. 
What are the openings, as stand-ins, which are to be found 
in, for example, plate I? 
First, there is the returned look of the photo-
graphed character. Second, there is the linguistic-
typographic character of the 'I' in the phrase 'So I thought 
about it'. Third, there is the modified typographic 'I' 
of the sentence fragment 'I was waiting for my train .. ' 
The past tenses of the verbs, 'thought' and 'was 
waiting', establish the structure of a narrative. They 
construct a present moment, for 'I', as a lack or opening 
into which the reader of the inscription may enter. That 
present moment, an imaginary moment of self-presence or 
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immediacy, is constructed as a relation to those two pasts 
already mentioned, i.e. the instance of 'So I thought about 
it', which is typographically marked by capitalisation, and 
the instance of 'I was waiting for my train ..• ', which is 
typographically marked by italicisation. 
That present moment, it is to be stressed, is not 
a plenitude. It is a coherence produced as a series of 
traces. It exists in and through its relationships to 
distinct pasts. It is not a conscious or unconscious self-
presence or an empirical presence. This is an issue upon 
which Derrida is emphatic: 
"The conscious text is thus not a trans-
cription, because there is no text present 
elsewhere as an unconscious one to be trans-
posed or transported. For the value of 
presence can also dangerously affect the con-
cept of the unconscious. There is then no 
unconscious truth to be rediscovered by 
virtue of having been written elsewhere. 
There is no text written and present elsewhere 
which would then be subjected, without being 
changed in the process, to an operation and a 
temporalisation ... which would be external to 
it, floating on its surface. There is no 
present text in general, and there is not 
even a past present text, a text which is 
past as having been present. The text is not 
conceivable in an originary or modified form 
of presence. The unconscious text is already 
a weave of pure traces, differences in which 
meaning and force are united - a text nowhere 
present, consisting of archives which are 
always ready transcriptions . •.. Everything 
begins with reproduction. Always already: ... " 
(24) 
The constructed present is not a plenitude and neither does 
it transcribe a past present nor an unconscious present. 
In the context of a narrative structure, itself 
an instance of a complex suture, the photographic present-
ation in plate 1 is registered both as a moment of suture 
for an imaginary visualised coherence and as an element of 
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that structure. It becomes that moment when 'I was wait-
ing for my train .. ', when 'I thought: That other girl at 
the linen counter. On a 'bottom drawer' expedition, I bet -
like me ... ' 
Again, given the structure of a narration, the 
typographic element of the verbal signifying chain begins 
to play out its role in distinguishing sequences of events. 
One sequence cohered by capitalisation is distinguished 
from another cohered by italicisation, while both are dis-
inguished from a third typeface which builds a link between 
the proper name, Westminster, and the time of the italicised 
narration. The distinct times of the different sequences 
are fused by the finalising, underlined presence of the 
proper name. Typographic features, therefore, both artic-
ulate and carry forward the narration. 
The proper name is but one of the destinations of 
the narrative. The accompanying underlining and the coat 
of arms, which serves as a grammatical full stop and as a 
narrative conclusion, reiterate the value of finality. 
Typographic, graphic, syntactic and semantic features are 
interwoven in that complex signifier, the name plus the 
shield. The other destination is the photographed 'girl', 
she-I, the girl who was on a bottom drawer expedition, 
the girl who now has a cheque book. 
For even while the photograph illustrates only 
one moment of the narration, that point at the train 
station, the image of the girl is that which has been 
fixed and is reiterated throughout the verbal text. The 
photographed image is not only illustrative in function. 
The photograph fixes the look that remains and that sutures. 
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All of the instances of the girl cited above can 
be considered to be distinct. The processes of suture 
unify them and make them continuous. In effect, the two 
destinations themselves, Westminster and the girl, even 
though constructed in distinct semiotic materials, become 
unified, in the interweaving of photographic suture and 
narrative suture. 
Through the figure of the now, realised as the 
presence of the narrative conclusion in Westminster and 
the photographically overdetermined imaginary coherence of 
the girl, a pact is sealed between the reader of the inscript-
ion and the inscribed reader. All that is required of the 
reader of the inscription to assent to this pact is that 
'she-I' give a nod, along the lines of the deictic 'This 
is 1961': Yes, yes, yes. 
It is that assent, as a further opening, which is 
carried forward into the small print of the social con-
tract which is emerging. Having sealed and secured an 
imaginary identity, it is you, as reader of the inscription 
and as imaginary plenitude, who are invited to act upon 
that identity: 
"Ask your nearest Westminster Bank branch 
(address in Telephone Directory) to give 
you a copy of the booklet 'On Using Your 
Bank' .•. ' 
Again, typographic style unifies this intervention, this 
time through the use of small print and a typeface without 
serifs. The bank, Westminster, becomes yours. The bank, 
in some sense 'belongs' to you, or becomes part of you. 
You and the bank are unified. 
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The series of elements, which are divisions but 
which unify all the same, suture the subject. You, I, she, 
and the bank are wed, having emerged successfully from our 
'bottom drawer' period. Suture is a marriage and marriage 
itself is a complex, ritualised process of suture. A 
double reiteration is established and may be repeated 
indefinitely. It is that reiteration and repetition which 
constitute the appearance of an identity. The advertisement 
sutures the subject, analogously to the way in which 
marriage sutures the girl, i.e. to her husband, to the woman 
she is to become, to the social roles she is to make her own. 
Suture operates as a series of apertures. Stand-
lns are constructed and presented. They join the reader 
of the inscription to the inscribed positions. Furthermore, 
they partake as an element in a process of double marking. 
Social practices are re-marked discursively. Having been 
re-marked, they are re-registered in the practices them-
selves. The practices are developed through such different-
iations and reappropriations. In plate 1, for example, 
advertisement and marriage re-mark one another, constituting 
a trace, one which may be rendered stable in the image of 
a reflection, which itself may be divided into a real and 
an epiphenomenal part. An ontological distinction is 
introduced into a social process. 
Suture opens, joins, coheres and advances, but 
it also closes. A process, a movement, a relationship are 
taken to be an imaginary plenitude. An ego is constituted, 
as a "point without dimension, desire or unconscious" (25). 
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This, in the example of plate 1, constitutes a moment of 
certitude, marked by the conclusivity of the Westminster, 
in the face of uncertainty, marked by the photographed 
character. 
Both plates 1 and 2 construct pictorially the 
presence of doubt, and hence contain a certain limited con-
tradictoriness. The presentation and the unification of 
such a contradictoriness, as Burgin notes (26), may be 
more easily conveyed photographically than by a verbal 
signifier. Photography constitutes a less articulated 
system of signifying elements than the linguistic and text-
linguistic. It is difficult to construct photographically 
exclusive logical relations, such as implication, disjunct-
ion and contradiction. Pictorial means tend to be too 
inclusive. Thus, a logical contradition will tend both to 
be presented and to be mediated. Hence, in plate 2 especially, 
the hesitation of doubt takes place alongside the imaginary 
plenitudes of knowledge, on the one hand, and pleasure, on 
the other hand. 
That doubling of doubt and knowledge, hesitation 
and certitude, lack and plenitude, is achieved in plate 2 
through the relay of the verbal text (27). The reader of 
the inscription is engaged through a photographed doubt but 
is returned, via the chain of the verbal and graphically 
modified text, to a second marking of the photograph, this 
time in terms of knowledge and pleasure. 
Plate 1 and plate 2 can be distinguished, as 
moments of suture, on the following grounds. In plate 1, 
a narrative structure prevails. In plate 2, a pictorial and 
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a submerged dramatic structure (the structure of the 
picture as a dramatic scene) predominate. The two plates 
can also be distinguished on the grounds of the genderisat-
ion of doubt or hesitation. Two distinct sutures are con-
structed, one upon masculine doubt and the other on feminine 
doubt. 
Masculinisation and feminisation as suture are 
achieved pictorially, dramatically and verbally. Distinct 
hand gestures, distinct facial expressions, distinct verbal 
patterns, distinct thought patterns, distinct problems, 
and distinct destinations are constructed. He strikes a 
pose, reminiscent of Rodin's thinker. He ponders. She is 
caught in an exposed, uncomposed moment of tension. His lS 
a private interiority, while hers is an uncomfortable 
exteriority. She bites her glove. She worries. She com-
pares herself unfavourably to others. He thinks about the 
meanings of a proper name. She thinks about herself. 
Both, ~s is developed in later sections, think 
about products and services, but use very different modal-
ities of 'thought', i.e. they have very different degrees 
of access to different discursive resources. 
Plate 2 constructs a scene and a character with 
which to identify from the aperture of the camera. The 
look from the camera, this time, is not returned. A suture 
and a distinction are made. 'He' inscribed and 'I' who 
read the inscription are divided from one another, yet in 
that division of the symbolic 'we' are nevertheless joined. 
A structurally similar conjunction/disjunction is 
proposed between 'Sack' and 'Dry' as that which pertains 
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between 'he' and 'I'. Sack and D 't d ' ry are un1 e ln a proper 
name, yet they are, in another sense, opposites. 
The inscribed reader is situated in that dist-
urbance, i.e. of unity by division and of continuity by 
articulation. The words are repeated over and over, as if 
in so doing they might reveal their relation: 'Sack? Sack? 
Dry Sack?'. The words articulate in an incoherent manner 
an underlying, and bracket ted question: '(A medium sherry 
with a dry-sounding name: why?) '. Dry or medium, a single 
sherry cannot be both. The problem for the reader of the 
inscription becomes: If 'Dry Sack' is the an~7er, what is 
the question? 
It 1S to that question, of what is the question, 
to which the small print of the verbal text is addressed. 
, , 11 l' 'th t t ' t We exp a1n ... , e ex ln ervenes. It intervenes 
not only to propose a solution to the question of '(A 
medium sherry with a dry-sounding name: why?)', but to 
explain what is at stake through that explicit question. 
Two kinds of problem frame the question: the 
problem of knowledge, on the one hand, and of pleasure, on 
the other hand. The reader of the inscription is sutured 
as an imaginary identity which is however divided between 
two domains of sense,intellectual sense and aesthetic 
sense. Knowledge or Beauty? Knowledge and Beauty. Dry 
or Sack? Dry and Sack. 'We'll explain ••. and save you 
the trouble of poring over a huge Elizabethan dictionary. 
Sack was a sweet fortified Spanish wine very popular in 
the 16th century.' 'We'll explain .•. ' both what he is 
doing and what is the question over which he labours. 
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How can an imaginary identity be divided? How 
can he be like me and yet not be me? How can the name of 
the sherry be explained? How can the ephemeral character 
of experience be related to the certitude which is provided 
by knowledge? This series of questions are contained and 
joined by the conjunction of the two terms, Dry and Sack. 
Plate 2 conducts a highly sophisticated play upon the stand-
in, which divides yet joins all the same. Its character 
is foregrounded in the play of non reciprocal exchanges 
which take place through the text. From the very first 
opening in the photograph, he and I are joined but off-set 
from one another. He fails to return the look of the camera, 
creating a lack into which the reader of the inscription 
enters and pursues an interrogation. 
The reader of the inscription interrogates his 
interrogation. The inscribed character utters to himself, 
for he does not recognise the I who looks upon him, 'Sack? 
Sack? Dry Sack?'. The reader of the inscription hesitates: 
What is it that he wants in what he says? 
Heath construes this movement of reading in the 
following way, rewriting Lacan, 
"Effect of the signifier under which it 
slides, the subject comes back on - 'attacks' -
the intervals of the signifying chain, takes up 
the desire of the Other: what does it want in 
what it says?" (28) 
The reader of the inscription and the inscribed figure are 
related through the domain of the Other, articulated by 
the signifiers, Dry and Sack. 
The subject is sutured as an ego with a masculine 
inflection, an ego which is prepared to pursue a further 
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interrogation of the text. This interrogation is developed 
using epistemological and aestl~etic modes of discourse, with 
their structuring presuppositions, as is discussed presently 
in relation to place 6. There 1 the sutured subject is 
developed as a man of reason and a man of taste. Reason and 
taste themselves are re-worked through the overdeterminations 
of discourses, an issue which is discussed in relation to 
plates 9 to 12. 
'Dry Sack' exhibits the structure of a stand-in, 
as a process of tracing back and forth which can serve to 
suture an imaginary identity and which can cohere an ego 
formation. Plates 1 and 2 exhibit two distinct strategies 
for effecting suture. Plate 2 is the more complex. To 
contrast plates 1 and 2 also allows an indication that the 
ego formation is already marked or inflected in terms of 
gender traits, and indeed age traits. 'Girl' and 'man' are 
identities which cohere two distinguishable processes, of 
ageing or maturing, and genderisation. In short, while an 
imaginary identity is constituted, it is already marked in 
terms of potential development, a point taken up when 
secondary revisions, imbrications, overdeterminations and 
deconstructions are pursued in the following sections. 
That is to say, the imaginary identity already re-marks 
complex social constructions. The ego, even while imaginary, 
a category which does not imply a specific ontological 
status, is never simple. 
Plates 1 and 2 can be recognised to construct 
two distinct fabrics of traces. Suture names a set of pro-
cesses. First, suture covers the provision of apertures, 
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by way of stand-ins. The stand-in divides, ln the symbolic, 
yet joins in the imaginary. Second, through suture, the 
subject is re-entered at different points throughout the 
text. The subject enters the system of signifiers and is 
circulated and advanced. Finally, suture names that moment 
of cohering, unifying and closing. 
Plates 1 and 2 instance two different strategies 
whereby such finalisation or totalisation can be achieved. 
In plate 1, narrative structure prevails. The narrative 
structure re-works the photographic structure. Plate 2 
instances both a pictorial finalisation and a dramatic 
structure. Both of these latter instances construe a closure 
around a scene. The picture opens and closes the dramatic 
sequence,the posing and resolving of a question. The 
dramatic enactment is pursued as a passage through an 
explanation. That explanation returns the subject to the 
pictorial structure. In doing so, however, the subject 
is altered and enters the picture at a different point, by 
way of the 'Dry Sack' rather than the male character. As 
a drama, the picture can be recognised to cohere a process 
of interrogation, from dissatisfaction or displeasure to 
the imaginary plenitude of enjoyment. As a pictorial 
structure only, as in the initial instance, the picture 
shows only a questioning whose boundaries are ill-defined. 
Suture, then, is the founding of an ego. It is 
constituted as a fabric of textual traces, to-ing and fro-
ing (29). They create an appearance which when fixed 
assumes the role of an identity. Upon the constitution of 
that ego, the reader of the inscription may approach once 
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more the textual presentation, to re-mark it. The textual 
apparatus is reopened to secondary revisions, imbrications, 
and overdeterminations. Through those subsequent processes, 
discursive practices, as distinct regions or regimes of 
strategic interaction, are cut out from one another and are 
inter-related to one another. 
Suture is a textual grounding. This textual 
grounding may be discussed in terms of Derrida~sconception 
of writing, a concept and a practice which is to be dist-
inguished from traditional uses of the term. A system of 
writing, for Derrida, constitutes a "multiplicity of layered 
surfaces" (30), in which, 
"The subject of writing is a system of relations 
between strata: ..• within that scene, on that 
stage, the punctual simplicity of the classical 
subject is not to be found. In order to describe 
the structure, it is not enough to recall that 
one always writes for someone; and the opposit-
ions sender-receiver, code-message, etc., remain 
extremely coarse instruments. We would search 
the "public" in vain for the first reader: i.e., 
the first author of a work. And the "sociology 
of literature" is blind to the war and the ruses 
perpetuated by the author who reads and by the 
first reader who dictates, for at stake here is 
the origin of the work itself. The sociality 
of writing as drama requires an entirely diff-
erent discipline." (31) 
Derrida's conception of the apparatus of writing 
encompasses and puts into difficulties the traditional 
oppositions between text and reader, author and text, and 
author and reader. It undermines any simple notions of 
expression, intention, and communication which rely upon 
those oppositions. Through the structure of the re-mark, 
the practical density of the social may be recognised, as 
an ever-pre-given complexity which lacks simple origin, 
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trajectory and destination and which lacks a simple ground. 
In being elements of a system of writing, in the sense 
sketched above, the structures of advertisements re-mark 
and alter and extend the structures of the social. The 
social becomes more differentiated. Advertisements do not 
reflect the structures of the social. 
To return to the selected advertisements, plate 
3 evinces a similar structure to plates I and 2, in terms 
of a division between semiotic materials. Yet it is less 
complex and, as is discussed below, is less compelling. 
It is still possible to realise a process of suture in 
plate 3. It divides yet joins the reader of the inscript-
ion, the coated male figures of the illustration, the 
'knowledgeable people' of the typographic text, and the 
name and label of 'Holl~nd and Sherry' cloth. 
The aim of the presentation can still be construed 
as a suture, one which is intended to be insistent, an 
intention inscribed in the use of a gnomic aorist in com-
bination with typographic and graphic modifications and in 
relation to an illustrative structure. Place 3, however, 
lacks the density of positions which both plates I and 2 
provide. Plate 3 requires more work, and a greater invest-
ment, of supplementation on the part of the reader of the 
inscription. This is a work 'he' may not be willing to 
carry out. Plate 3, as a result, holds less compulsion for 
the reader of the inscription. 
There is a lack of compulsion, first,because of 
the perspectival distancing of the illustration, a distance 
confused by the cropping of the illustration suggesting 
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the proximity of the larger male figure. The reader of 
the inscription, while implied by the structure of the 
illustration, is relatively disengaged. Possibly 'he' lS 
an outsider or possibly 'he' is an inferior. Second, the 
generalised form of the verbal presentation implies the 
reader of the inscription through the distancing of pro-
verbial, common wisdom, to which (apparently) all have equal 
access. 
The suture is distant and slight. The constitut-
ion of textual traces is sparse. This points up the dist-
inction between illustration and photograph as suturing 
devices. The illustration is composed of discrete elements 
organised in a pictorial frame. The selectivity and the 
sparsity of the illustration in plate 3 can be contrasted 
with the density and inclusivity of the photograph in plate 
2. The photograph unifies and makes continuous, even while 
it permits articulations in terms of selection, emphasis, 
focus, highlight, foregrounding, color, tone and charact-
erisation. 
Plate 3 digitalises and generalises its address. 
The subject address is relatively adbstract. It is not 
that the textual construction is splintered or fragmented. 
The sequence of elements is clearly laid out. The dis-
creteness of the elements, however, fails to locate the 
reader of the inscription in a textual density that could 
be construed as a personal, individual address. Here is a 
social space indeed, but one in which superiors are being 
presented. The suture operates here to join the reader 
of the inscription with 'his' superiors. The stand-in 
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becomes a model, which signifies that which is to be emulated, 
or indeed served. 
Plates 2 and 3 can be distinguished on four fronts. 
First, they can be distinguished technologically. Photo-
graphy replaces illustration. New typographic designs are 
incorporated. More sophisticated relationships between 
typographic image and photographic image mean that new inter-
relationships between photographically and typographically 
articulated discourse develop. This novel discursive text-
ual format is conveyed by new printing techniques on higher 
quality paper. Second, they can be distinguished strategically. 
Plate 3 posits social amelioration as a relatively simple 
process of achieving the status of one's superiors. The 
reader of the inscription is to become that other. A system 
of cultural paternalism is invoked, into whose ranks one, 
as reader, is recruited. The process of becoming other is 
rather different in plate 2. The inferiority of the reader 
of the inscription is not underscored. A suture of greater 
density and of greater complexity engages the reader of the 
inscription in a more gradual elevation. 
are never simply those others up there. 
Social superiors 
Social betterment 
implies a process of drawing out of oneself those parts 
which are superior. 
The third and fourth distinctions are inter-
twined, and bring to attention points developed through the 
discussion of imbrication in the following section. Third, 
then, plates 2 and 3 can be distinguished in terms of the 
character of the product which serves as one elements of the 
sutured identity. The product in plate 2 is a final product 
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ready for individual consumption. Plate 3 constitutes a 
suture which encodes not a final product but a prepared 
material, one which requires a further labour by means of 
which to transform it into a finalised product, for example 
a suit or a coat for men. The suture in plate 2 encodes 
branded products. The label in plate 3 is only one element 
or ingredient of the brand name which could be placed on a 
final product. Branding, ~s a system of naming, may be 
recognised to intervene in systems of production in a 
qualitatively novel way, influencing perceptions of what 
is produced and by whom. A greater stress falls upon final 
products, made by (brand-)named corporations, whose images 
become important elements in the social construction of 
identities as stand-ins or representations. 
This leads to the fourth distinction. This con-
cerns the difference in the characters of the addressees and 
their consumption behaviour between plate 2 and plate 3. 
In plate 3 the consumer is expected to re-work the labelled 
material commodity. Consumption involves a labour of trans-
formation, the production of a qualitatively different 
commodity. In plate 2 the consumer enjoys the product. 
Two kinds of 'use' are distinguished. The one 
in plate 3 implies active labour, while the other in plate 
2 implies a relatively passive indulgence. This later use 
produces pleasure in the constituted addressee, a pleasure 
proposed as being analogous to the production of knowledge, 
or rather the intuited perception of knowledge. This 
indicates a difference between the character of the vehicles 
in which the respective advertisements appear. 
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The seven years which elapsed between the product-
ion of plate 3 (1957) and plate 2 (1964) mark technological 
and strategic changes in terms of the complexity of subject 
of address and of suture. During that time the magazine 
which serves as the vehicle for the advertisements itself 
undergoes a character change. Plates 2 and 3 stand in 
different relationships to the imaginary masculine identities 
they seek to construct and address. Plate 3 addresses from 
the vantage point of a trade journal for the tailoring 
industry. Plate 2 addresses from the position of that 
magazine revamped to address an economically, politically 
and culturally situated social grouping, a professional class 
or class-fraction. 
The addressees of plate 2 are required to labour 
less arduously, both in relation to constituting the 
sutured identity which requires less investment and in terms 
of consuming the product which requires less active labour. 
Plate 2 addresses a position which is considered to have 
been already achieved by any actual reader and hence to 
reflect that position. The apertures in plate 3 leave much 
to be achieved on the part of any actual reader both in 
relation to the product and the social identity. In plate 
2 the addressee is not expected to alienate himself in the 
form of an other. The other reflects himself, an other to 
which he is joined. 
These are points which can be developed in the 
discussion of imbrication. The concept of suture 1S designed 
to focus the formation and constitution of the ego as 
representation, a representation which enters into the pro-
ductions of specific discursive and communication practices. 
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Both plate 2 and plate 3 inflect the ego in a 
masculine direction. The concept of the masculine is theor-
ised as an imaginary coherence which re-marks and covers 
over complex social processes of production, transformat-
ion and differentiation. The constitution of representations 
of masculinity, as stand-ins and as instances of sutured 
identities, ~erves as the basis for the perception of a 
division between the possibilities for masculine social 
production and feminine social production, both in terms 
of symbolic and pragmatic production. This similarly 
introduces the issue of the discursive imbrication of 
specific representations of masculinity and femininity in 
given social practices, discursively reiterated in advert-
isements texts. Before proceeding onto the topics dis-
cussed under the heading of imbrication, however, one last 
plate is discussed to bring out certain other features of 
suture. 
Plate 4 posits further symbolic marks, marks 
which may be pragmaticised through the discursive imbricat-
ion of specific forms of suture. Again it is to be insisted 
that these marks have the structure of re-marks. They 
re-mark complex social processes. The re-marks are them-
selves social products which cannot be treated as if they 
reflected epiphenomenally some prior ontological ground, a 
simple real. 
Ethnicity, both in terms of a racial theorisation 
and in terms of a situational national and regional inter-
pretation, and class may be recognised to function as sutures 
alongside gender and age, as for example in plate 4. 
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Plate 4 uses similar semiotic material to plates 
I and 2. Structurally, a photographic text is placed above 
a number of typographically distinguishable verbal texts. 
As in plate 2, the photographed characters do not return 
the look of the camera position. The reader is joined but 
distinguished. They and I are not simply identical. 
The photographed characters are named as 'foreigners'. 
Again they are distanced from the reader of the inscription. 
That distance however is negotiated. 'Foreigners are people'. 
They are people 'too!', that is, like 'we' are. The reader 
group, however surprising this may seem, are like the photo-
graphed group. The photographed group, no matter how 
primitive and unsophisticated they appear, are a literate 
people. As such they are therefore like us, they are people, 
too. 
The suture of photograph and caption works as a 
negative identification. They, foreigners are not us. 
However, they are people, like us. The small point con-
structs from that opposite, the not us, a more positive 
identification. 
Thus, 'we' are identified with s.c. Peacock. 
"S.C. Peacock advertisements appear In pretty well every 
country in the world. We've even made forays behind the 
Iron Curtain." We, again, are distinguished from another 
of our 'opposite numbers'. While we are not the photographed 
'primitives' or 'savages', however noble they are, still 
we are not locked behind an Iron Curtain, wherein remains 
a 'barbarous' culture and society of an other kind. 
Similarly, just as the photographed 'savages' are people, 
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so are those behind the Iron Curtain: 'We found people there _ 
real people! '. That is, not the false people, the pro-
letariat, of communist propaganda but real people, i.e. like 
us! 
Such real people may exist in what appears to us 
as 'barbarous' societies, but such barbarity is characterised 
as quaint, living, as they are named, in 'furrin parts'. 
That is, they pose no real threat. They are simply antiquated 
and perhaps a little misguided. Their threat can be dom-
esticated. 
The suture is developed from, first, an ambignous 
connectedness with, to second, a negative identification 
with, to, third, a positive superiority over our 'opposites', 
those who are not us. We, in our superior position, are able 
to construct a 'genuine understanding of the special interests 
of real local people'. Real people live in local situations, 
in determinate communities, as do we. We, nevertheless, are 
able to transcend that locality. It is that which dis-
inguishes us from them, and makes us superior. 
Superior and transcendent, we can modulate our 
messages and actions. 'An advertisement originally written 
for Nellie of Scunthorpe simply won't adapt for Ali of 
Cairo or Pablo of Rio. I While Nellie is like us, in being 
a real person living in the nation in which we live, the 
sentence construction nevertheless suggests an other status. 
She is approximated to Ali of Cairo and Pablo of Rio and 
becomes subject therein to our condescension. Scuntorpe, 
Cairo and Rio de Janeiro evoke a collective otherness, 
united in their not being London, or Paris or New York. 
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While one implication is to suggest a common 
'Englishness' between 'S.C. Peacock' and 'Nellie of 
Scunthorpe' an other effect is to institute a clear dis-
tinction between we and those we address. Those we address 
are inferiors. The character of that inferiority is ethnic, 
whether as racial difference between nations and continents 
or as regional difference between parts of a nation, 
capital and provincial. 
The specification of 'Nellie of Scunthorpe' indeed 
secures the negative aspect of the suture. We are not 
'primitives' or 'savages'. We are not of African, Middle 
Eastern or Latin American cultures. We are not communists. 
We are not women. We are not from the industrialised 
provinces. We transcend such local situations, as indeed 
we transcend situatedness itself. We, S.C. Peacock, may 
have offices in London, Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, 
Halifax and any number of other places covered by our 
'overseas division', but we are not of anyone of those 
places. 
The issues raised here introduce those discussed 
in sections on imbrication and overdetermination, which 
concern the structuration of the subject in ideological 
formations in relation to an hegemonised institutional 
order. The suture constructed here, for advertisers and 
for those seeking to identify their needs with advertisers, 
is one of superior, transcendent, masculine identity. In 
plate 4, an opposite embodiment is shown. No positive 
representation is photographed. The sutured identity exists 
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as an immanence constructed through the photographic and 
verbal texts. 
Plate 4 focuses the issues of race, ethnicity, 
regional identity, cultural situatedness, political systems 
of government, social class and gender. It does so by 
photographing and enumerating those others who are not the 
constructed addressee, the imaginary ego for whom the 
suture works. 
For such issues to be so close to the surface of the 
presentation is uncharacteristic of the majority of advert-
isements shown to a general public. As will become pro-
gressively more clear through the remaining analyses, the 
categories of masculine and feminine are the dominant suture-
figures. These two categories are used to contain other 
systems of differentiation which may be re-marked by the 
advertisement. 
In as far as plate 4 is addressed to a restricted 
audience of advertising and marketing professionals, and 
those interested in hiring their services, it stresses 
themes which might otherwise have to be omitted or suppressed. 
It would be unwise to address a more general public in terms 
which provoked in them a sense of ethnic inferiority, racial 
inferiority, class inferiority or gender inferiority. How-
ever, as a communication between superiors, constituted as 
an imaginary exchange between converse egos, such risks 
can be taken. 
Sutures characteristically employ a positive 
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identification in commercial public discourse. Plate 4 
risks a negative identification and risks themes surfacing 
which trouble the simplicity of the category of the masculine 
and the feminine. This recognition serves as a backdrop to 
the discussion of imbrication which follows. 
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4.2 TEXTUALITY 2: IMBRICATION 
Suture concerns the positing and positioning of 
a unified 'one' as the inscribed reader. Imbrication con-
cerns the relations between that inscribed 'one' and the 
other constructed by the textual presentation. Suture and 
imbrication together,then, name theprocesses of construct-
lng a position to whom the other constituted by the text 
may 'communicate' or 'speak'. In imbrication, a speculary 
or imaginary other is constructed, for the addressee, as 
as 'utterer' of the discourse. The other is embedded ln 
a speculary scene. 
A communicative practice takes place as the dis-
ambiguation of the posited addressee's imbrication with a 
set of others constructed through the speculary scene. The 
reader who unfolds these sutures and imbrications, as dis-
tinct from the inscribed addressee, may invest those scenes 
and imbrications with significance. This occurs to the 
extent that s/he identifies her/him-self with the sutured 
'one' . 
Since the ego is already constructed on the basis 
of a representation, the text may constitute an intervent-
ion into the constitution of the subject by constructing 
a speculary presentation onto which the ego may be dis-
placed or transposed. Access to the real of experience, 
mediated by the ego, is by way of such imaginary of speculary 
constructions. These may be misrecognised as the real it-
self and treated as entities. Alternatively, they may be 
understood as objectifications of the symbolic processes 
whereby the subject is sustained in relationship to the Other. 
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So far, reading advertisements has been discussed 
in terms of suture, as the formation of an ego. The ego 
lS formed as an imaginary unity. It should be recognised 
that, 
"This is not to say, however, that any and 
every spectator - and, for instance, man 
or woman, of this class or that - will be 
completely and equally in the given con-
struction." (1) 
Sutures can be more or less successful in practice, 
depending upon the relationships between the already con-
stituted intersubjective positions and ego formations of 
the reader who approaches the advertisement. The constructed 
reader or spectator is never simply identical with the 
reading or spectating individual. The constructed reader 
or spectator may, if the suture has worked, operate as a 
""double speculary" structure" (2) which serves as a 
principle of punctuation for the possible meaning - product-
ion. Thus, that constructed position may serve to permit 
a given set of statements and semiotic constructs to be formed 
as a communicative practice. It operates to close down 
potential meaning - production around a structure of com-
munication which may be perceived to be dialogic in character 
( 3) • 
As such, particular advertisements depend upon 
the hermenentic skills of determinate readers to construct 
given textual elements in the form of sutures, and hence 
consequently to construct the communicative intent of the 
advertisement. The communicative character of the advertise-
ment may be perceived to unfold as the construction of the 
- 215 -
imbrication of the reader or spectator into, first, the 
structure of a communicative practice and, second, the sit-
uation of communication. The discursive character of advert-
ising, therefore, is not recognised as one element of a 
complex corporate strategic intervention into the social, 
but as the unfolding of a communication or, at the extreme, 
of a dialogic conversation. 
Imbrication, then, concerns the negotiation 
between determinate readers and the invited spaces con-
stituted by advertisements. Access to those spaces is by 
way of the constructed openings of suture. Not all social 
subjects have equal access to those openings or imaginary 
communicative spaces. 
Plate 5, for example, constitutes a highly 
restricted space for suture and for imbrication. The 
suture is available to those who identify themselves in 
and through 'the word'. The word-image presented, 'LITERATI', 
is again predominantly a masculine category. But this is 
not conclusive. The aim of the advertisement is to 'prove' 
the identity of 'guinness' and 'literati'. The word 
'guinness' can be substituted for the word 'literati'. 
The central section of the advertisement demonst-
rates that proof. The tone of mockery is already a borrow-
ing which the embedding of the name of James Joyce in the 
word 'rejoyce' confirms. 
The suture is primarily constructed through the 
literary word. But the suture develops into a communicat-
ive and representational imbrication through the use of 
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typographic and photographic intervention. The constructed 
suture is imbricated, in one sense, onto a critical 
aesthetic discourse, and in another sense, a representat-
ional practice, one which has come to dominate conceptions 
of perception. 
The former imbrication, through citation of the 
name of Joyce and the typographic and literary experimentat-
ion he is taken to stand for, leads to discussions of 
literary modernism. In such discussions, the concepts and 
conventions of realism and representationalism are prominent. 
Finnegans Wake can be taken to signify the end of 
"the age of Modernism" (4). This term can be used to name, 
"a movement in literature which rejected 
the late 19th century concept of Liberal 
Man and presented (as in Ernest Hemingway 
and D.H. Lawrence) Natural Man, and (in 
Eliot, Joyce and, later, Evelyn Waugh and 
Graham Greene) Imperfect Man" (5) 
In these moves, literary style became "spare, ironic, 
experimental" (6), all of which the advertisement itself 
mimics. The advertisement cannot be said to partake in 
this style since it attempts to graft it onto a photographic 
realism. 
The word 'guinness' lS taken to refer to the 
photographed glass of guinness which ironically represents 
the presumed, 'real', glass of guinness. In this direction, 
which is the latter imbrication mentioned above, the sutured 
ego is led in the direction of a different scene, one which 
is not primarily literary in mode. The imbrication points 
towards the glass of guinness, on the table-top or bar-top, 
in the public house. 
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This again reiterates the literary constructions 
of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, but reduces them to a 
simple referential realism. Realism moves towards that 
which can be perceived by the ego, an ego under challenge 
in the movement of modernist literary styles. In this 
imbrication of ego and other, the other who 'speaks' is 
the glass of guinness itself. It speaks of its own qualities 
and its posited effectivity upon a subject, as a construct-
ive influence which improves the inscribed addressee. 
If the presentation is to remain an advertisement, 
one of the two imbrications must dominate the other, an 
issue developed in the section on overdetermination. If 
the imbrication onto the critical aesthetic discourse of 
literary modernism asserts itself, this might lead to 
"The "breakdown of the object" which comes, 
Beckett asserts, to the same thing as "the 
breakdown of the subject" is embraced as 
the essence of the modern." (7) 
It is precisely this breakdown which the realist imbricat-
ion intervenes to arrest. Guinness steps in to 'save' the 
disimbricating literati,to secure him, rather than her, 
with an imaginary identity constructed in a 'communicative' 
exchange with a glass of guinness which speaks through its 
text-ure. 
In the movement of the modernist imbrication, 
the posited identity of ego-other-literati-photographed 
glass of guinness - the name 'Guinness' - the name 'Joyce' -
the status 'classic'-the represented 'real glass of 
guinness' might be undone. In the movement of a realist 
imbrication, the photograph stabilises the presentation, by 
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pointing to a definite, objective reality. The placing of 
the 'guinness' in a position of caption under the photo-
graph anchors the words to the photograph. The categoris-
ing of the texture as classic solidifies further the drift 
to realism. 
The advertisement seeks to remain within the 
boundaries of a more 'classic' style of textual construct-
ion while flirting with the possibilities of a more exper-
imental practice. Thus, while the material density of 'the 
word' or 'literary style' is used to construct a suture, a 
more conventional representational style is used to con-
struct the dominating imbrication, i.e. towards a percept-
ion of the 'real' by the ego. The cultural authority of 
James Joyce and related critical aestetic discourses are 
used to construct a simple reference to a perceptible pro-
duct. Such reference, from such authorities, is intended 
to serve as a recommendation. The issues of authorisat-
ion and reality are also entered into in section 4.3 on 
overdetermination. 
Rejection of such naivety at the level of pictor-
ial and graphic structures, of course, can be recognised as 
one of the features of advertisements during 1956 to 1964. 
Plate 5 was aimed, by being placed in Encounter in 1964, 
at an audience whose sensibilities were more attuned to 
the literary manipulation of typographic presentations. 
Plate 6, however, by being placed in the Sunday Times 
Colour Magazine also ln 1964, was aimed at an audience 
whose visual, pictorial and graphic repertoires were becom-
ing more sophisticated. 
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Plate 6 indulges in a play with pictorial styles. 
The advertisement reiterates certain painting styles, and 
in doing so engages specific critical debates concerning 
modernist and avant-garde stances. For, as the male 
character of the left attests, this advertisement concerns 
very much stances. 
The suture in plate 6 is more overtly masculine. 
Two male figures are presented. A difference of age is 
constructed. The age difference is set alongside a diff-
erence in styles of painting. Finally, to these differences 
is added a third, between cream sherry and dry sherry. A 
complex series of substitutions and interactions takes place 
between these elementary systems, men, painting and sherry. 
The premise from which the suture is developed 
lS that in the case of older men, cream sherries and a 
certain painting style matters are more stable and con-
clusive. There is a critical concensus about their status. 
The imbrications concern how the experience of men is con-
ceived, how certain painting styles are conceived and how 
certain sherries are perceived. 
Older men, on the basis of long experience, 
become connoisseurs. They 'know what they like'. They 
collect and possess what they know and like. A certain style 
of painting and a certain kind of sherry fall into the 
category of collector's item. They are established, like 
the men themselves. 
The situations of other men, who may be younger, 
other styles of painting, which may be more recent, and 
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other kinds of sherry, which may be less established, lS 
more volatile. For them, 'the picture is still confused'. 
This metaphoric association between picture as situation 
and picture as painting serves as the structuring link 
between overall argument and its means of realisation. 
The painting on the left becomes a clear picture. 
What it represents is obvious. It shows a valued object 
and in itself is an object of value: a clear representat-
ion of a culturally valuable object and experience. It 
is unclear, in the picture on the right, what it is to which 
the inscribed spectator is to respond. Colour, design and 
texture may become apparent as objects of attention in 
themselves but there is no recognisable 'thing' or 'topic' 
represented. It becomes difficult to construct a con-
census concerning what is represented and hence whether 
or how that representation is to be valued. 
While the paintings carry the argument to some 
extent, it is returned to the sherry. The qualities of 
Harvey's Bristol Dry, like the qualities of the painting 
on the right may be imperceptible, given certain dominant 
assumptions. What guarantees the quality and value of 
Harvey's Bristol Dry 1S that it is the product of 'the 
same skill and care' as that which goes into Harvey's 
Bristol Cream. 
Thus, a complex tissue of argumentation which 
begins with an identification of a cream sherry and an 
older man, passes through a distinction between older and 
younger men and from thence to a comparison of painting 
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style, returns to a dry sherry. 
The advertisement institutes the dry sherry 
alongside the cream sherry through a complex series of 
sUbstitutions and shifts. The textual whole is encoded 1n 
a photographic image which itself favours the painting on 
the left hand side. The photographs imbricate the sutured 
ego into two scenes of connoisseurship. 
The closure the advertisements serve to secure 
emerges as a communicative structure between inscribed 
ego and the other of the represented connoisseur on the 
left. He communicates his knowledge, pleasure and pride 
of ownership. To that pictorially constructed 'conversation' 
is added a further one which seals the content of the 
message. The abstract voice authorises the preference, 
while attaching itself to the small bottle in the right 
hand corner. The named bottle, 'Harvey's Bristol Cream', 
speaks its own recommendation. It authorises itself and 
seals its own identity. That authority, in a reductive 
play upon the term 'critical', is named that which 1S 
'beyond criticism'. The sutured ego is imbricated to the 
'beyond' of absolute authority and absolute self-identity. 
The advertisement seeks to pursue only as far 
as that which is collected, the value and meaning of 
pictorial styles where the advertisement seeks to draw a 
limit, and where the advertisement may become as confused 
as the picture it denigrates, is in admitting and engaging 
the critical debates which surround the phenomena of Pop 
Art, Abstract Expressionism and painterly abstraction. 
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The advertisements seeks to identify the 
connoisseur with the Pop Art painting before which he 
stands. The relationship with the painting in the scene 
on the right becomes difficult to understand when it is 
recognised that Pop artists sought to displace what the 
advertisement seeks to valorise. 
"The younger Pop artists in America felt 
that Abstract Expressionism was an elite 
art, to which only a tiny class, mainly 
of painters and poets could respond. At 
the same time it had come to be greedily 
collected by the middle class and the 
establishment art world, and its protagonists 
found themselves compelled to stress how 
'difficult' this art was by emphasising its 
moral extremism and its radical form." (8) 
The painting on the right owes more to this establishment-
valorised expressionism than does that on the left. The 
advertisement works to recou r& "tepop Art for establish-
ment connoisseurship. This constitutes a reversal of 
previous critical appraisal during that period in the late 
1950's when Pop Artists such as Jasper Johns and Robert 
Rauschenberg sought to overturn the hegemony of Abstract 
Expressionism. These artists presented images and 
motifs of "apparantly wilful banality" (9) which were 
"rendered with deadpan flatness, (that) could 
only prove disquieting to criticism that had 
articulated its values on the experience of 
abstract painting." (10) 
The advertisement seeks to constitute an imaginary 
communication from a speculary connoisseur which excludes 
the political machinations whereby certain painting styles 
achieve hegemony and are actively subverted by other styles. 
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The situation is all the more confusing given 
that Pop Art seeks to rework elements of Avant-Garde practice, 
whose critical aesthetic was aligned to a political project. 
The imaginary scene of the connoisseur's communication 
serves to arrest the recognition of the relations between 
Abstract Expressionism, on the one hand, and Avant Garde 
practices, on the other hand. 
Thus,the advertisement constitutes an imbricat-
ion onto an imaginary scene, in which Pop Art is reiterated 
and registered in a discourse of class-based connoisseur-
ship. The figure of the connoisseur unites masculinity, 
knowledge, pleasure and private ownership. This constitutes 
a moment of domestication of Pop Art, a process already 
begun in the pages of the Sunday Times Colour Magazine in 
the issues of 26 January 1964, in an article entitled 'Pop 
Art: way out or way in?', and the issue of 26 April 1964, 
in an article entitled 'America on target', a reference to 
Jasper Johns' choice of imagery. 
In another context, Pop Art has been taken to 
mark the initiation of a period of postmodernism (11). 
Avant Garde and modernism are taken to be the major cultural 
forms of expression of the 20th century. Avant garde 
practice is distinguished by its sense of negativity, 
sometimes hysterically asserted (12). Postmodernism, then, 
while evoking aspects of the Avant Garde was in no position 
to emulate its project of aesthetic and political negation. 
Furthermore, 
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"At the same time it goes without saying 
that the postmodernist revolt against the 
institution art in the United States was 
up against bigger odds than futurism, 
dadaism or surrealism were in their time. 
The earlier avant-garde was confronted with 
the culture industry in its stage of 
inception while postmodernism had to face 
a technologically and economically fully 
developed media culture which had mastered 
the high art of integrating, diffusing, and 
marketing even the most serious challenges." 
(13) 
In the advertisement, the challenge has been 
mastered. Imbrication, then, not only constructs a 
speculary scene, but that scene operates as a means of 
stabilising the presentation by cutting off that historical 
dimension by means of which the logic of the argument would 
be disrupted. 
Plate 7 continues the programme of domesticating 
potential disruption. The imbrication onto an imaginary 
scene is presented as if the scene itself represented a 
dream. The dream is the scene through which may be per-
ceived the emergence of an unconscious desire. 
The paradoxes of the dream and the paradoxes of 
fetishism, in the Freudian sense, can be inter-related 
with the paradoxes of fetishism in the marx ian sense through 
plate 7. For a woman to dream that she was an artist 
carried within it the implication that 'I dreamed I was a 
man', for it is men who are artists. 
woman, 
"As femininity was to be lived out in the 
fulfillment of socially ordained domestic 
and reproductive roles, a profound con-
tradition was established between the ident-
ities of artist and of woman" (14) 
The ambivalence of the situation, that 'I', a 
dreamed that 'I' was a man is constructed pictorially. 
- 225 -
The woman bears the symbols of masculinity: artist's pallette, 
painter's brush, artist's beret and artist's cravatte. She 
is both model and painter. Facial features, hair length 
and style, bodily form, skirt and breasts covered by a 
'maidenform bra' betray the woman's feminine status. The 
role of the 'maidenform bra' is that of dream symbol, i.e. 
Cymbal, which provokes in the woman the recognition of her 
desire for a man, and her desire to be a man. 
The 'maidenform bra' both accentuates and con-
ceals the breasts. It gives them a particular form, a 
form which phallicises them, while making them 'invisible' 
to the perceiver. The 'maidenform bra' ,?sradoxically, 
restores the phallus to the woman. It makes of woman both 
the perceiver and the possessor of the object of desire. 
She becomes that image which serves as, 
"the spectacle on to which men project their 
own narcissistic fantasies" (15) 
The 'maidenform bra' returns the look to man In which he 
may recognise himself. In the dream, the woman recognises 
this structure of narcissistic vision of the man. The 
'maidenform bra' becomes a way for the woman to intervene 
in the marcissistic vision of the man. In this way the 
woman 'controls' or 'directs' the phallic vision of the man. 
The 'maidenform bra' serves as a fetish, and in doing so 
acts as an object in the constitution of masculine sexual 
desire. 
"Fetishism, Freud first pointed out, involves 
displacing the sight of woman's imaginary 
castration onto a variety of reassuring but often 
surprising objects - shoes, corsets, rubber goods, 
belts, knickers, etc. - which serve as signs for 
the lost penis but have no direct connection with 
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it. For the fetishist, the slgn itself is 
the subject of his fantasy - whatever actual 
fetish objects or else pictures or discriptions 
of them - and in every case it is the sign of 
the phallus. It is man's narcissistic fear of 
losing his own phallus, his most precious 
possession, which causes shock at the sight of 
the female genitals and the fetishstic attempt 
to disguise or divert attention from them." (16) 
The imbrication with an imaginary dream scene 
in plate 7 proposes a work upon the body for the woman 
in which a phallic-dominated conception of woman, as 
stand-in for the phallus in a structure of narcissistic 
vision, and of sexuality becomes necessary to gain the 
power which the woman desires. This diverts attention 
from an other, perhaps more valid, work in terms of which 
power may be struggled for and gained. 
"The work to be done is that of deconstruction. 
The 'otherness' of woman as negative of man 
and the repression of woman in our culture is 
not without radical possibilities for challeng-
lng the oppressiveness of patriarchal systems 
for both men and women ... 
'In art practice, women can engage in work to 
expose these ideological constructions by 
questioning the traditional institutions of 
artist and art, by analysing the meanings 
which representations of woman signify and by 
alerting the spectator to the ideological work 
of art, the effect of artistic practices and 
representations." (17) 
The strategy recommended ln the advertisement is 
that, for 12 shillings and 11 pence, a commodity can be 
purchased which will serve as a fetish in which a certain 
form of masculine vision can find its look returned to 
form a narcissistic structure. Sexual relations between 
'man' and 'woman' are commodified in one direction, a pro-
cess whereby relations between constituted persons are 
misrecognised as the relation between things, and fetishised 
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in another direction. The position of woman is in this 
juncture. Her work is to construct a mode of objectificat-
ion, using commodities to create a desirable body. A 
woman's work is primarily sexual in character, given that 
sexuality is defined in phallic terms. 
The imbrication of plate 7 arrests an other 
potential kind of work, such as that pursued by feminist 
artists who, equally as the woman in plate 7, desire power, 
but do not desire the position shown in that advertisement. 
Thus, 
"Recent feminist artists ... have tried to 
work collectively to establish a sympathetic 
environment and a critical forum where work 
can be developed and understood on its own 
terms. They have revived the use of specific-
ally 'feminine' craft techniques (e.g. needle-
work as opposed to oxyacetylene welding); and 
have attempted to work out of experiences such 
as those of female sexuality or domesticity, 
conventionally considered too unorthodox, 
private or trivial for creative material. 
In this they are of course drawing, if 
indirectly, on precedents provided by futurism, 
Dada, Surrealism, Pop, conceptual and perform-
ance work and on another 'avant-gardes' which 
have challenged conventional notions of what is 
proper to art - although the point here is less 
the nature of the influences than the uses to 
which they may be put." (18) 
Plate 7, then, sutures a woman and imbricates 
woman as the opposite other, the negative, of man. The 
figure of woman is pursued, as an overdetermined social 
product in the discussions of plates 11 and 12. 
Plate 8 returns the discussion of imbrication to 
the figure of man, in all his imaginary or speculary 
plenitude. The figure presented is the 'gentleman'. The 
gentleman reflects and elevates the sutured ego. He stands 
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over his possessions, master of all he surveys. He is 
master over animal nature, his obedient German shepherd, 
and over technological invention, his veteran Bentley. 
He is a hero: 
"the English would tend to portray the hero 
as controlled, courteous, reluctant to show 
emotion, honest and straight forward ... " (19) 
The lack of emotion is crucial. 
"A real gentleman, though, even if he loses 
everything he owns, must show no emotion .. " (20) 
It indicates the completeness, and the imaginariness, of 
his control, his fixing in and through an image such as 
that shown in plate 8. 
The figure of the gentleman constitutes the 
cultural imbrication of the sutured ego as the 'gentleman' 
of 'good taste' who also has 'the money to indulge' that 
taste. The figure is imbricated as thoroughly 'English'. 
"Any examination of the English socio-cultural 
history of the last 200 years has to come to 
terms with the pervasive concept of the 
'gentleman', one which even today, if from a 
subterranean position, can exert a potent 
influence on English responses to issues". 
"Though inextricably associated with the 
ruling class, the term has never become 
synonymous with membership of it. Equally 
inextricably it is bound up with a vision of 
national identity and destiny ... " (21) 
To complete the characterisation of the figure of the man, 
his taste and his financial wealth are complemented by 
his reason. 
"Two images of man vied with each other: on 
the one hand we find a stress on reason, on 
the.othera stress on sentiment. While the 
Cartesians, upholding the ideals of reason, 
demanded that knowledge exhibit its credentials, 
the adherents of sentiment wanted intuitive 
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certainty, an innate sense of what is right 
which cannot and need not give account of 
itself. Such innate good sense was called 
taste." (22). 
The man possesses "innate good sense", which can be adduced 
from his very appearance. The hair length and style, the 
clothing and the physique all attest to his status, as 
gentleman. 
"The clothing system in particular replicates 
for western society the functions of the so-
called totemism. A sumptuary rneterialization 
of the principal coordinates of person and 
occasion, it becomes a vast scheme of communicat-
ion - such as to serve as a language of everyday 
life among those who may well have no prior 
intercourse of acquaintance. "Mere appearance" 
must be one of the most important forms of 
symbolic statement in Western civilization. 
For it is by appearances that civilization turns 
the basic contradiction of its construction into 
a miracle of existence: a cohesive society of 
perfect strangers." (23) 
In other words, "only superficial people fail to judge by 
appearances" (24). 
The stress upon appearance was being developed 
actively by marketing practitioners from the 1950's onwards. 
Style in men's dress was receiving a renewed and qualitat-
ively different kind of attention, as the pages of Advertiser's 
Weekly in the late 1950's attest. Appearance could now be 
used to articulate political opinion and concepts. Thus, 
in plate 8, is presented 'Drummond's Freedom Suitings'. The 
suit reflects freedom and constitutes a position from which 
the wearer may act freely, being constituted as a man who 
is in control. The wearer is constituted as a Free Individ-
ual, such as he of Conservative Party ideology. 
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"We Conservatives would lead the nation through 
the present dark hours to a form of society 
centred upon the importance, the dignity and the 
ultimate value of the individual human being. 
Wherever modern life tends to dwarf the individ-
ual in comparison with the economic, political 
or social unit, the need is to humanize organizat-
ion, not to organise humanity. Today we insist 
on individual liberty not in order to proclaim 
anarchy, but because we fear to see freedom 
crushed out and human personality forgotten 
altogether. An individual is an end in himself 
and the final justification of Government is that 
it makes possible the fullest development of 
personality and enables all men and women to 
lead their own lives in their own way within the 
limits of law and social justice." (25) 
The themes of individual liberty and property ownership 
have remained central to Conservative Party ideology. 
Ownership is deemed to give people a stake and a new 
independence. Property is the basis of freedom. 
"What I am desperately trying to do is create 
one nation with everyone being a man of 
property, or having the opportunity to be a 
man of property." (26) 
The close interweaving of these two themes lS 
crucial to bourgeois ideology in general. 
"Bourgeois society sees itself as an 
instrumental group which accumulates 
social wealth only by way of private 
wealth; that is to say, it guarantees 
economic growth and general welfare by 
way of competition between private 
individuals acting strategically." (27) 
Thus, in plate 8 a cultural imbrication, a man 
of taste and reason, is collocated with a politically 
Conservative and an economically and ideologically bourgeois 
individual. Moreover, as plate 8 might be taken to indicate, 
In relation to plate 4, 
"The suspicion of black pupils that when 
"man" to talked about it does not mean 
black man has not been removed." (28) 
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Hence, given the high status of the figure of man as pre-
sented in plate 8, it might be conceived that, 
"the British educational institution is 
designed to prove that black children, like 
all working-class children, cannot succeed." (29) 
It is equally obvious that plate 8 does not 
constitute a dominant ideological representation in the 
sense of being equally effective upon all classes, ethnic 
groups and gender groups. Plate 8, in being presented in 
the context of Town magazine constitutes an imbrication 
primarily for those men who consider themselves to belong 
to the instrumental group which constitutes bourgeois 
society. 
The presentation of a number of distinct imbricat-
ions at once, e.g. cultural, political, ethnic, economic 
and ideological, raises the problem of overdetermination. 
How are these distinct imbrications kept under control 
through the categories of man and woman, the primary 
differentiating system of the public discourse of display 
advertising? How is it that the complex text operates 
specifically as an advertisement whose topic is the 
purchasable commodity? 
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4.3 TEXTUALITY 3: OVERDETERMINATION 
Suture concerns the construction of a unified 'one'. 
The structures of imbrication concern the projective, com-
municative relations between that 'one' and the other con-
stituted by the text. In imbrication, it is recognised 
that both ego and other are inscribed in the text. The 
concept of communicative practice refers to the construct-
ion of relationships between ego and other is inscribed. 
A communicative practice can be enacted irrespect-
ive of the degree of conscious identification with the 
sutured 'one', the inscribed ego position, by the reader of 
the inscription. Thus, discursive practice concerns the 
relationships between inscribed ego and the reader of the 
inscription. These discursive relationships take the form 
of the possibility of an identification with or a denial 
of the inscribed ego, and the possibility of the intro-
jection and re-projection of that identification or denial. 
This space of possibility is also that of critical relation-
ships, and, as is discussed in 4.4, of deconstructive 
relationships. Identification and denial are pre-critical. 
They are the material out of which the critical emerges. 
Deconstruction raises the question of the limits 
of the critical as interpretative or hermenentic re-working 
of identification/denial. Deconstruction questions the 
authority and finality of critical definitions. 
The effectivity of a text upon a reading subject 
depends upon the degree of introjection and re-projection 
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of the field of the other, constituted by the text, by 
the subject. The subject gains access to that field of 
the other by way of the unified, inscribed ego of suture. 
The inscribed ego is engaged upon or with a series of 
imbrications. These imbrications take the form of a set 
of representations which may serve as substitutions by 
means of which the ego is displaced through the meaning-
production of the text. 
Overdetermination, then, concerns the density of 
movement, through substitution and displacement, of the 
inscribed ego in communicating with the field of the other. 
Through the material, semiotic density of overdetermined 
imbrications is formed an order of representations. The 
ordered sequence of representations constitutes, In its 
density and movement, effects of the 'real'. In over-
determination, then, a determinate 'real' order of things 
and of persons is constructed. 
The question of the real can be divided analytic-
ally into the relationships between ego and opposite or 
objective other and ego and other egos or converse egos. 
The effect of the real is constituted through two develop-
ments of communicative practice. In the first, that of a 
referential realism, that which is constituted in over-
determined imbrication posits and indicates a domain of 
objective material existents. Imbrications in this direction 
represent for the ego and to the ego what exists as object-
ification. 
In the second development, conversational com-
munication is taken to found the associational relationships 
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between ego, as self, and other ego. In this wayan order 
of constituted persons 1S recognised. In overdetermination, 
communicative exchange unfolds as the recognition of signs 
of inequality and of a struggle for power. In overdetermin-
ation, this struggle is characteristically resolved as a 
hegemonisation of relationships between ego-based individuals. 
Hence, 'natural' or 'objective' order and 'social' 
or 'associational' order are the two determinate effects 
of the real constituted in overdetermination. Both are ego-
based processes. They are also moments by which the ego 
is secured. The degree of effectivity of a text upon a 
reading subject~ then, depends upon the extent of (positive) 
commitment and (hegemonised or rationalised) committedness 
of the subject, as preconstituted ego-formation prior to 
engagement with the text, to the interrelated orders of the 
real. 
This engagement of text and subject, then, is 
mediated by determinate communicative practices which limit 
the possible productivity of the discursive institutional 
resources of the text, i.e. the intertextuality of concrete 
texts. Intersubjective resources and hermeneutic skills 
are embedded in and upon discursive institutional resources. 
Text and subject interpenetrate one another. Communicative 
practices intervene to posit imbrications in whose over-
determination, are constructed specific ordersof the real. 
The power relations enacted through any given 
text depends upon whether, and how, it can construct the 
subject as ego committed to the orders of the real con-
stituted through the discursive production. In any given 
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instance, other than an act of pure faith, if such is poss-
ible, the relationships between reading subject and orders 
of the real is more than likely to be one of a degree of 
committedness. Committednessencodes a grain of difference 
with or resistance to commitment. 
Thus, under the heading of overdetermination the 
construction of orders of the real are discussed. This 
can but remain a contribution to the analysis of situations 
in which reading subjects engage with texts. In those 
engagements, subjects enact their commitment or their 
hesitant or resistant commitedness to the posited realities. 
As will be recognised, the possibility for decon-
struction arises in relation to the question of commit-
ment and resistance to the 'real' order of things and to 
the 'real' order of persons. Simple representational 
realism, of the objectified other, and immediate accept-
ance of authorised intentionality, of the converse other, 
are both put in question in the movement of deconstruction. 
In plate 9, the suture is masculinised and the 
imbrication is with a doubled masculine other in a split 
speculary scene. The centre stage is dominated by pro-
ductivity. The right hand of the imbrication, 'working 
hard', presents the double labour of producing objectified 
products that are the result of a man's labour, and in doing 
so reiterating the masculinity of the ego-form. The left 
hand of the imbrication, 'hard working', presents the under-
side of the 'success' posited on the right. A willingness 
to work, the characteristic of being 'hard working' is 






the frame, of production. Here it is 'hard working', it 
is difficult to get any work done. 
While plate 9 reiterates the man of plate 8, 
he is not quite the gentleman, of control and of com-
pleteness, shown in plate 8. In plate 9, he still labours 
to complete himself. He works to produce objectified pro-
ducts and him-self. He is engaged in a symbolic production, 
re-producing the form of his masculinised ego, and in a 
more pragmaticised labour, producing and editing written 
documents. While he writes, he is engaged In 
" .. phonetic writing, the medium of the 
great metaphysical, scientific, technical, 
and economic adventure of the West .. " (1) 
The presented labour, one which the reading of the 
advertisement itself extends, is multiple. How, in reading 
the advertisement, is a pragmatic suggestion to be extracted 
and defined from the construction of a complex imbricated 
scene? 
While there are a number of distinguishable 
labours being evoked through the imbrication, a hegemonised 
concept of production is being asserted. Such a concept 
features the factors of (clock) time and money. In a 
simplified formula, the more time spent working, the more 
money is 'made'. To waste time not working is to waste 
money. 
The pragmatic suggestion is that 'time spent on 
travelling need not be wasted'. The man, as employee, may 
be doing productive work while travelling. Already the 
form of the masculine suture is overdetermined in imbricat-
. n He is situated and defined in the context of a division lO • 
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of labour, both mental/manual, and management/worker. 
This works as a class overdetermination of a symbolic pro-
duction, a middle-class man, but not aristocratic indeed, 
as the man in plate 8 pretends. 
The imbrication entails a history, an education 
for mental labour and management skills. Middle class 
man is sustained by an education in the liberal humanities. 
Thus, 
"A graduate from an Qxbridge Arts degree is 
expected to have acquired four intellectual 
attributes which will be used throught his 
or her life. They are: a knowledge of what 
is mean by scholarship; an ability to think 
with a disciplined mind understanding the 
relationship between theory and evidence; the 
ability to write; and a general grounding in 
the origins and development of European thought 
and civilisation." (2) 
It is this traditional liberal humanist education which is 
challenged in deconstructive reading practices, as is 
pursued in the following section 4.4. 
"Presumably one cannot deconstruct meaning until 
one has learned to construct it; certainly all 
the major deconstructionists are men and women 
who have passed through the pathways of a trad-
itional liberal humanist education. Their work 
derives much of its force and energy from their 
inwardness and familiarity with the values and 
assumptions they call into question." (3) 
In 1964, when plate 9 was issued, and in the con-
text of Town magazine, which addressed those who already 
considered themselves masculine and a part of the middle 
classes, such liberal humanism could be evoked as the back-
ground to the pragmatic overdetermination by business 
practice. Plate 9 evinces a particular construction whose 
deconstruction did not begin to be seriously attempted until 
the 1970's. 
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"The critical deconstruction of enlightenment 
rationalism and logocentism by theoreticians 
of culture, the decentring of traditional 
notions of identity, the fight of women and gays 
for a legitimate social and sexual identity out-
side of the parameters of male, heterosexual 
vision, the search for alternatives in our 
relationships with nature, including the nature 
of our own bodies - all these phenomena ... are 
key to the culture of the 1970's ... " (4) 
Liberal humanist education gives access to high-
status knowledge, whose dominant characteristics might be 
summarised, in an oversimplified way, as follows 
"These are literacy, or an emphasis on 
written as opposed to oral presentation; 
individualism (or avoidance of group work 
or co-operativeness), which focuses on 
how academic work is assessed and is a 
characteristic of both the 'process' of 
knowing and the way the 'product' is presented; 
abstractness of the knowledge and its structur-
ing and compartmentalizing independently of the 
knowledge of the learner; finally and linked to 
the former is what I have called the unrelated-
ness of academic curricula, which refers to the 
extent to which they are 'at odds' with daily 
life and common experice." (5) 
It is this form of knowledge at whose head stands 
philosophy. Philosophy penetrates behind appearances, 
while explaining them in the light of first principles. 
Philosophy takes nothing for granted and_is fully intellectual. 
"Philosophy aims at changing men's lives by 
revealing the truth about things, which is 
very different from what is commonly thought." 
( 6 ) 
In elaborating this discourse contred upon truth, 
philosophy and other modes of Western discourse, fall prey 
to ethnocentrism, logocentrism, phallocentrism and ego-
centrism (7). 
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Business knowledge degrades high-status knowledge, 
yet calls upon the forms of high-status knowledge. The 
imbrication of plate 9 retains writing, the indivudal, the 
man. Writing, however, is overdetermined as work, and as 
work it is part of a generalised economy. 
"The field of political economy, constructed 
exclusively on the two values of exchange and 
use, falls to pieces and must be entirely 
reanalyzed in the form of a Generalized 
Political Economy, which will imply the pro-
duction of symbolic exchange value as the same 
thing and in the same movement as the product-
ion of material goods and of economic exchange 
value. The analysis of the production of 
symbols and culture is not thus posed as exter-
nal, ulterior, or "superstructural" in relation 
to material production; it is posed as a 
revolution of political economy itself, general-
ized by the theoretical and practical intervent-
ion of symbolic exchange value." (8) 
The conditions of a generalised political economy 
make a simple class analysis, in terms of two clearly 
defined opposing classes, difficult to sustain. Since the 
early 1950's the changing forms of capitalist economic 
formations have, by some theorists, been posited as having 
the effect of eroding the class structure of Western 
societies. Hence, it was asserted that, 
"the old sources of tension and class con-
flict are being progressively eliminated and 
rendered irrelevant; that the structure of con-
temporary western societies is being recast in 
a mould of middle-class conditions and styles 
of life that these developments signal the 'end 
of ideology'." (9) 
While plate 9, then, ought to serve as a possible 
imbrication for all adult males in Britain, in fact it 
remains situated in a small circulation magazine. Plate 
9 imbricates the inscribed reader with a situation in which, 
it is presumed, that, 
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"the substantive inequalities of earlier 
capitalism are both diminishing and losing 
their former significance ... for these and 
other reasons, radical dissent is progress-
ively weakened as new patterns of living and 
aspiration negate or cut across the older 
class-bound horizons and loyalties." (10) 
Given this situation, it is further supposed that 
"In so far as power remains concentrated, it no 
longer derives from the accumulation of private 
property, but from control over bureaucratic 
organisations of diverse kinds - public at 
least as much as private - in which authority 
is divorced from wealth. Thus two dimensions 
of inequality no longer coincide." (11) 
The imbrication of plate 9 substantiates this 
novel, presumed, non-coincidence of authority and wealth. 
The power derived from wealth is challenged by that derived 
from the technologised pragmaticisation of knowledge. 
Working hard, then, is a means of wresting control and 
gaining authority in and over the power derived from wealth. 
The pragmatic recommendation may be that travell-
ing by train allows time not to be wasted, but the purpose 
of not wasting time is to engage in a multiple, overdeter-
mined labour. The obvious product is objectified artefacts, 
in this case written documents. Equally, the form of the 
masculinised ego is re-produced, as are class distinctions, 
even if these are no longer simple. 
Control and high-status, both ln 'knowledge' and 
in 'business', accrue to the masculine ego. The masculine 
ego is not a simple symbolic form. It is constituted 
through that overdetermination. It is re-produced through 
the overdetermined labour of business practice, whose 
scene is the site of imbrication in plate 9. 
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Social production in general, then,is overdeter-
mined by this complex category of the masculine, as that 
which stands in the place of and represents the high-status. 
Plate 9 imbricates the inscribed reader in one of the 
scenes of the man's work. 
Plate 10, in contrast, imbricates the inscribed 
reader, the sutured feminine ego-formation, with a scene 
of feminine production. The scene is again, like plate 7, 
constructed as if it were a dream, to reinforce the more 
imaginary labours in which the category of the feminine 
pursues its identification. 
Like an architectural construction, "it's the 
foundation that matters". If the foundation is secure, 
the building stands. So it is with the construction of a 
woman. A woman is a woman's body, there is no question of 
the site of production. Plate 10 makes it plain that a 
woman's body is a construction site. Steel girders are 
like 'pantie-girdles'. They are the framework upon which 
can be hung facades. 
It's the foundation, or it's the fundament, that 
matters. The woman's buttocks are to be re-made by the 
'Liberty Beatnix'. 
"The female body has become industrialised; 
a woman must buy the means to paint on 
(make-up) and sculpt (underwear/clothes) a 
look of femininity, a look which is the 
guarantee of visibility in sexist society 
for each individual woman. Advertisements 
sell the means of production of the look, 
sealing it in a given image of female des-
irability, attainable by means of lip sticks, 
bras, scents and so on ... Magazines provide 
the know-how, techniques and expertiese, 
sealing the association of woman and sexuality 
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in the minds of women themselves. It is 
almost as though woman herself were a 
factory, feeding in the means of production, 
painting on the mask and emerging trans-
formed with value added in the process, a 
commodity ready for consumption." (12) 
The woman is imbricated with an industrial society 
but her labour is lowly, fundamental. 
"women's contribution to the modern world 
can be measured according to their sex 
appeal." (13) 
Woman becomes the image of the desireable as the beautiful. 
This desireability, however, as has been indicated in plate 
7,takes the form of representing the phallus for a certain 
masculinised vision. Woman is powerful only in as far as 
she constructs an appeal to a certain phallicised mode of 
perception. This appeal is constituted, first, by a move-
ment of neutralisation. The girdle covers the woman's body 
and makes of it a screen for projection. Second, the body 
is granted,through projection, the status of the phallus. 
The girdle serves as an element in a possible pragmatic 
strategy for acquiring the insignia of phallic power. 
Woman's productivity is overdetermined as relat-
ively low-status and as, therefore, rendering the feminine 
ego relatively powerless. The imbrication in plate 10 
indicates where she might maximise her productive opportuni-
ties, but this~eaks simultaneously of her overdetermined 
lack of self-determination. Her products, and especially 
her body as product, are overdetermined, as Bourdieu states, 
"In a class society, all the products of a 
given agent, by an essential overdetermination, 
speak inseparably and simultaneously of his 
class - or, more precisely, his position in 
the social structure and his rising or falling 
trajectory - and of his (or her) body - or, more 
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precisely, all the properties, always 
socially qualified, of which he or she 
is the bearer - sexual properties of 
course, but also physical properties, 
praised, like strength or beauty, or 
stigmatized." (14) 
This overdetermined position lS hegemonised in the advert-
isement scene in the direction of the purchasable commodity, 
the 'Liberty Beatnix'. Thus, the complex determinations 
upon social trajectory are made simple, 
"We are made to feel that we can rlse or 
fall through what we are able to buy ... " (15) 
Woman's labour, upon an image construction is 
overdetermined as an economic labour. It is perceived as 
a labour upon sexuality as such. Yet this sexuality, the 
presumed essence of desire, is interwoven with commodities. 
Again, woman's labour, as evidenced in plate 7, engages 
sexual fetishism, or a phallicised sexuality, and commodity 
fetishism, as the representation of social relations in the 
form of relations between things, an economic system over-
determined by the generalised object of exchange, money. 
Thus, plate 10 imbricates the sutured feminine 
ego with a representation through which her sexual/economic 
labour may be performed. 
"We exist as individuals in relation to and 
in the relations of language, the systems 
of meaning and representation in which, 
precisely, we find ourselves ... Sexual re-
lations are relations through language, not 
to a given other sex; the body is not a 
direct immediacy, it is tressed, marked out, 
intrinsically involved with meanings. Of 
course, we can shake our heads, appeal to the 
fact that we know the direct experience of the 
body, two bodies in love, making love. Yet 
'direct experience', 'the body' and so on are 
themselves specific constructions, specific 
notions; the appeal to which is never natural 
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but always part of a particular system, a 
particular representation - and with part-
icular social effects." (16) 
Plate 10, then, hegemonises woman's labour by 
reducing it to a sexual labour. The aim of that labour lS 
to construct an image or representation for a particular 
phallicised perception of the body. The advertisement 
imbricates the sutured feminine ego with that scene of 
labour. It intervenes to assert the value of the 'Liberty 
Beatnix' in the construction of the desired image. In 
doing so, the image which was fetishised becomes cornrnodi-
fied. The image becomes overdetermined by the economic 
system with its articulations of class. 
Woman, therefore, remains at the bottom of a com-
plex system of differentials. The speculary other of plate 
10 claims a certain liberty, a 'beatnick' liberation. This 
points to an overdetermination in the system of marketing 
and advertising itself. Both plates 7 and 10 are strongly 
influenced by American advertising strategies and techniques, 
if not actually produced in New York by an American agency. 
These two plates appear in the context of Honey magazine. 
Both advertisements appeal to the newly constructed youth 
market. 
The liberation hinted at, and situated in the 
first instance in the context of American society, is 'sexual'. 
The liberation is not from the phallicised, masculine dom-
ina ted sexuality but from a sexuality which was, in a 
relatively immediate sense,reproductive in its aim. Sex-
uality was wrested from reproduction, for sexual pleasure. 
This form of sexuality, as plates 7 and 10 show, remains 
phallocentric. 
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Plate 11, on the contrary, imbricates woman in 
the system of sexuality for reproduction. Woman's pro-
duction 1S presented as a functional institution. 
"Woman's function is reproduction. Sexually, 
she is man's object and falls under his order 
and authority. In herself, she is outside of 
the sexual, has no specific sexual being, is 
untouched by sexual feeling. Yet the reality 
is troublesome, disturbing, slips out of true 
with this given creed. What is to be done 
with this contradiction? How is a sexual being 
of women to be acknowledged nevertheless while 
sustaining the image of its non-existence? 
The answer lies in its recognition as disorder ... 
.. if possessed by sexuality woman is close to 
danger, violently overtaken, liable to fits 
and spasms, is in the realm of hysteria - for 
it is as this that hysteria now operates: as 
the sexual representation of women." (17) 
Plate 11 imbricates the sutured ego with the 
scene of woman as wife, the wedding ring, and mother, the 
infant. This is woman's non-hysterical role, a sexual 
function in a phallicised sexuality, which is overdetermined 
by a general economy. 
Plate 11 imbricates the woman, through the speculary 
other, in the family and the horne. The domestic environment 
serves as one of the principal sites for symbolic (re-) 
production. In modern, industrialisedsocieties kinship 
relations and differentiations are overdetermined by 
political economic relations, dominated by the capitalist 
money system. Institutional social relations are overdeter-
mined by the economic in the extended order constituted in 
modern social formations. Thus, economic relations are 
elevated to a position of dominance. It serves as the site 
from which symbolic differentiations are projected and in 
which they are coded and objectified. Thus, 
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"In bourgeois society, material production 
is the dominant locus of symbolic product-
ion; in primitive society it is the set of 
social (kinship) relations." (18) 
This leads to a situation in which, 
"money is to the West what kinship is to 
the Rest. It is the nexus that assimilates 
every other relation to standing in production. II 
(19) 
Woman's sexual (re-) production becomes a relatively 
lowly practice. The family no longer serves as the dominant 
site for the generation of dominant categories. The cat-
egories constructed through family practice are overdeter-
mined in relation to the economy. Woman is offered commod-
ities which pertain to her productions, cared-for-babies, 
and cared-for-homes. The symbolism into which the ego is 
imbricated in plate 11 is not kinship solely or predominantly, 
it is an economic symbolism pertaining to material (maternal) 
productivity. 
" •.. the economy, as dominant institutional 
locus ... throws a classification across the 
entire cultural superstructure, ordering 
the distinction of other sector by the 
oppositions of its own." (20) 
In this way, social relations become, first, pragmaticised 
and, second, commodified. It is therefore a simple project 
to insert a further commodity form into an already prag-
maticised and commodified field of relationships, such as 
family relations have become. 'Johnson's Baby Powder', 
'Johnson's Baby Lotion', 'Johnson's Baby Cream', and 
'Johnson's Baby Soap' can be instituted in the production 
of cared-for-babies. All of these items can be taken as 
representatives of the symbolic token, a token which has 
become an entity and a commodity. 
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"In our culture, money does not represent a 
relation between people as does the 'symbolic 
object'. As the valorizationof an ENTITY, 
money under capitalism represents Imaginary 
relations between things and the 'things' it 
represents are the 'clear and distinct' people 
who are exchanged - as alienated objects - in 
the system. Money isn't simply 'like' the 
solipsistic, schizoid entities we call 'individ-
uals'. It is their general equivalent of 
exchange. In our society, people represent 
labor time, and labor time - whether energy 
or organization - is money. This point is 
obvious, but it nevertheless has to be made: 
if money can rent people, then money 1S people." 
(21 ) 
Thus, Plate 11 seems to imbricate the feminine 
ego in a symbolic exchange in which all signifiers are 
signs of a relation. However, given the economic over-
determination of social relations and symbolic exchange, 
it can be perceived that all signifiers operate in an 
imaginary, pragmaticised exchange. They have become signs, 
not of relations, but of things. These things in turn 
exist under the determination of the generalised object of 
exchange, money. Plate 11 imbricates woman, not in the 
locus of symbolic exchange and kinship relations, but in 
the domain of commercial exchange. It imbricates her, in 
an overdetermined way, with a very lowly position in the 
system of generalised political economy. 
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4.4 TEXTUALITY 4: DECONSTRUCTION 
In this section, while sutures, imbrications and 
overdeterminations are recognised, the seeming inevitability 
of their trajectory is refused. Critical reading relations 
are interposed. The potential conflicts which the texts 
may articulate, when read according to different discursive 
practices, are set out. Inscribed authorisations are 
challenged, while a critical orthodoxy is similarly refused. 
Authority, it is recognised, is not a matter of simple 
decision but of overdetermined practice. Authority is 
established in and through prolonged struggles for power 
in the social. Power itself is a relational and differential 
concept. 
In plate 12, a masculine suture is imbricated with 
a speculary scene indicating colonial man. His imperial 
standing becomes his imperious quality. Imperial power 
seems to emanate from an essence, becoming embedded in his 
self and his material possessions. 
The suture is imbricated in terms of gender, race 
and class. All of these are facets of his imperial position. 
If the characteristic overdetermination is refused, i.e. 
that which assimilates Cusson's Imperial Leather to the 
essential quality of imperial man, the communication from 
the speculary other can be constructed in the following 
terms. 
First, racially, he is a member of the superlor 
white race, 
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"characterised by an "energetic intelligence" 
that sustained their love of freedom, order 
and honour." (1) 
The white race are sUferiorboth to the Blacks and the 
Yellows. 
"Lowest rank was allocated to the Blacks, 
beings dominated by animal passion and 
equipped with very limited intellectual 
and moral capacities. Next carne the Yellows, 
a breed devoted to the achievement of mat-
erial satisfaction, but otherwise typified 
by their apathetic acceptance of mediocrity 
in all things." (2) 
Thus, the superiority encoded as 'fame' and 
'promise' and 'good taste' in plate 12 implies a certain 
racism if it is to be imbricated as imperial. But racism 
has never been a simple phenomenon. Racial difference is 
overdetermined in relation to political and economic interest. 
"Fanon accused (Mannoni) of understating 
the historical depth and incidence of 
racism in European culture and above all, 
castigated him for his blindness to the 
economic and political interests which 
were sustained by colonial racism." (3) 
While the inscribed ego is imbricated with an 
imperial scene, this scene was already, by 1957 when the 
advertisement was printed, a reference to an historical 
past. Plate 12 mythologies reference to an historical 
figure. It does so in terms of his projected fame, promise 
and good taste. The imbrication sits awkwardly in relation 
to the breakdown of the Empire, the formation of the Cornrnon-
wealth, and the irruption of Commonwealth 'immigrants' In 
the homeland, the heart of the (old) Empire. 
"By the massive immigration to our country 
in the past twenty years (since 1945) more than 
a million people of a dozen nationalities have 
erupted in our midst. It was never planned, 
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and was scarcely understood until it had 
already happened. Some came by right of 
political asylUm like the Poles, Hungarians 
or the wretched Anglo-Egyptians after Suez; 
some by holding a Commonwealth passport -
the West Indians, Africans, Maltese, Cypriots 
and Asian groups. Some, like the massive 
Irish contingent, the Australians (60,000 
of them!), New Zealanders and Canadians, were 
scarcely considered as immigrants at all." (4) 
In these conditions, racial difference overdeter-
mined by the system of imperial rule re-emerged in the old 
Empire's heart as a 'colour bar', a bar which serves to 
divide and exclude. 
"Apologists for coloured immigration tend to 
adopt a high moral tone. They talk about the 
historical debt this country owes to places 
which remained Imperial slums while Britain 
exploited agricultural and mineral resources. 
This type of patronising ally is bitterly 
resented by many immigrants .•. Yet despite 
all the pious talk about a multi-racial society 
(the coloured immigrants) are not being treated 
as equal and useful members of society. The 
colour bar in Britain has a discreet and 
evasive quality, and while immigrants are 
tolerated they are certainly not accepted." (5) 
In 1957, then, to a small masculine audience, 
it remained possible to imbricate 'good taste' and future 
prospects ('promise') with Imperialism. By 1964, however, 
it was more opportune to imbricate man, the individual, 
with 'internationalism'. The concept of 'internationalism' 
displaces that of 'imperialism~ a displacement greatly 
encouraged, if not promoted, by the United States who were 
eagre to break down the European nations' Colonial trading 
systems. 
By 1964, some of the more negative discursive 
productions, cited in relation to plate 12, had entered 
into the representation of 'man' himself. No longer could 
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imperial man serve as a positive identification in a world 
marked by the distinctions between purportedly equal 'nations' 
in a newly formulated internationalism. 
Indeed, by 1964 'man' can be wholly displaced as 
figure. In plate 13, he is imbricated with a car. The car 
embodies the man and vice versa. The technological represent-
ation of man, suggested as one possible displacement in 
plate 8, is completed. The identity of car and man can be 
taken for granted so much so that there is no need to 
show the bodily figure of the man. 
A dialogue takes place between the sutured ego 
and the speculary other, i.e. the car. The car speaks 
in many languages, allowing the sutured ego to converse 
with others from many different nations. The car trans-
lates the man himself, as well as translating for the man. 
Plate 13 deconstructs, to a limited extent, plate 
12. Man is reconstructed in the speculary scene of a 
restructured world capitalist order as a technological 
figure. He may still be an individualist but the overdeter-
mined character of his individuality has shifted. Man is 
now situated, in plate 13, in a world order in which America 
is hegemonic, but is not an Imperial power in the sense of 
the older European empires. This new articulation was 
designed to, 
"avoid the systemic international economic 
problems of the interwar periods of crisis. 
The reforms that led to the capital labor 
accord, Keynesian demand management and the 
protective state were aimed at the most serious 
economic problem of the Great Depression: in-
adequate aggregate demand." (6) 
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The new, technological man takes his place in 
the formation of 'late capitalism', as part of the capital-
ist world economy which is, 
"an articulated system of capitalist semi-
capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of 
production linked to each other by capitalist 
relations of exchange and dominated by the 
capitalist world market." (7) 
Under such conditions, the position of techno log-
ical man is secured as part of the 'First World', to which 
second and third class nations are subordinated. The 'First 
World', which is also the 'Free World', is united in its 
opposition to the Communist Bloc. 
If plate 13 consolidates the new position of man 
ln late capitalism, plates 14 and 15 can be used to continue 
the deconstruction of the older and the newer figures of 
man. 
Plate 14, from 1958, addresses the audience of 
advertising practitioners, an audience which is 82% 
masculine in identification (8). It is unambiguously 
presented in plate 14 that the role designated for woman 
is one of subordination. This subordination may no longer 
be so visibly enforced. Women's political project, how-
ever, is still subverted. The subversion is not by the 
physical force which remains as a resource for legal-
juridical authority. The subversion takes place as a 
reconstituting of woman in the role of domestic consumer. 
Woman's education, in terms of her reading and cultural 
practices more generally, is to be refocused upon those 
meaning productions available through advertisements and 
commodity purchasing. 
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Again, the imperial figure of man serves as the 
imaginary authority on whose behalf the force of con-
straint is exercised. Advertisements are conceived to 
remodel constraint and to present constraint as liberation. 
Women, having gained access to the domain of the public are 
to be constrained in terms of how they may develop that 
public role. Women are to be rehegemonised in the domestic, 
through the discursive representations made possible by the 
public media. Advertisements are to partake in this 
rehegemonisation of women, as subject to private property 
and patriarchy. 
"Underneath the growth of privacy, then, was a 
possessive, self-protective individualism rooted 
in a system of competitive private property. 
This integration of the patriarchal family 
system with a system of private property was 
the fundamental grounding of the private; a 
sphere that did not routinely have to give an 
accounting of itself, either by providing 
information about its conduct or justification 
for it. Private property and patriarchy were 
indirectly the grounding of the public ..• 
•.• two major interests are encompassed in 
this enclave of the private (property and 
patriarchy)" (9) 
Women are to be re-privatised, and in becoming 
so both politically subjected and economically subjected. 
They are to be economically subjected to the point of being 
commodified. 
The critique of the private, a domain which over-
determines the public, constraining how statements made in 
public may be understood, interrelates two strands. The 
first is that which seeks to subvert the power of wealth 
in the form of private property, i.e. socialism. The 
second is that which seeks to subvert the power of mascul-
inity in controlling both private and public domains of 
social existence, i.e. feminism. 
" -
2-
Thus, plate 13 rehegemonises man in an inter-
nationalist form, but seeks to imbricate man in a scene 
devoid of socialist ideology and feminist ideology. Man 
inhabits a technologically produced environment, freed 
from political constraints, in a Free World. Plate 14 
hegemonises the threat of feminism and a potential social-
ism. Plate 15 'arrests' a criminal, a criminal who may 
harbour both homosexuality and communism. 
Plate 15 constructs a masculine suture, but 
imbricates, in a confusing way, the ego with both the 
figure of authority and the figure of error. 
One man, the arrested one on the left, depends 
upon the other, who strides forth purposefully looking 
ahead to where he is going and failing to return the look 
of his charge. The sutured ego is imbricated with two 
masculine figures who represent the duality of a single 
figure, the impossibility of the figure of man. That 
impossibility takes on a modern character in plate 15. 
It is both political and sexual at once. 
In theclimate of abipolar world, divided between 
bourgeois individualist liberalism and Marxism-Leninism (10), 
a man cannot be both. Similarly, a man cannot be both 
homosexual and heterosexual. 
"the choices for men are: fetishism, acknowledged 
or denied homosexuality, or 'manhood', which is 
itself a makeshift resolution of the other poss-
ibilities, all of which are contained within it." 
(11 ) 
Given all of these constraints, what emerges, in all his 
glorious infamy, is the figure of the spy. He,who sees 
what he should not see and sells what he should not sell to 
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those who should not know, is captured in plate 15. Plate 
15 undertakes a prodigious labour of containment. 
First, it shows what cannot be shown: male 
homosexuality. Yet it denies that the relationship is 
erotic. The engagement of the two men, or the divided man, 
is one of law enforcement not homosexual attachment. The 
homo-erotic character of the man on the left's look is 
denied by the figure of authority on the right. 
"as Julian Mitchell's recent play Another 
Country communicates quite beautifully, 
homosexuality, however commonly practised 
it may have been especially in public school 
and Oxbridge circles, was in the 1930's 
officially unacceptable, requiring a duplicity 
for those who wished to succeed in "respect-
able" careers." (12) 
A sexual activity is criminalised, and the 
criminal apprehended. The criminal figure in plate 15 
plays upon an historical association, between homosexuality 
and espionage. 
"The language of subversion, espionage and 
homosexuality became a unique blend: its 
images were directly or indirectly suggest-
ive of all or any of these activities. How 
natural, how inevitable, it was that some 
of these young men should go into literature 
and the arts, some into espionage and sub-
version and some into both." (13) 
Thus, plate 15 presents a paranoid figure of 
containment, on the one hand: 
"It should be noted, however, that paranoia 
is defined in psychoanalysis, whatever the 
variations in its delusional modes, as a 
defence against homosexuality." (14) 
On the other hand, it acts as a defence, by 
capturing the spy, against international communism. 
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"The free world faces the mounting challenge 
of international Communism backed by Soviet 
power ..•. The aim of the Soviet bloc is to 
weaken and disrupt the free world. Its instru-
ments are military, political and economic: 
and its activities are world-wide. To meet 
this challenge, the free world must organise 
its resources - moral, military, political, 
and economic - and be ready to deploy them 
wherever the situation demands." (15) 
In the free world, the sanctity of the individual 
is protected from subordination to the State. The free world, 
having defeated the fascist aberration and the tendency 
toward imperialist acquisition, must defend itself against 
communist totalitarianism (16). 
Thus, plate 15 engages with a political philos-
ophy which priorities the concepts of individual and private 
property, such as the self-developmental tradition which 
begins, 
"not from what is good for society or "all 
mankind" but from the individual and his 
need for an anchor in the physical world to 
enable him to impose his will upon it so as 
to express himself as a free and independent 
being. The first tradition accepts the 
individual as given, and justifies private 
property in terms of its efficiency in pro-
viding for his wants and his welfare. The 
second considers the individual as an end 
to be achieved, and justifies property as the 
means by which he forms himself in relation 
to other selves and the world of things." 
(17) 
The figure of man coheres and centres the system 
of representation and communication which advertisements 
construct, if read from the position of consumer. That 
position permits the inscribed intentionality to be 
registered as the overdetermining frame. This allows the 
complex textual construct to be read as a pragmatic com-
munication about a represented commodity in a speculary, 
reflective, scene. 
- ?fi? -
A deconstructive reading of this figure of 
coherence and centering proceeds from the displacement of 
man from centre of Empire to centre of nation, a nation 
overdetermined in relation to American hegemony and 
mUltinational corporations and in opposition to Communist 
totalitarianism. 
Thus, man as self, as individual and as centre 
must be recognised as an imaginary identification in whose 
figure can also be recognised the determinate others whom 
he seeks to deny self-determining existence. Their 
realities are hegemonised according to the orders of the 
real of the individual as man. 
There are the racially other, the other in terms 
of gender, the other in terms of sexual preference, the 
other in terms of those without private property, and the 
other in terms of political-ideological adherence. All of 
these figures are 'contained' or 'arrested' by the figure 
of man. None is allowed to speak save in those terms which 
express an overdetermined, qualified, and hegemonised 
allegiance to that system of economy which is misrecognised 
through the posited attributes and possessions of the man. 
Advertisements permit the construction of complex 
texts which seem to represent social subjects to themselves 
and to one another as if there were differences of gender 
and taste only to distinguish them. Thus, in plate 15, it 
is taste preference alone which separates the men: 'Layton' 
lS differed from 'Carnet'. 
Deconstruction must point the way to the other 
sides of the man's calm certitude, to the senses of betrayal, 
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anger and confusion which are embedded in processes of 
hegemonisation. The scrutiny which the man on the left in 
plate 15 places upon the figure of the law must be taken 
not as a sign of guilt¥admiration but of disbelief, leading 
to the disimbrication from that representation and a 
deconstruction of that hegemonised order of the real. That 
representation is not simply denied, leading to its 
invigorated return, but critically appraised, not as an 
essence but as a set of relations to determinate others 
over whom power is exercised. 
Deconstruction is not identification with the 
repressed or the oppressed. It is a work upon the construct-
ion of the 'real', 'authority' and 'power relations' through 
processes of hegemonisation in and overdetermined social 
order. Thus, the representation in plate 15 is not denied. 
It is treated as a complex construction whose elements engage 
systems in the reiterated reproduction of the real. A 
scrutiny of the constructedness of that figure must be 
reiterated by a work upon those institutional organisations 
which sustain the elements of the construction as reproduc-
ible. 
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The theory constructed and worked in sections 3 
and 4 militates against authoritative closures. What is 
stated here must be taken as a provisional punctuation. 
The thesis set out to show that a particular group of 
texts, while misrecognised as simply a communicative pract-
ice, can still operate as a discursive practice. The dis-
cursive practice interrelates communication, representation, 
commerce and ideology, while admitting the possibility of 
a deconstruction of any determinate meaning production. 
Advertisements, because they are overdetermined, 
cannot be simply communicate. They are not elements in a 
dialogical conversation. Similar to other discourses in 
the media of mass communication they are non-reciprocal In 
character. While advertising as discourse is developed 
primarily in the context of economic institutions' strateg-
ies, when presented to a public they are relatively indet-
erminate. Meaning production is disambignated and closed 
down through the realisation of a communicative practice. 
There is no necessity, however, for any actual social sub-
ject to identify with and to introject the ego position 
which is crucial to the unfolding of that communicative 
practice. This remains the case even while that social 
subject has the hermeneutic skills to recognise the invited 
space for suture. 
By resisting the overdetermining authority of 
marketing practice over advertisements, which guarantees 
the production of the communicative practice, and by 
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holding in reserve the dominance of economic institutions 
which guarantee the authority of marketing, other discursive 
productions become possible. Nevertheless, advertisements 
are constructed in such a way as to make a communicative 
practice seem most obvious. The increasing use of photo-
graphic structures in the period focused can be understood 
as a recognition on the part of advertising practitioners 
of the effectiveness of constituting sutures and imbricat-
ions through photographs. The posited ego and other con-
stituted through photography invites introjection insist-
ently. 
Thus, while advertisements can and do communicate 
and represent, those functions are constituted only in and 
through the operation of an overdetermined discursive social 
practice. The 'other' constituted in imbrication and the 
'real' constituted in overdetermination must be recognised 
as speculary or imaginary representations. As such they 
intervene in the constitution of the socially real, access 
to which is only ever through structures of representation 
overdetermined in social practice. 
Advertising, then, cannot communicate simply or 
directly with locally situated social subjects. They 
must be imbricated with the order of discourse and, through 
discourse, to the extended institutional order of the social. 
Advertising is not, then, a simple response to what locally 
situated social subjects call for. Through advertising, 
social subjects are reconstituted, as are their desires. 
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They are reconstituted in the place of consumers, whose 
desires may be met by commodified forms of social product. 
In this way, the strategic actions of social subjects in 
locally situated histories are interpreted as forms of con-
sumption behaviour. Consumption behaviour, however, is 
not a simple real which is perceived and represented. It 
is constructed in and through marketing practice. 
The ideological movement of marketing dominated 
advertising is two-fold. First, the underlying sameness 
of consumption behaviour is posited as a global phenomenon. 
For example, it is argued that, 
"Advertising is going global to meet the needs 
of an increasingly international market place ... 
Global advertising hastens the day when people 
around the world will drink the same soft 
drinks, ride in the same cars, and soothe their 
throats with the same cough drops," (1) 
Second, differences are reintroduced through the increas-
ing fragmentation of the consumer market. However, such 
differences are understood as distinctions between kinds 
of consumer preference. They do not admit forms of 
cultural conduct which are irreducible to the terms of 
consumption. Whether or not marketing practitioners recog-
nise it, there is a movement towards reducing forms of 
culturally constituted behaviour to being considered 
variations on the fundamental reality of consumption. 
To read advertisements as a communicative pract-
ice reduces them to being effective within the horizon of 
readily commercialised consumption behaviour. It is to 
misrecognise their constitutive effectivity. 
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The analysis of advertisements is designed to 
show the complex operation of discourse, especially public 
discourses presented in the mass media such as advertising. 
Such discourses are not simply communicative, if communicat-
ion is modelled on the dialogic conversation between equal 
individualse Rather, it is suggested that conversational 
discourse might be better understood if considered in 
the light of non-reciprocal discursive practices such as 
advertising. The way in which discursive practices con-
stitute social relations and operate ideologically in 
realising or resisting power relations, may become more 
readily recognisable. 
It is important to understand the character of 
public 'speech', since the issue of how public speech lS 
constrained is crucial to political conceptions of the social, 
such as those which focus parliamentary democracy and which 
seek to found political democracy on the basis of the work-
ings of economic markets: The issue of the ideological 
constitution of individuals in 'free speech'. Discourse, 
as has been argued, is always overdetermined and constrained. 
Discursive resources, in semiotic form, cannot be considered 
a neutral vehicle which may be used freely and equally by 
any social subject. 
Advertising, as discourse, reiterates and hegemonises 
power relations. That is the character of its overdeter-
mined commercial, public, performance if realised as a 
communicative practice solely. The thesis has sought to 
introduce a mode of analysis through which that operation 
is clearly demonstrated and, to a limited extent, reopened 
deconstructively. It is to be insisted, however, that 
- 269 -
deconstruction of one institutional site for securi~g 
hegemonised order is not, in itself, enough. It is 
effective, as deconstruction, only if its strategic 
project is reiterated and extended In prolonged social 
practice, in a whole series of institutional modes and 
sites. This text remains a contribution to resistance 
rather than the conclusion of struggle. 
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